

# U.S. MILITARY COMMITMENTS AND ONGOING MILITARY OPERATIONS ABROAD

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## HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION

SEPTEMBER 9, 2003

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## **U.S. MILITARY COMMITMENTS AND ONGOING MILITARY OPERATIONS ABROAD**

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**TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 9, 2003**

U.S. SENATE  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
*Washington, DC.*

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m. in room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Warner, McCain, Inhofe, Roberts, Allard, Sessions, Collins, Ensign, Talent, Chambliss, Graham, Cornyn, Levin, Kennedy, Byrd, Reed, Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Dayton, Clinton, and Pryor.

Majority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup, professional staff member; Mary Alice A. Hayward, professional staff member; Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff member; Ann M. Mittermeyer, counsel; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member; and Scott W. Stucky, general counsel.

Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic staff director; Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional staff member; Kenneth M. Crosswait, professional staff member; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Maren R. Leed, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, minority counsel; and Peter K. Levine, minority counsel.

Staff assistants present: Leah C. Brewer, Andrew Kent, and Nicholas W. West.

Committee members' assistants present: Christopher J. Paul and Dan Twining, assistants to Senator McCain; John A. Bonsell, assistant to Senator Inhofe; James Beauchamp, assistant to Senator Roberts; Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator Sessions; James P. Dohoney, Jr., assistant to Senator Collins; D'Arcy Grisier, assistant to Senator Ensign; Lindsey R. Neas, assistant to Senator Talent; James W. Irwin and Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistants to Senator Chambliss; Aleix Jarvis, assistant to Senator Graham; Christina O. Hill, assistant to Senator Dole; Russell J. Thomasson, assistant to Senator Cornyn; Mieke Y. Eoyang, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Christina Evans and Terrence E. Sauvain, assistants to Senator Byrd; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Davelyn Noelani Kalipi and Richard Kessler, assistants to Senator Akaka; William K. Sutey, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Todd Rosenblum, assistant to Senator Bayh; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; and Terri Glaze, assistant to Senator Pryor.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER,  
CHAIRMAN**

Chairman WARNER. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. The committee meets this morning to receive testimony on U.S. global military commitments and ongoing military operations. We welcome our witnesses this morning: Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Ambassador Marc Grossman; and General Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

We also are privileged to have with us a special guest here this morning. General Mattis, if you would stand, please. General Mattis is commander of the Marines in country in Iraq. I had the privilege of visiting him in Iraq with a congressional delegation (CODEL), and at some point in time we are likely to have you come forward, General. Thank you.

We meet today, 2 days before the second anniversary of the September 11 attacks on this Nation, terrorist attacks which took the lives of over 3,000 innocent victims and forever changed our sense of security, forever changed the manner in which we in this great Nation will conduct our lives for ourselves, our families, and indeed our Nation's defense posture.

As we reflect this morning on the request by the President for \$87 billion, we should keep in mind, apart from the tragic loss of life, what was the cost of September 11, what is the cost to do everything we can as a Nation to prevent a recurrence of any incident similar to that or others?

Since that fateful day 2 years ago, U.S. military forces, working side by side with coalition partners from around the world, have been engaged in an all-out global war on terrorism in an effort to prevent future terrorists from reaching our shores. As the President stated so eloquently on Sunday evening, and I quote him:

"And for America there will be no going back to the era before September 11, 2001, to false comfort in a dangerous world. We have learned that terrorists attacks are not caused by the use of strength; they are invited by the perception of weakness. The surest way to avoid attacks on our own people is to engage the enemy where he lives and where he plans and where he trains. We are fighting the enemy in Iraq and Afghanistan so that we do not meet him again on our streets, in our cities, in our towns, and in our villages."

What has been accomplished over the past 2 years in the war on terror? That is the question before us today. What are the future tactics, plans, and costs? That is before us today.

I think myself we have accomplished a great deal. The Taliban regime which provided a safe operating base for al Qaeda in Afghanistan no longer controls that nation and has been driven into the hills. Do they appear? Yes, occasionally, but certainly not with the force they once had. They have been replaced by an emerging democratic government. Al Qaeda's training camps in Afghanistan have been destroyed. Many of its top leaders and operatives are dead or in custody, and the remnants again are scattered.

Over the past 2 years, thousands of terrorists around the world have been captured and many terrorist operations have been disrupted. That is progress. In Iraq, Saddam Hussein's reign of terror has ended, never to return. The threat he posed to his people, his neighbors, and indeed to the world has been removed, and Iraq is in the early stages of establishing a democratic form of government representative of the needs of all the Iraqis, not just selected portions of that population. Saddam Hussein doled out the largesse to only a few, and most of all himself.

Much remains to be done in both Iraq and Afghanistan to consolidate our military victories, and we as a Nation are committed to seeing it through to the end, let there be no doubt. We must not lose sight of the many achievements of the past 2 years. I believe, and I think most Americans believe, that the world is a safer place because we and a coalition of partners acted promptly and decisively.

Recent military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are a tribute to the professionalism and dedication of the men and women in the United States Armed Forces and their families. We are proud to have with us today the distinguished Chairman and other military officers as symbols of those achievements by our professional military.

Both operations achieved their basic goals in record time. Their primary military objectives were removing regimes from power that were a threat to the security of the United States and indeed the world. They were led by a team—Secretary of State Colin Powell, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and their deputies, one of whom, Secretary Wolfowitz, is here before us today; and on the military side, General Myers, indeed General Franks, and General Abizaid.

I personally am very proud of that team, to have had the opportunity to work with them. While we have had our differences, I respect them. I commend their leadership, and we are going to stick together to get this job done.

We have assumed extensive post-conflict stability operations that are ongoing and require significant manpower, resources, time, and commitment to fully secure the peace. Has everything gone exactly as envisioned? We all know that is not correct. But when in history has an operation of this magnitude gone exactly as planned?

But now is not the time, in my judgment, to try and assess what went right and what went wrong and who may be at fault for faulty vision. What we should do now is resolve to remain strong behind this President and this team, to do everything we can to cut back on the tragic casualties we are taking, not only loss of life but loss of limb, and to care for those families and to press on as quickly as we can to establish this nation in a security framework so that they can take the nation back, the Iraqis themselves, and to run it.

As we meet this morning, we are ever mindful that the U.S. and Coalition Forces continue to be exposed to significant personal risks through this ongoing phase of operation.

On Sunday the President went before the American people to forthrightly give his views and ask for their continuing support. As part of that thoughtful address to the Nation, the President clearly

stated, "We will do what is necessary," and asked Congress for \$87 billion to fund the ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

I am confident that Congress will support him. It is imperative that Congress, we the representatives of the people, provide the President and the men and women of the Armed Forces and those engaged in the stability operations and the reconstruction the resources they need to fight this war on terrorism. Ultimate victory in this global effort depends on our continuing support.

It is a war we will win. It is a war I am confident the American people will continue to support, provided we continue to give strong leadership.

I heard this morning that there may be a division of opinion about this \$87 billion: support for that portion that goes for the troops, but a question mark on that portion that goes to the reconstruction and the political reconciliation so that the Iraqi people can take over their own government. I am open to listen to those who have ideas, but in my judgment the reconstruction is a direct corollary to the casualties we take. The sooner the electricity is on, the sooner the water is running, the sooner that we give that nation a quality of life over and above what Saddam Hussein allowed his people, in my judgment the sooner the Iraqi people will in greater numbers turn to support the coalition and finish the job. So look at the timetable, those who want to try and change course, on exactly who, how, why, and when we do this reconstruction.

Over the past several months, approximately half the members of this committee took the opportunity to join our forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, and indeed Liberia and other locations around the world. I want to thank them and I urge others to avail themselves of the opportunity, because the on-scene presence not only says to the troops we are with you, but much can be learned and brought back to bear on the decisions that this committee and other committees in Congress have to make.

We have all come away from these visits with our own impressions, and I share my own. First and foremost, as Americans we can take pride in the magnificent performance and the professionalism of our troops. Soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines I met with are doing their jobs and doing them well, often in the harshest of conditions, on land and afloat. It is very clear that our troops understand the importance and the necessity of performing their duty and the enormity of the task and they appreciate the support of the American people. Their morale is strong and they are fully committed to getting the job done.

All of America appreciates the sacrifice they have made, together with their families, and we commend them for the strength that they have shown in the face of the strongest of adversity.

In Iraq, I was encouraged by the level of involvement of other nations, and I fully support the administration's renewed efforts to obtain a new United Nations (U.N.) mandate, which will hopefully result in additional troops from other nations to share the burdens in Iraq. Currently, 29 countries have forces on the ground in Iraq and others have committed to the effort. A Polish division composed of troops from many nations has recently taken over a sector in central Iraq. Significant numbers of Dutch and Italian forces have joined the British division in the south.

Clearly, the significant commitment of U.S. Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as Liberia will have an impact on the ability of the U.S. to meet other military commitments. Discussion has begun about the nature of our future force presence abroad. Last week General Myers was quoted as saying, "We are still in Bosnia, we are still in Kosovo. Should we be there? Should the Europeans pick up more of that? We are in many places, in numbers that perhaps we do not need to be in. Given the new security environment, it cannot be business as usual in the rest of the world." I commend you for that insight, General.

We are greeted this morning by the news of extension of some of our National Guard and Reserve units and others in terms of their period of service in Iraq. All of this ties together to focus attention on the overall size of the forces, and there is a legitimate debate as to whether the in-country force level meets the requirements of the commanders. We expect to hear discussions on that today.

In my opinion, the framework of national security and foreign policy issues before the administration is the most complex since World War II. We are fortunate to have this Defense-State team before us today in public service addressing these challenges. I welcome our witnesses.

Senator Levin.

#### **STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN**

Senator LEVIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming our witnesses today.

As we meet, Iraq is anything but secure. Attacks on Americans continue. Just within the last month, the Jordanian embassy was bombed, the U.N. headquarters in Baghdad was bombed, the Shiite mosque in Najaf was bombed, a Sunni mosque in Baghdad was attacked by gunmen last Friday, and there are reports that al Qaeda and sympathetic foreign fighters are infiltrating Iraq to attack U.S. and coalition personnel.

Our military forces are stretched thin. Over 180,000 are fighting the war in Iraq or supporting it from Kuwait and other Persian Gulf states. Another 10,000 are conducting combat and stability operations in Afghanistan. At the same time we are helping to maintain the peace in Liberia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Of course, we have thousands of troops deployed in South Korea, dedicated in war plans to the defense of that nation in a region that is becoming ever more volatile with the North Korean drive to obtain and develop nuclear weapons.

We read in the paper this morning that thousands of National Guard and Reserve troops in Iraq and the Gulf area are going to have their tours of duty extended, and that is indeed very troubling news to people back in all of our States.

Sunday night the President finally came forward with the amount that he will ask in a supplemental appropriation request for fiscal year 2004 for military operations and reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan, \$87 billion. This huge sum is a bitter pill for the American people to swallow in a year when the President's budget falls billions short in funding education programs and the No Child Left Behind Act; proposes to cut highway funding by \$2.5



billion from current levels; when the administration proposes to cut after-school programs by \$400 million, or 40 percent, from this year's level; when it proposes new costs on veteran's health care programs that will be a real hardship for those who have served our country in uniform in the past; proposes huge cuts in funding for programs to help small- and middle-sized manufacturing firms at a time when we are losing tens of thousands of manufacturing jobs in this country every month.

This \$87 billion comes on top of the \$79 billion appropriated for those purposes in this fiscal year. It is ironic to note that administration officials denounced Mr. Lindsey's estimate that the cost of the war before it was launched would be in the range of \$100 to \$200 billion. We are already in the upper reaches of that estimate for the first 2 years of a long commitment.

Secretary Wolfowitz, you told Congress in March that, "We are dealing with a country that can really finance its own reconstruction, and relatively soon." Talk about rosy scenarios. Before this committee, when senior military leaders tried to give us realistic estimates that Iraq will require substantial numbers of U.S. troops for the foreseeable future, they were contradicted and at times ridiculed by the civilian leadership of the Department of Defense (DOD).

It has been clear from the beginning that the United States cannot do all of this alone. The U.S. needs the support of the international community in Iraq, including the troops of Muslim nations, not only to share the burden, but also to change the perception of many Iraqis from that of a western occupation to that of an international effort to stabilize and rebuild their country.

The administration was long overdue in recognizing the need for the increased involvement of the world community through the United Nations in Iraq. The administration only belatedly and begrudgingly now has gone back to the United Nations for an explicit mandate, a mandate that many countries such as Pakistan, Turkey, and India have said for months that they needed if they were going to send troops to Iraq.

The administration's task is now more difficult because it delayed so long. Their go-it-alone chickens are coming home to roost. Ninety percent of the troops in Iraq are American troops and probably a larger percentage of reconstruction funds are going to be American if the administration's proposal is adopted, unless we change the context, unless we change the dynamic in Iraq, to one of an international community effort with the support of the United Nations.

But if the administration is going to win international support, it is going to have to be willing to provide a substantial and meaningful U.N. role in the political development of a new Iraqi government and in the reconstruction of Iraq.

The issue, by the way, is not whether there will be a unified military command under a U.S. commander. There must be and there will be. We have the dominant share of the troops. There is no doubt about that issue. But based upon my visit to U.N. headquarters in New York yesterday, my meetings with our U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., John Negroponte, and with U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, I do not believe that we will receive a sub-

stantial contribution of troops and resources from other nations unless the administration is willing to give the United Nations a substantial and meaningful role in the civilian side of the reconstruction effort.

It is imperative that we do so, so that we will be clearly exposing the lie that the jihadists use to attract soldiers for their army of terror, that the west intends to dominate a Muslim country.

Congress will provide the funding to give our troops what they need, let there be no doubt about that. But before providing reconstruction funds, partly to assure that those funds can be effectively spent in an effort that will be successful, we must assure ourselves that the administration is willing to give more than lip service to enlisting the support of key additional nations in providing troops and resources for the long struggle that lies ahead in Iraq.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much.

Several members have asked for time for opening statements, but I had to make the judgment call that we would proceed directly to our witnesses. In that context, I will extend the time for a questioning period to enable members to add some observations prior to their questions.

Secretary Wolfowitz.

#### **STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL WOLFOWITZ, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I have submitted a fairly long statement that I will put in the record and I will try to give you a reasonably short summary.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. The full text of all statements will be incorporated in the record.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. One of the things that is most important for troops facing danger on the front lines is the knowledge that their dedication and sacrifice is appreciated by the people of America. On behalf of the men and women who serve our country so faithfully and so well, let me begin by expressing thanks to Congress for the bipartisan support that you give our Armed Forces.

Just 2 years removed from the most brutal attack on our Nation's soil since Pearl Harbor, we remain a Nation at war. We fight a threat posed by an enemy that hides in the shadows and has burrowed into scores of countries around the globe. With the help of a coalition of some 90 nations, we have gone after that adversary of freedom wherever he may be found, using every resource at our command, including our instruments of diplomacy, intelligence, law enforcement, financial influence, and of course every necessary weapon of war, to defeat the global terror network.

It might be worth mentioning, Mr. Chairman, that I just got an unclassified summary from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of where we stand in that larger war, and let me just read two sentences from it: "2 years after the September 11 attacks, al Qaeda's central leadership is reeling from the impact of the counterterrorist successes of the U.S. and our allies. The central leadership of al Qaeda is at growing risk of breaking apart, as our blows against the group create a level of disarray and confusion throughout the

operation that we have not seen since the collapse of the Taliban in late 2002.”

I think that is a good news story. I guess one should also remember that in war good news can be followed by bad news. But I think the point is that we are moving to victory.

Like World War II and the Cold War, this war is being fought on a global stage. Like those previous conflicts, the stakes are enormous and our very freedom is threatened. However, we also need to realize that this war is different from any previous war. If we react based on experiences from past conflicts or from prior peacekeeping experiences, we are likely to act incorrectly in many cases. We face a new situation and we need to constantly think anew about it.

At the Pentagon, just 1 year removed from sealing the horrible gash that the terrorists made in our outer wall, the memory of our lost comrades remains strong. Our military and civilian forces have not forgotten whom we are fighting and what we are fighting for. They above all know what is at stake.

It is a big job. It is going to take patience and time and determination. It will take more than killing and capturing terrorists and dismantling terrorist networks, as important as that is. It also requires winning on what I would call the second front of the war on terror, what the President called in his State of the Union message building a just and peaceful world beyond the war on terror, and particularly in the Muslim world.

We do not start a job that we cannot finish, and when we do start a job we give it our best. That is the American way. As the President said on Sunday night: “Our strategy in Iraq has three objectives: destroying the terrorists, enlisting the support of other nations for a free Iraq, and helping Iraqis assume responsibility for their own defense and their own future.”

“First,” he said, “we are taking direct action against terrorists in the Iraqi theater, which is the surest way to prevent future attacks on coalition forces and the Iraqi people. Second, we are committed to expanding the international cooperation in the reconstruction and security of Iraq, just as we are in Afghanistan. Third, we are encouraging the orderly transfer of sovereignty and authority to the Iraqi people. Our coalition came to Iraq as liberators,” the President said, “and we will depart as liberators.”

I would like to focus in these brief opening remarks on three critical areas where we seek the support of Congress and particularly of this committee: First specific issue, obtaining the resources and the authority to train and equip and field foreign military forces fighting along side our own; second, to give us the flexibility that we have asked for to reduce the stress on active duty end strength by making it easier to convert military jobs to civilian jobs; and most important, most demanding, to support the President’s request expressed so forcefully Sunday night for the resources needed to wage and win this war. We need resources for our military. We also need resources to win that second battle front, both in Afghanistan and Iraq, to help those people build new and free countries that will remain free of instability and terrorism and to send a message to the world, especially to our enemies, that we have the staying power to finish the job.

Concerning the first point, General Abizaid and his commanders have said repeatedly that they not only do not need more troops, they do not want more American troops. What they do want are more international troops to share the burden of providing stability forces. But most of all what they want are more Iraqi troops, because it is their country that we have liberated and it is they who need to take over the main security tasks.

In July, when I visited the marines in southern Iraq, the commander of the First Marine Division, Major General Jim Mattis, who, as the chairman noted, is here with us today, told me how he had sent some of his 15,000 troops home already because he had enough of them to do the job and he did not want what he called "the reverberations of a heavy footprint" that a large army requires. He said that if you want more people on your side, do not bring in more Americans.

General Abizaid mentioned in his briefings here last week that what we really need are more Iraqis fighting with us. We have begun recruiting and training Iraqis for an Iraqi Civilian Defense Corps to take over tasks such as guarding fixed sites and power lines.

It is the same with former New York City Police Chief Bernie Kerik, who just volunteered for 4 months helping Iraqis rebuild their police force. He favors empowering Iraqis over sending more American troops. He said if you triple the number of coalition forces, "you will probably triple the attacks on the troops."

The future is not in the military, but in getting control back in the hands of the Iraqi people. We are making rapid progress in that area. We have gone from no Iraqis fighting with us when Baghdad fell to currently more than 55,000—55,000, Mr. Chairman, serving with us and providing security for their country. That makes Iraqis the single largest member of the coalition after the United States, and they are taking on the hard missions. They are fighting and taking casualties with us. Just a few days ago, one of them was killed by a suicide bomber attempting to attack our troops.

Those numbers are predominantly Iraqi police, some 40,000. But we have started two new formations, the Iraqi Facilities Protective Service and the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps. By January we plan to have 15,000 members of the Civil Defense Corps and 20,000 members of the Facilities Protective Service. Those numbers, as well as the police numbers, can be increased more rapidly with the resources that the President is asking Congress to provide.

We should not, however, find that we are held back by a shortage of money or authority to give those willing and able to fight on our side the proper training and equipment to get the job done.

On converting military jobs to civilian jobs, we ask Congress to give us the flexibility to make it easier to do that because it would help relieve some of the current stress on the Active-Duty Force. Right now the complexities of putting civilians in the thousands of jobs that do not need to be performed by men and women in uniform puts unnecessary strain on our uniformed personnel. I could also add, Mr. Chairman, from personal experience, that it makes it more difficult to recruit the great talent pool that we have out

in this country among Iraqi Americans and Afghan Americans who are ready and willing to serve either as civilians or as military.

In the current situation, bringing more troops on line by increasing our end strength will not provide a short-term answer. It takes time to recruit and train people and any increase we put into effect now would have no appreciable effect for some time to come. If the current strain on our military forces reflects a temporary spike from an increase in wartime operations tempo, it would be better to resist increasing forces for the long term because doing so will impose a sizable personnel cost in the out years that will inevitably come at the expense of other things that our Armed Forces need.

What can deliver results more quickly are the things we are looking at to reduce the stress on our current end strength. That includes an examination of our entire global footprint, as you just suggested in your remarks, Mr. Chairman. It means looking at how to make adjustments in the active-Reserve mix so that particular portions of our force, and particularly specific portions of our Reserve Force, are not inordinately strained. It means looking at how we can shift some jobs performed by people in uniform to civilians who can do them just as well or perhaps better.

We are asking you now to help us with our proposed national security personnel system. The fact that we are fighting a tough and sustained war on terrorism only makes the need to take that step even more pressing.

But finally and most important, Mr. Chairman, we are asking you to provide substantial means to fight and win this war. The bulk of the President's request, some \$66 billion, will be dedicated to ensuring that our men and women in uniform have the resources they need to complete their missions in the war on terror. The rest, \$21 billion, would help build safe, stable, and self-governing societies in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In recent weeks, many of you have said that even if this is a formidable venture, even if it costs substantial resources, it is important enough to our country, to our security, to our national interest, to merit Congress's full support. The costs are large, but it is a battle that we can win and it is a battle that we must win, because victory in this battle will be a major victory in the war on terrorism and a major defeat for the global terrorist networks.

As large as these costs are, they are still small compared to just the economic price that the attacks of September 11 inflicted, to say nothing of the terrible loss of human life. Even those costs are small in comparison to what future, more terrible terrorist attacks could inflict.

By those actions and by what Congress says, you can help us send the message to the world and particularly to our enemies that America is behind our troops, that America has the staying power to fight this war on terrorism to victory.

The Baathist bitter-enders and their foreign terrorist allies believe that if they can inflict casualties on us, as in Beirut and Somalia, we will give up and go home. We know that Osama bin Laden saw Somalia as an example of how Americans can be driven out by inflicting casualties. We know that Saddam Hussein told Ambassador April Glaspie in 1990 that he could take massive casualties and we could not stand even a few.

The sooner these terrorists and Baathists understand clearly that our will cannot be broken and that the Iraqi people, despite hardship and difficulty, will persevere in building their new society, the sooner we will win. That is why it is so urgent that Congress pass this supplemental request, and I would encourage speedy action when the request is formally submitted, because just as the speedy action of Congress after September 11 sent a strong message to friends and enemies alike and to our troops, so too a rapid response now will send that same message, and particularly to the troops who are giving us 100 percent. They need to know that we are behind them 100 percent.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to join you in expressing my thanks and the thanks of our troops for the special efforts, for the special efforts that members of this committee and Congress more generally have made to visit Iraq. Your visits have been important not only for the morale of our men and women; they have also given you an opportunity to get a much clearer picture of the situation on the ground.

The common experience of almost everyone I have talked to who goes to Iraq seems to be that, while we all see the problems that are so frequently reported in the press, we also see a great deal of good news. In the case of Iraq, where the only news for 35 years was horrible news, the remarkable amount of good news is indeed a story.

It is impossible to generalize about Iraq, Mr. Chairman. I am afraid when a bomb goes off in one place people get an impression that the whole country is about to come apart. The truth is—and I suppose when I say it I should knock on wood—one does not know what tomorrow will bring. But the truth is that so far the predominantly Shia south has been remarkably stable and I would say far more stable than most pre-war predictions would have given you. The mixed ethnic Arab-Turkish-Kurdish north has also been remarkably stable, again contrary to fears many of us had that we might face large-scale ethnic conflict.

Our problems, and they are real, have largely been concentrated in the Baathist areas in central Iraq and parts of Baghdad. I have tried in my statement at some length to give some feel for that wide variation. I am not going to take you through it now, but I would like to mention southern Iraq, and Najaf in particular, partly because it was in the news and partly because General Mattis is here and if you wish to hear more from him he can tell you much more than I can.

But it is interesting, I think, what stunning successes the Marines achieved in those two cities, Najaf and Karbala, the holiest cities of Shia Islam. It is a success that can be perceived, I think, even despite the recent tragic bombing in Najaf. That event of course was a terrible tragedy and has contributed to unease and fear in Iraq, and that is precisely what the people who did it intended, and as far as we know they were probably outsiders.

It does not take many people to plant a car or a truck bomb. They have done that here in the United States. To me, the real news has been the remarkable calm and restraint that Iraqi Shia have shown in the wake of that horrible provocation. Some hundreds of thousands of people came out to witness the funeral pro-

cession of Ayatollah Hakim as it passed, with no major violence reported. Fears have been expressed that this horrendous act could lead to attacks by Shia on Sunni, but so far at least that has not happened.

Last week, General Abizaid told reporters that, after being in the United States a week and a half and reading news reports on conditions in Iraq, it could lead him to think that perhaps he should go back to Iraq, he said, and find someone to surrender to. Yet when he talks to our troops, well-informed by first-hand knowledge, he said, "They are so confident and so positive that it takes me only about 30 minutes," the General said, "to understand that we have this under control."

Of course, there are still many challenges remaining for our troops and, as our commanders consider military operations in Iraq, there are at least two things they tell us they would like more of. Number one is Iraqis fighting to secure their own liberty, as I mentioned earlier. The number two critical item is forces of other countries, and we are making progress there as well.

So far, close to 30 nations have sent close to 23,000 personnel to Iraq. Over 40 nations have pledged more than \$3 billion in assistance. In southern Iraq, Polish forces have assumed command of an international division and we are hoping to add another division above and beyond that. The President's request will provide some \$800 million to support the troops of our coalition partners who need that help to provide support.

In the wake of the bombing on the U.N., we have a new opportunity to get a more extensive resolution from the U.N. that will make it easier for those countries that are contributing to continue to do so and hopefully easier for new countries to enter as well.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to conclude by mentioning something that General Mattis said to me when I visited Iraq in July. He said the people that presented the fiercest opposition to them as they drove north in that phase of major combat operations were the Fedayeen Saddam, a group of thugs with a cult-like dedication to Saddam Hussein who, though their numbers are reduced, are still a problem, and foreign terrorists.

I asked him: "How did you know that foreigners were fighting?" He said: "Well, we found a lot of foreign passports on the battlefield." He was good enough to bring a few of these that he found back with him. This is one, a foreigner who came into Iraq on March 24 through Syria—not a Syrian, but through Syria. The entry permit on his passport said he came to, "volunteer for jihad."

Here is another one who came into Iraq through Syria, the same crossing point. The entry permit said "to join the Arab volunteers." Here is a third one that came in on April 7.

In other words, from the very early stages of the war foreign terrorists were coming into Iraq, obviously with the full knowledge and cooperation of the Iraqi government, and sent to the front lines to fight Americans. They are still there. Others are coming. Getting better border controls is one of our important objectives.

But I think it is a strong illustration of the major threat that we face today. As the intelligence briefings put it, it is the combination of former regime loyalists and foreign terrorists. The level of cooperation between them is something that is hard to determine.

There is some, we know. There is probably a lot more that we do not know.

The foreign terrorists, Mr. Chairman, who go to Iraq to kill Americans understand this: If killing Americans leads to defeat and the restoration of the old regime or any new tyranny, it would score an enormous strategic victory for terrorism and for the forces of repression and intolerance, rage and despair, hatred and revenge. As the President told members of the American Legion recently: "Terrorists know that a democratic Iraq in the Middle East would be a further defeat for their ideology of terror."

Iraqis understand this. Along side us, they are working hard to fight the forces of anger and helplessness and to seize this historic opportunity to move their country forward.

When I met with General Abizaid when we were both in Iraq in July, he put the battle in Iraq into a larger perspective that I think is worth quoting. I would remind everyone too, as most of you know, that he is not only a distinguished general, he is a real Middle East expert, a fluent Arabic speaker who has spent many years in that part of the world.

The general said: "The whole difficulty in the global war on terrorism is that this is a phenomenon without borders. The heart of the problem is in this particular region and the heart of the region happens to be Iraq. If we cannot be successful here, we will not be successful in the global war on terrorism."

"Success in Iraq," the general said, "offers a chance, when you combine it with initiatives in the Arab-Israeli theater and initiatives elsewhere, to make life better, to bring peace to an area where people are very, very talented and resources are abundant, especially here in Iraq."

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, America's troops and those of our coalition partners, among whom I would emphasize are the Iraqi people themselves, are determined to win, and they will win if we continue to give them the moral and the material support they need to do the job. As the President said, our forces are on the offensive. As Army Vice Chief of Staff General Jack Keane said in testimony here: "They bring the values of the American people to this conflict. They understand firmness. They understand determination. But our troops also understand compassion. Those values are on display every day as they switch from dealing with an enemy to taking care of a family."

I have seen the troops in Iraq, as many of you here have as well, and I think you would all agree General Keane is absolutely right.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Wolfowitz follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. PAUL WOLFOWITZ

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: One of the things that is most important for troops facing danger on the front lines is the knowledge that their dedication and sacrifice is appreciated by the people of America. On behalf of the men and women who serve our country so faithfully and so well, let me begin by expressing thanks to Congress for the bipartisan support that you give our Armed Forces.

The enemy are people who show no mercy toward women or children. They are people who kill Arabs and Indonesians and Iraqis and Afghans, not just Americans and Europeans and Australians.

Although they claim to act in the name of Islam, they attack not only churches and synagogues, but mosques as well. They pride themselves on being people who love death above life. They fear democracy because, as one recent al Qaeda publica-



tion makes clear, in their view, the goal of democracy is to “make Muslims love this world, forget the next world and abandon jihad.” Evidently, they are not happy that citizens of democracies can freely choose to remain faithful to their religious beliefs and traditions—apparently in their view, religion can survive only if it is imposed by tyranny and terror.

#### AMERICA: A NATION AT WAR

It is fitting that, during this week of September 11, we gather in this seat of American democracy to take stock of America’s efforts since that tragic day, in the global war on terrorism.

Just 2 years removed from the most brutal attack on our Nation’s soil since Pearl Harbor, we remain a Nation at war. We fight a threat posed by an enemy that hides in the shadows and has burrowed into scores of countries around the globe. With the help of a coalition of some 90 nations, we’ve gone after this adversary of freedom wherever he may be found, using every resource at our command—including our instruments of diplomacy, intelligence, law enforcement, financial influence, and, of course, every necessary weapon of war to destroy and defeat the global terror network.

Like World War II and the Cold War, this war is fought on a global stage. Like those previous conflicts, the stakes are enormous and our very freedom is threatened. However, we also need to realize that this war is different from any previous war. If we react based on experiences from prior conflicts—or from prior peacekeeping experiences—we are likely to act wrong in many cases. We face a new situation and we need to think anew about it.

I’ve traveled to Afghanistan and Iraq, as have many of you here, and I think you’ll agree, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, that the men and women of America’s Armed Forces support this national endeavor with the greatest pride, their very best efforts, a clear understanding of their mission, and the strongest possible determination to win.

At the Pentagon, only 1 year removed from sealing the horrible gash the terrorists made in its outer wall, the memory of our lost comrades remains strong; our military and civilian forces have not forgotten whom we are fighting and what we are fighting for. They, above all, know what’s at stake.

If you go to the Memorial Chapel in the Pentagon, which is located at the restored site of the deadly impact, you’ll find that service members and civil servants, as well as other Americans who come to visit, to this very day, write their thoughts into a book there—they leave their condolences for those lost at their posts, killed simply because they were defending America. Visitors put into words their faith that America will prevail over the forces that would destroy freedom.

We will prevail. We will prevail because we’re the people who meet adversity head on and come out better for it. When the terrorists attacked, they seem to have thought we were a weak people, grown used to comfort, and softened by everything we enjoy in this great Nation. But, since September 11, they’ve come to learn just how wrong they are.

We rebuilt the Pentagon. The builders who labored so tirelessly to put it back together made it better than it was before. That’s the American way.

We fought back. When the time came to make a choice, America took the fight to those who would rob us and others of our freedom. We acted decisively to keep gathering threats from becoming even more deadly attacks on the American people—because sitting back and hoping we don’t get hit again is not a strategy.

We worked with those dozens of countries, exchanging intelligence, closing bank accounts to keep funds from moving to terrorists; sharing information and police records, keeping people from crossing borders—to keep applying pressure across the globe. Of course, we’re working with our coalition partners in Afghanistan and Iraq and in other regions of the world to root out terrorists. It’s a big job, and it’s going to take patience and time and determination.

It will take more than killing and capturing terrorists and dismantling terrorist networks—as important as that is. It also requires winning on what could be called the second front of the war on terror, what the President called “building a just and peaceful world beyond the war on terror,” particularly in the Muslim world.

We don’t start a job we can’t finish. When we do start a job, we give it our best. That’s the American way.

As the President said on Sunday night: “Our strategy in Iraq has three objectives: destroying the terrorists, enlisting the support of other nations for a free Iraq and helping Iraqis assume responsibility for their own defense and their own future. First, we are taking direct action against the terrorists in the Iraqi theater, which is the surest way to prevent future attacks on coalition forces and the Iraqi people.

Second, we are committed to expanding international cooperation in the reconstruction and security of Iraq, just as we are in Afghanistan. Third, we are encouraging the orderly transfer of sovereignty and authority to the Iraqi people. Our coalition came to Iraq as liberators and we will depart as liberators.”

#### HELPING WIN THE WAR ON TERROR

To help this Nation finish what it has begun and continue to victory in the war on terror, I'm here today to ask for help in three critical areas:

1. Obtaining the appropriation and the authority to train and equip foreign military forces;

2. Giving us the flexibility we've asked for to reduce the stress on active duty end strength by making it easier to convert military jobs to civilian jobs; and,

3. No single thing is more important or more demanding than supporting the President's request, expressed so forcefully Sunday night, for adequate resources to wage and win this war. We need resources for our military, we also need resources to win that second battle front, both in Afghanistan and Iraq, to help those people build new and free countries that will remain free of instability and terrorism—and to send the message to the world, especially to our enemies, that we have the staying power to finish the job.

#### *Training and equipping foreign military forces*

In the authorization bill, we asked Congress to provide us with \$200 million in authority to provide assistance or support to foreign nations aiding U.S. military operations to combat terrorism. We intend to use this authority to train and equip foreign forces that are fighting alongside our forces—and often in place of our forces—in the war on terrorism. Both the House and Senate deleted that provision from the bill. While we have been asking on an urgent basis for the conference committee to restore this authority, we will undoubtedly be requesting it again, and probably on a larger scale, in the supplemental request that the President spoke about Sunday night. However, I would still urge the conference to consider restoring our original request because it is impossible sitting here to predict that Iraq and Afghanistan will be the only places in the world where well trained and equipped foreign forces fighting alongside our own could help our forces be more effective and save American lives.

To fight the kind of war we face, we need maximum flexibility to benefit from the effect of foreign military forces who share our goals. We can't do it alone. Nowhere is this more clear than in Iraq.

General Abizaid and his commanders have said repeatedly that not only don't they need more troops, they don't want more American troops. They do want more international troops to share the burden of providing stability forces and to reduce the political liability of a U.S.-only occupation. But most of all, what they want are more Iraqi troops because it is their country that we have liberated and it is they who need to take over the main security tasks.

In July, the commander of the 1st Marine Division, Major General Jim Mattis, told me how he'd sent some of his 15,000 troops home already because he had enough of them to do the job, and he didn't want what he called the “reverberations of a heavy foot print” that a large army requires—the fuel, the food, the equipment, and all the materials a sizable force in place requires. He said that if you want more people on your side, don't bring in more Americans.

As General Abizaid mentioned in his briefings here last week, what we really need are more Iraqis fighting with us. We've begun recruiting and training Iraqis for an Iraqi civilian defense force to take over tasks such as guarding fixed sites and power lines.

It is the same with former New York City Police Chief Bernard Kerik, who just completed 4 months helping Iraqis rebuild their police force. He favors empowering Iraqis over sending in more troops. He said: If you triple the number of coalition forces, you'll probably triple the attacks on the troops. The future is not in the military but in getting control back in the hands of the Iraqi people.”

Currently we have more than 55,000 Iraqis serving with us in providing security for their country, *making Iraqis the single largest member of the coalition after the United States. These Iraqis are fighting with us and taking casualties with us.* Just a few days ago, one of them was killed by a suicide bomber attempting to attack our troops.

Their numbers are made up of roughly 40,000 members of the Iraqi police, as well as members of the new Facility Protection Service, the new Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, and the border guards. By January, we plan to have 15,000 members of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, and 20,000 members of the Facility Protection Service.

With additional resources, those numbers could be expanded further, because there is no shortage of Iraqis willing to serve. We also have plans to field 66,000 police and 3 divisions of the new Iraqi Army which could be speeded up substantially with the additional resources the President has called for.

Iraqis want to do their part to help secure public order and create a civil society. In fact, some 50 Iraqis have already died and many more have been wounded working with us to do just that.

We should not find that we are held back by a shortage of money or authority to give those willing and able to fight on our side the proper training and equipment to do the job.

#### *Converting military jobs to civilian jobs*

Along with preparing more Iraqis to fight with us, giving us the flexibility to make it easier to convert military jobs to civilian jobs—my second point—would help relieve some of the current stress on the Active-Duty Force. Right now, the complexities of putting civilians in the thousands of jobs that don't need to be performed by men and women in uniform puts unnecessary strain on our uniformed personnel. Today, as some thousands of uniformed personnel perform non-military jobs, we are calling up Reserves to help deal with the global war on terror.

In the current situation, bringing more troops on line by increasing our end strength is not the answer. It takes time to recruit and train people, and any increase we put into effect now would have no appreciable effect for some time to come. If the current strains on our military force reflect an inevitable, yet temporary, spike from an increase in wartime operations tempo, it would be better to resist increasing forces for the long-term. If it turns out that an increase was unnecessary, a sizeable increase in personnel costs would come at the expense of other things our Armed Forces need.

What makes more sense—and can deliver results more quickly—are the kinds of things we're looking at to reduce the stress on our current end strength, including reexamining our entire global footprint, looking at how best to make adjustments in the active/Reserve mix, and most of all, looking at how we can shift some jobs performed by the military that would be more appropriately be done by civilians.

We realize that achieving the goal of reforming the Defense Department's civil service system requires some bold moves to constitute real transformation. We are asking you now to help us take such a bold step and help us with our proposed National Security Personnel System. That we are fighting a tough and sustained war on terrorism only makes the need to take that step to reform our personnel system even more pressing.

#### *Providing the necessary resources*

That we fight this war to win is why, in his address to the Nation Sunday evening, President Bush announced his intention to submit a request to Congress for additional funds to pay for military and intelligence operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere in the war on terror and to help pay for the reconstruction of both nations.

The bulk of the President's request (\$66 billion) will be dedicated to ensuring our men and women in uniform have the resources they need to complete their missions in the war on terror. The rest (\$21 billion) would help build safe, stable, and self-governing societies in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In recent weeks, many of you have agreed that even if this is a formidable venture, even if it costs substantial resources, it is important enough to our national interests to merit Congress's full support.

As the President said to the Nation on Sunday, the undertaking in Iraq is "difficult and costly—yet worthy of our country, and critical to our security." This undertaking is so critical because, as the President said, "Iraq is now the central front" in the war on terror. "Enemies of freedom," he said, "are making a desperate stand there—and there they must be defeated."

There's no question that a powerful signal will go out to the terrorists and their allies that defeat in Iraq will be theirs when Congress acts quickly on the President's request.

For Iraq, the roughly \$51 billion of the total amount the President has requested for military expenses will be key to eliminating the remnants of Saddam's regime, as well as the foreign terrorists who've been fighting in Iraq. The President will request \$20 billion to help in Iraq's transition to self-government, and to create the conditions that will encourage economic investment. Iraq's infrastructure was badly decayed. It is estimated that between \$50–\$75 billion will be needed to address the infrastructure's decades of malicious neglect. Roughly \$5 billion will go to addressing security, so crucial to overall success, by training people who can guard borders

and enforce customs laws, as well as a new Iraqi army, police force, and local civilian defense corps.

As the President said on Sunday, this victory will require us to commit “years and resources,” just as in the aftermath of the Second World War, when we helped rebuild Germany and Japan. But that effort and investment, he reminded us, “has been repaid in three generations of friendship and peace. America today accepts the challenge of helping Iraq in the same spirit we have helped others.”

The costs are large, but it is a battle that we can win and we must win. Because victory in this battle will be a major victory in the war on terrorism and a major defeat for the global terrorist networks. As large as these costs are, they are still small compared to just the economic price that the attacks of September 11 have inflicted, to say nothing of the terrible loss of human life. Even those costs are small in comparison to what future more terrible terrorist attacks could inflict.

#### *America is behind the troops*

By those actions and what Congress says, you can help us send the message to the world, and particularly to our enemies, that America is behind her troops, and has the staying power to fight this war on terrorism to victory.

The Baathist bitter-enders and their foreign terrorist allies believe that if they inflict casualties on us, like in Beirut and Somalia, we will give up and go home.

We know that Osama bin Laden saw Somalia as an example of how Americans can be driven out by inflicting casualties. We know that Saddam Hussein told Ambassador April Glaspie in 1990 that he could take casualties and the Americans could not.

When the terrorists exploded a bomb outside a shrine in Najaf, and when they detonated a bomb in the U.N. Headquarters, the men and women killed weren't the only targets.

Terrorists were aiming a blow at something they hate even more—the prospect of a country freed from their control and moving to become an Iraq of, by, and for the Iraqi people. Terrorists recognize that Iraq is on a course towards self-government that, once achieved, will be an example to all in the Muslim world who desire freedom, pointing a way out of the sense of failure that the extremists feed on. They test our will, the will of the Iraqi people, and the will of the civilized world.

The sooner these terrorists understand clearly that our will can't be broken and that the Iraqi people, despite hardship and difficulty, will persevere in building their new society—the sooner the terrorists will come to terms with their defeat.

That is why it is so urgent that Congress pass this supplemental request to cover ongoing military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq to ensure our troops have the resources they need to complete their mission.

Just as after September 11, a speedy bipartisan passage of the supplemental request would send a strong message to our friends and our enemies—and to our troops, who are giving us 100 percent. They need to know we are behind them 100 percent.

#### *View of the Military Front: Afghanistan*

Afghanistan was the first arena in the global war on terrorism and the United States remains strongly committed to success in that country. Success in Afghanistan entails the establishment of a moderate and democratic political order that is fully representative of the Afghan people. Afghanistan has suffered a great deal over the last quarter century and it has come a long way since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001. The United States shares and supports President Karzai's and the Afghan people's hopes for a peaceful, democratic, and prosperous country that can serve as a partner in the region and as a model for other Muslim states.

As part of our ongoing commitment to success in Afghanistan, we seek to accelerate the progress the United States, our Coalition partners, and our allies in the Afghan government have been making to bring lasting peace to the war torn country. Together, we have accomplished a great deal over the last 2 years. The Afghan people are experiencing restored liberties, some as simple as the right to education. The Afghan government, under the able leadership of President Karzai, continues to establish legitimate authority throughout the country and in the international community as a respected and recognized member of the community of nations.

Over a million Afghan refugees have returned, and many more continue to do so with hopes for a better future in their native land after years of refuge in neighboring countries. Schools, clinics, and businesses continue to open around the country. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), now under North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) command, continues to help provide security in the capital, Kabul. NATO's mission in Afghanistan is testimony to the Alliance's commitment to redefining its role in the new global era. We continue to support the ISAF mission

in Kabul and look favorably upon possible expansion of the mission beyond the capital.

The United States continues to lead the international community in reconstruction and humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan, with close to a billion dollars in 2003 alone. We are assisting the Afghan government in its effort to rebuild the Afghan National Army (ANA). The ANA has already proven effective in support of the war on terrorism.

We have accomplished a great deal and we recognize that much more remains to be done to ensure success in Afghanistan. The war on terror is one aspect of our involvement in Afghanistan. The other is our commitment to promoting a functioning moderate and democratic political order that can serve as the foundation for lasting peace in the country. Realizing this vision will require increased commitment on the part of the United States and the international community.

Recent weeks have shown that security in Afghanistan must be protected and enhanced as an important prerequisite to lasting peace. Taliban forces and their allies operating out of their sanctuaries along both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border are attempting to regroup and destabilize Afghanistan. Taliban elements are targeting Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) workers, Afghan civilians, including moderate local religious leaders, in an effort to impose their tyrannical and alien ways on the Afghan people. ANA forces working with U.S. and Coalition forces continue to successfully target and neutralize Taliban forces in southern and eastern Afghanistan. ANA forces have successfully conducted their first operations in support of their efforts.

President Karzai continues to assert the legitimate authority of the central government in an effort to improve governance and security in the provinces. Over the last year alone, he has appointed new governors to key provinces and has initiated the important reform of the National Ministry of Defense. The United States stands firmly behind President Karzai and his administration in their effort to implement the will of the Afghan people. Afghanistan will soon usher in a new constitution by the end of this year with elections scheduled for June 2004. The Bonn Process has been a vital political roadmap for the country. We remain committed to its success and we recognize that our commitment will require increased resources to help the Afghan people realize their hopes for a better future free from religious tyranny and warlord banditry.

#### *Iraq*

I would like to express my thanks and the thanks of our troops for the special efforts that members of this committee have made to visit Iraq. Your visits have not only been important for the morale of our men and women, they also give you an opportunity to get a much clearer picture of the situation on the ground. The common experience of almost everyone who goes there seems to be that, while we can see the problems that are so frequently reported in the press, we also see a great deal of good news. In the case of Iraq—where the only news for 35 years has been bad news—the remarkable amount of good news is indeed a story.

I had an opportunity to get some of that good news first hand in July when I visited the troops of the 1st Marine Division in the Shia holy cities of Najaf and Karbala. The Marines achieved some stunning success in those cities in Iraq's Shi'a heartland, success that can be perceived even despite the recent bombing in Najaf. That event was, of course, a terrible tragedy and it has contributed to unease and fear in Iraq. However, it doesn't take many people to plant a car bomb or truck bomb. They've done that here in the United States. To me, the real news has been the relative calm and restraint that Iraqis have shown in the wake of this horrible provocation. Some hundreds of thousands of people came out to witness the funeral procession of Ayatollah Hakim, with no major violence reported. Fears have been expressed that this horrendous act could lead to revenge attacks by Shi'a and Sunni, but so far at least that hasn't happened.

Last week, General Abizaid told reporters that, after being in the United States a week and a half, overheated news reports on the conditions in Iraq could lead someone to think he should go back to Iraq "to find someone to surrender to." Yet when he talks to our troops—well-informed by first-hand knowledge—he said, "They are so confident and so positive that it takes me only about 30 minutes to understand we've got this under control."

Secretary Rumsfeld has just returned from Iraq, and reports that the general is exactly right. Our troops do have the situation under control. We must ensure they have the tools, the resources, and the moral support back home, to keep it that way.

There are still many challenges remaining for our troops in Iraq. As our commanders consider military operations in Iraq, there are at least two things they tell

us they would like more of. Number one is Iraqis fighting to secure their own liberty, which I mentioned earlier.

Their number two critical item is forces from other countries, and we're making substantial progress there. So far, close to 30 nations have sent close to 23,000 personnel to Iraq. Over 40 nations have pledged more than \$3 billion in assistance. In southern Iraq, Polish forces have assumed command of an international division, and we are hoping to add another division above and beyond that. The President's request will provide some \$800 million to support the troops of our coalition partners with limited resources who are interested in providing support.

In that same multinational division, the Spanish brigade has taken charge of the other major holy Shia city, Najaf. Further south, under the British multinational division, an Italian infantry brigade—which will include some 400 carabinieri—who will be performing security and stability operations.

We are actively pursuing the option of a U.N. resolution, which would lead other countries, whose laws or domestic politics require such a resolution, to contribute more.

We want these troops not merely to supply additional military manpower and to relieve the pressure on our own forces. More importantly, their presence will demonstrate to the Iraqis and to the world that the transformation of Iraq is of importance, not only to the U.S., but to the entire international community.

The other critical item that General Abizaid wants more of is actionable intelligence. The key to getting more intelligence is cooperation from Iraqis. That cooperation has been increasing substantially. One example of that cooperation was the Iraqi who turned in the Hussein brothers. That event itself has led to a large increase in the amount of intelligence that Iraqis are bringing to us—indeed such a large increase that we now have the challenge of sorting out the wheat from the chaff.

As many of our commanders have told me and told Congress, in Iraq, it is now mostly a battle for intelligence. As General Mattis has said, “any victory we get is brought to us by the Iraqi people.” Such victories are all a matter of building trust. Here are some examples of how the marines of the 1st Division did it.

One of the division chaplains suggested that his marines bring cold water to the Iraqis they encounter, because when it's 115 degrees, it's hard to hate someone who's giving you cold water. The troops employ what they call “wave tactics”—when they see Iraqis, they wave. When the marines are talking to people, they take off their sunglasses. It's quite common for young children to run quite a ways to meet up with the marines, and take their hands as they patrol the streets. A young corporal or lieutenant gets credit for this next idea—when marines see an Iraqi funeral procession, as the body passes by, they stop and present arms to show their respect. This practice has spread throughout the country, because it's working.

In these ways, and many more, our troops are breaking through the walls of that ghastly prison Hussein built, and they are earning the trust of the people they have liberated. I would add, they're gaining valuable intelligence, one of the sure keys to winning this fight.

#### A VARYING PICTURE, REGION BY REGION

While many Iraqis may still remain in the grip of fear conditioned by the old regime, our troops, our coalition allies and the new national and local Iraqi councils continue to make other significant progress in lessening its iron hold.

The Governing Council of Iraq is easily the most representative body of governance ever formed in that nation, and is rapidly gaining real powers and responsibilities, such as appointing ministers, representing Iraq to the international community, and beginning the process of drafting the first-ever Iraqi constitution.

This transfer of power to the Iraqi people is taking place at the local level as well. Over 90 percent of Iraqi towns and provinces now have their own governing councils, including the holy Shiite cities of Najaf and Karbala.

Those military commanders I talked with in Iraq who also have experience in the Balkans all said that, in Iraq, we are far ahead of where we were in Bosnia and Kosovo at comparable times, and in some cases, we are ahead of where those places are today.

Lieutenant General Ric Sanchez, the outstanding new commander of Combined Joint Task Force 7 and a veteran of Kosovo, told me that things are happening in Iraq after 3 months that hadn't happened after 12 months in Kosovo. I asked him to elaborate, and off the top of his head, he jotted down a list of 10 things. Included on the General's list of developments are these:

- The judicial system is functioning at a rudimentary level. Investigative judges are working and misdemeanor trials are ongoing with convictions.

- The political infrastructure is functioning. Neighborhood, district and city councils have been stood up. Over 90 percent of major cities have city councils and there is a National Level Interim Governing Council.
- The police force is at more than 50 percent of the requirement. Police are conducting joint and unilateral effective operations.
- Schools were immediately stood back up. At all levels the school year was salvaged.
- The medical system is operating.
- Local economies are bustling, including oil, agriculture and small business.
- Public services—electrical, water, sewage—are nearly up to pre-war levels.
- Recruiting and training for new Iraq security forces is underway—and, as already noted, we have gone from zero to 55,000 in just 4 months.

In fact, despite the terrorism, the entire south and north are impressively stable, and the center is improving day by day. The public food distribution is up and running. We planned for a food crisis, but there isn't one. Hospitals nation-wide are open. Doctors and nurses are at work. Medical supply convoys are escorted to and from the warehouses. We planned for a health crisis, but there isn't one.

Oil production has continued to increase, and recently it has averaged between 1.5 and 2 million barrels per day.

We planned for the possibility of massive destruction of this resource of the Iraqi people, but our military plan helped preserve the oil fields for the Iraqis.

The school year has been salvaged. Schools nationwide have reopened and final exams are complete. There are local town councils in most major cities and major districts of Baghdad, and they are functioning free of Baathist influence.

There is no humanitarian crisis. There is no refugee crisis. There is no health crisis. There has been minimal war damage to infrastructure. There has been no environmental catastrophe, either from oil well fires, or from dam breaks.

However, Saddam's legacy of destruction and decay is another story entirely.

#### *South*

In the south, the Marine Corps made wonderful progress. General Mattis has told us how effective his battalion commanders—typically lieutenant colonels—have been as the hub of activity in the cities. They have stressed creating a supportive environment by parking their tanks out of sight, and getting in among the people to win their trust and confidence. In one example I mentioned earlier, the marines gave out chilled water to demonstrators at political rallies. Whenever the marines have rebuilt a school—and in Karbala alone there are nine such schools—they present a brass bell with the inscription: "To the children of Iraq from the First Marine Division."

Our Army Civil Affairs teams are equally impressive. They have created functioning local governing councils free from Baathist influence. The governor of Karbala captured this development best when he told me: "We Shi'a have theological ties to Iran, but we refuse to be followers of any country outside Iraq. I want to stress, we aspire to independence and democracy. We want to heal the wounds from the past regime's atrocities. We want to build factories, bring in the internet, practice our religious rites in freedom, and have good relations with our neighbors and the world. The marines in Karbala—commanded by Lt. Col. Lopez—work day and night with our Governing Council to provide security and services."

Of course, the peace in the south was recently shaken by the bombing at the Imam Ali Shrine in Najaf. While this attack was a particularly heinous and outrageous act, even by the standards of Middle Eastern terrorism, it is not representative of greater instability in the South any more than September 11 was a symbol of instability in the United States. It was what it appeared to be—the desperate act of evil men.

Yet as the funeral marches for Shaik al-Hakim illustrate, hundreds of thousands of Iraqis were able to come out together without incident to pay respects to this spiritual leader. Despite the large numbers of people, and the intense emotion aroused by the bombing, the funeral processions were generally peaceful overall.

#### *North*

Stability in the north is another success story. General Dave Petraeus and his troops of the 101st Airborne arrived in Mosul on 22 April and over the next 30 days they put together this impressive list of accomplishments:

- Met with community leaders;
- Agreed on an election plan;
- Established an elected interim city council;

- Re-opened hospitals, schools, banks, and businesses;
- Set up a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC);
- Repaired the strategic bridge on the Mosul-Irbil road;
- Fixed the benzene and propane shortages;
- Opened the airport to humanitarian assistance flights;
- Signed the Makhmur harvest accords between Kurds and Arabs;
- Completed the wheat harvest;
- Re-opened the border with Syria so trade could resume;
- Set up the new Mosul newspaper;
- Paid government workers;
- Re-established train service;
- Established Task Force Neighborhood and Task Force Graffiti and helped clean up the city; Task Force Pothole employs Iraqis and improves the roads;
- Conducted joint police patrols;
- Began training a new police force;
- Diplomatically removed Peshmerga forces from disputed areas to back above the green line;
- Average 300 day, 300 night, and 90 joint sector security patrols (U.S. with local police); and have established air and ground quick reaction forces to respond to Baathist attacks;
- They are currently supporting 10 major Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) funded reconstruction projects.

General Petraeus said they have invested in water, electricity, roads, schools, hospitals, banks, agriculture, summer youth leagues, community swimming pools, orphanages, and kids' amusement park projects. He believes there are reasons for continued optimism in the north. They include: the quality of interim government leadership; citizen trust and confidence in Coalition Forces; a good university and school system; functioning food and fuel distribution systems; access to trade with Turkey and Syria; relatively good infrastructure; natural resources (water, oil, farm land); growth of small businesses; educated, hard-working, entrepreneurial populace; and as the locals have said, there is a "thirst for democracy."

#### *Center and Northeast (4th Infantry Division)*

General Ray Odierno has a more difficult security challenge in the predominately Sunni areas and in areas close to the Iranian border. He understands the nature of the Baathist and foreign terrorist threat and how that interacts with and affects his civil-military programs. He said they have incredible tactical intelligence on the Baathist cells and are making solid progress in defeating this threat. Operations like Operation Peninsula Shield, Operation Sidewinder, and Operation Soda Mountain have been effective in rooting out Baathists and foreign terrorists. He said as we capture or kill the foot soldiers, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the mid-level Baathist financiers to organize, recruit and maintain an effective force.

As Odierno deals more and more effectively with the Baathist forces, he too has been able to complete an impressive array of civil-military projects in his area of responsibility. In Kirkuk, the northern part of his area of responsibility, General Odierno's troops have established Battalion Commander "safe houses" to more effectively interact with the population. They have stood up and are training a police force.

My meeting in July with the Kirkuk Interim Governing Council members was one of the most heartening of all. Many of the 18 members spoke of their gratitude to President Bush and our troops for their liberation. The word "liberation" was used repeatedly by the members. An Arab member spoke eloquently of the need to return Kurdish property to their rightful owners. "All Iraqis were victims of the last regime," he said. Others spoke of American troops working with us "in a nice way to help solve our problems," that "doors are always open to us" and that "we found out the Americans are our brothers who came as liberators not as conquerors."

One member said: "Please tell President Bush thank you for his courageous decision to liberate Iraq. Many American soldiers have volunteered their lives [for liberation]." The Turcoman member asked that I convey to President Bush the Turcoman communities' thanks for liberation. Another member commended the "tireless efforts of General Odierno and his army" in helping the Iraqi people. Finally, a member, speaking English, asked me when the U.S. Government was going to "confront Arab television for their incitement to kill Americans?"

That council member's question suggests something else we don't hear reported enough: the vast majority of the Iraqi people are with us.

This fundamental truth was reflected in the statement issued on the occasion of the Najaf attack by the Iraqi Governing Council: "This type of criminal act will only



make our people more determined to move forward in building a new Iraq so that security and prosperity will prevail.

#### IRAQI PEOPLE ARE WITH US

The people of Iraq are not only looking ahead to the day when they have their own representative government, they are taking active steps to make that happen now. There are some who still ask the question: Is democracy possible in Iraq? There are even some who doubt that democracy could ever take root in the Arab world. But, the people of northern Iraq, beyond the reach of Saddam Hussein and his regime, over the course of more than a decade demonstrated an impressive ability to manage longstanding differences and develop relatively free and prospering societies.

The mayor of Karbala expressed his personal gratitude, telling us they would, “never forget that America saved us and delivered us from the regime.” He added: “We want to establish a national government and maintain relations with America.”

My meetings with Iraqis convinced me that they are looking to do the same thing. We attended a meeting of the Mosul city council, which was instructive in debunking the myth that Arabs, Kurds, Turcomen, Assyrian Christians, and Yezidi cannot live and work together. The mayor of Mosul—who is a Sunni Arab and former Army commander who spent a year in prison and whose brother and cousin were murdered by the regime—said life under the old regime “was like living in a prison.” He described the regime as “a ruthless gang that mistreated all Iraqis.” Now that that regime has been removed, he and his council can turn their attention to more ordinary problems. Investment and jobs, he said, are their top priorities. He credited the wisdom of General Patraeus in improving the security situation. He added that jobs and investment will follow.

When I asked the mayor if ethnic differences will prevent people from working together, the Turcoman assistant mayor immediately said: “We have never had ethnic problems in the past. Saddam created them. We have always considered ourselves members of the same family. It never crossed our minds that the next person is different.” To that, the mayor added: “What caused this great [ethnic] gap was Saddam. Throughout our history we have had no problems. This has happened only in our recent history. We consider ourselves one garden with many flowers of different colors.”

Even though the enemy targets our success, we will win the peace. But, we won’t win it alone. We don’t need American troops to guard every mile of electrical cable. The real center of gravity will come from the Iraqi people themselves—they know who and where the criminals are. They have the most at stake—their future.

When inevitable challenges and controversies arise, we should remind ourselves that most of the people of Iraq are deeply grateful for what our incredibly brave American and coalition forces have done to liberate them from Saddam’s republic of fear.

When we’ve shown Iraqis we mean to stay until the old regime is crushed, and its criminals punished—and that we are equally determined to give their country back to them—they will know they can truly begin to build a society and government of, by and for the Iraqi people.

In many ways, the people of Iraq are like prisoners who endured years of solitary confinement—without light, without peace, without much knowledge of the outside world. They have just emerged into the bright light of hope and fresh air of freedom. It will take time for them to adjust to this new landscape—but, all things considered, they are doing rather well.

Today, we are fighting a war on terror—a war that we will win. As the council member’s question about the incitement to violence he saw on Arab television suggests, however, the larger war we face is the war of ideas—a challenge to be sure, but one that we must also win. It is a struggle over modernity and progress, pluralism and democracy, and real economic development.

When I was in Iraq, General Mattis told us that the two groups who fought most aggressively during major combat operations were the Fedayeen Saddam—home-grown thugs with a cult-like attachment to Saddam—and foreign fighters, principally from other Arab countries.

How do we know this? For one thing, the terrorists themselves tell us. General Mattis and his men found foreign passports on many of the enemy they killed, some of which stated openly that they had come to Iraq for the purpose of fighting jihad.

Today in Iraq, we still face that poisonous mixture of Baath regime loyalists and foreign fighters.

Brigadier General Martin Dempsey, the commander of the Army's 1st Armored Division, recently described those foreign fighters as "international terrorists or extremists who see this as the Super Bowl."

Foreign terrorists who go to Iraq to kill Americans understand this: if killing Americans leads to our defeat and the restoration of the old regime, they would score an enormous strategic victory for terrorism—and for the forces of oppression and intolerance, rage and despair, hatred and revenge. As the President told members of the American Legion recently: "Terrorists know that a democratic Iraq in the heart of the Middle East would be a further defeat for their ideology of terror."

Iraqis understand this. Alongside us, they are working hard to fight the forces of anger and helplessness and to seize this historic opportunity to move their country forward.

When I met with General Abizaid during my trip to Iraq, he placed into larger perspective the battle in Iraq. He said, "The whole difficulty in the global war on terrorism is that this is a phenomenon without borders. The heart of the problem is in this particular region, and the heart of the region happens to be Iraq. If we can't be successful here, we won't be successful in the global war on terrorism." Success in Iraq, said the general, offers "a chance, when you combine it with initiatives in the Arab/Israeli theater and initiatives elsewhere, to make life better, to bring peace to an area where people are very, very talented and resources are abundant, especially here in Iraq."

Each time terrorists have achieved a tactical success, whether in New York or Bali or Riyadh, or more recently in Najaf and with the U.N. bombing in Baghdad, they've temporarily shaken people, but each time they've aroused people.

In fact, the statement released by the Iraqi Governing Council following the Najaf bombing decried "the brutality and descent into insanity of the criminals who target a person while he is worshipping. This type of criminal act will only make our people more determined to move forward in building a new Iraq so that security and prosperity will prevail. The evil hand that struck Ayatollah Bakr al-Hakim and his brilliant record in confronting the buried regime will not be able to prevent the realization of Hakim's legitimate goals and supreme humanitarian values."

Based on his experience training the new Iraqi police, Bernie Kerik is reported to have said that attempts to frighten the new police force—such as in the bomb blast at the Iraqi police academy in Baghdad that killed one and wounded a dozen others—won't work. He said, "They're not going to intimidate them. They are courageous people who have been fighting for 37 years and now they finally have a chance to win."

\* \* \*

America's troops and those of our coalition partners—among whom we would emphasize are the Iraqis themselves—are determined to win. They will win, if we continue to give them the moral and material support they need to do the job. As the President said recently, our forces are on the offensive. As Army Vice Chief of Staff Gen. John Keane said in congressional testimony, "They bring the values of the American people to this conflict. They understand firmness, they understand determination. But they also understand compassion. Those values are on display every day as they switch from dealing with an enemy to taking care of a family."

I've seen the troops in Iraq, as have many of you here. I think you'll agree that General Keane is absolutely right.

The President on Sunday clearly stated the mission and the stakes involved, exactly as our troops understand them: He said, "We are fighting the enemy in Iraq and Afghanistan today, so that we do not meet him again on our own streets, in our own cities."

America's Armed Forces will not be deterred from their mission by desperate acts of a dying regime or ideology. There is no question that America's commitment to secure a peaceful Iraq—back home—must be at least equal to the commitment of our troops and to the stakes, for it is related to nothing less than our security and that of our children and grandchildren.

We look forward to doing our part to work with the Members of Congress to help support our Armed Forces throughout the world who are doing their part to make America and her people more secure.

Thank you.

Chairman WARNER. Mr. Secretary, we thank you for your strong leadership and a very informative statement this morning.

We have excellent attendance here at our committee. We are anxious to get into the questioning, but we also want to receive

your observations, Secretary Grossman, and those of the Chairman, and we will invite General Mattis to the table so that he can respond to areas of his special expertise in the course of the questioning. Thank you.

Secretary Grossman.

**STATEMENT OF HON. MARC I. GROSSMAN, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS**

Secretary GROSSMAN. Mr. Chairman, I do not know if perhaps I should yield to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General MYERS. Go.

Secretary GROSSMAN. Okay, thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, other members of the committee: I thank you very much for this invitation to appear today. Senator, I would like to also put my full statement in the record, and I will try to limit it as much as I possibly can.

Let me first of all say that, since we are here all together at this table, that the State Department, we, every single one of us, are committed to supporting in every way America's men and women in uniform. As I have on many occasions in front of this committee, I want to thank all of the members of this committee for your support for the 46,000 men and women of the State Department who also defend their country in 258 diplomatic posts around the world and I think do a very important job in winning the war on terrorism.

They have suffered as well, in embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam, and also, as Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz said, have made I think a substantial contribution to the effort to create diplomatic coalitions, mop up terrorist financing, and bring more people to this fight. In fact, after the defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan, State Department people volunteered to staff our reopened embassy in Kabul, where they endured, and still do endure, hard living conditions.

We are not a big organization, so these numbers may not seem large compared to our colleagues, but 33 State Department employees joined General Garner in Iraq in April, 47 of my colleagues serve today with Ambassador Bremer, and 22 more are scheduled to go out in the next few weeks. Altogether, almost 300 State Department people have volunteered to go since July and I think that is a credit to the dedication and patriotism of the men and women of the Department, foreign service, and civil service.

Mr. Chairman, in your letter of invitation you asked us to talk a little bit about America's global commitments. I think it is important in that regard to first step back and remember that, almost exactly a year ago in fact, President Bush signed the National Security Strategy of the United States. It is that document which forms the basis of the conduct both for America's foreign policy and military policy. It says that the primary aim of the United States is to not just make the world more secure, but also to make the world better.

In order to bring about, as Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz said, political freedom, economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity, the President has designated a number of tasks. I hope you had a chance to see Secretary Pow-

ell's speech at George Washington University last Friday, in which he laid out what we are doing together with our military colleagues to meet these tasks, including strengthening alliances to defeat global terrorism, building cooperative partnerships with other major powers, including Europe, Japan, Russia, China, and India, and working with other nations to defuse regional conflicts and prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, our friends, with weapons of mass destruction.

Luckily, as a number of you have said, we are not alone. The United States is not alone in this effort to make a better world. So at the President's direction, we seek partners and allies because it enables us to achieve better our national objectives.

Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, you asked in your letter about cooperation with individual countries, with NATO, with the United Nations, and other multinational organizations. All NATO countries contribute to the global war on terrorism. Indeed, as we have discussed at this committee, Afghanistan represents an historic first out-of-area operation for the alliance as a whole.

We are also working with the United Nations in Iraq. We have said from the very beginning, our President has said, the United Nations has a vital role to play in the reconstruction of that country, and the criminal bombing of the U.N. headquarters in Baghdad only further shows the importance of galvanizing international support for Iraq's reconstruction.

As the President announced to the Nation on Sunday and Senator Levin talked about yesterday in his meetings in New York, the United States is seeking a new U.N. Security Council resolution to build on those we already have in 1483 and 1500. That resolution would try to accomplish three things: First, it would invite the Iraqi Governing Council to submit a plan and a timetable for them—not anybody else, but for them—to write a constitution, develop political institutions, conduct free elections leading to the Iraqi people's resumption of sovereignty over their own country.

Second, as Senator Levin mentioned, it would authorize a United Nations Multinational Force under a U.S. commander; and third, afford the United Nations a more comprehensive and active role in the transition back to Iraqi sovereignty.

We are also working, as members of this committee know, for successful donors conferences both for Afghanistan and for Iraq, so that we can galvanize the financial support not just of other countries and other multilateral institutions, but also the international financial institutions.

Mr. Chairman, in my statement I have tried to describe how the State Department and the Defense Department and the combatant commanders work together to try to develop these needs, and so I hope that people will take a look at that. I will not go through all of that, but it is a very important area of cooperation between the military services, the DOD, and the State Department.

I would say one other thing about the work of the Department, that we have two other dimensions that are key and fully integrated with what we do with our defense and military colleagues. Those are to work with allies and partners to help them solve regional conflicts; and working with partners to address the internal

security problems that can lead to terrorism and other trans-national threats.

Mr. Chairman, in your letter you asked me to highlight what we were doing to get other countries to be involved in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Liberia. If I could, sir, ask that the charts that we have, which I think we distributed to each one of you, be part of the record. I will not go through every single one, but I think that they show graphically what it is that we are trying to accomplish with this coalition.




**COALITION\* FOR THE IMMEDIATE DISARMAMENT OF IRAQ**

**49 Member Nations**

Afghanistan	Estonia	Marshall Islands	Slovakia
Albania	Ethiopia	Micronesia	Solomon Islands
Angola	Georgia	Mongolia	Spain
Australia	Honduras	Netherlands	Tonga
Azerbaijan	Hungary	Nicaragua	Turkey
Bulgaria	Iceland	Palau	Uganda
Colombia	Italy	Panama	UK
Costa Rica	Japan	Philippines	Ukraine
Czech Republic	Korea	Poland	US
Denmark	Kuwait	Portugal	Uzbekistan
Dom. Republic	Latvia	Romania	
El Salvador	Lithuania	Rwanda	
Eritrea	Macedonia	Singapore	

\*Coalition defined as those nations who have agreed to be listed in the coalition and have expressed public support for its aims. This does not/not reflect military contributions, only political support.

Unclassified



## Operation Iraqi Freedom

### Conflict Support

- 45 countries provided access, basing, and/or over-flight rights

- 24 countries contributed military assets

Unclassified



### Iraq Stability Contributors

#### Countries with forces in Iraq

29

TOTAL ~22,800

- Azerbaijan
- Albania
- Bulgaria
- Czech Rep
- Denmark
- Dominican Republic
- El Salvador
- Georgia
- Estonia
- Honduras
- Hungary
- Italy
- Kazakhstan
- Korea
- Latvia
- Lithuania
- Macedonia
- Mongolia
- Netherlands
- New Zealand
- Nicaragua
- Norway
- Philippines
- Poland
- Romania
- Slovakia
- Spain
- Ukraine
- UK

#### Countries committed to provide forces for Iraq

3

TOTAL ~600

- Portugal
- Moldova
- Thailand

#### Countries considering decision to provide forces for Iraq

14

TOTAL TBD

### 46 Countries

Potentially Supporting  
Iraqi  
Stability and  
Humanitarian Relief

Unclassified



## Operation Iraqi Freedom

### NATO Contributions

**NATO Coalition\* Members  
that Contributed Combat and/or  
Support Assets for Conflict  
Operations and/or ABO and/or  
force protection**

Czech Republic  
Denmark  
Hungary  
Iceland  
Italy  
Netherlands  
Poland  
Portugal  
Spain  
Turkey  
UK

**NATO Countries  
Currently  
Participating  
in Phase IV  
Operations**

Czech Republic  
Denmark  
Hungary  
Italy  
Netherlands  
Norway  
Poland  
Portugal  
Spain  
UK

**NATO Countries  
Providing Humanitarian  
Assistance and  
Reconstruction Assistance**

Belgium	Italy
Canada	Luxembourg
Czech Republic	Netherlands
Denmark	Norway
France	Poland
Germany	Portugal
Greece	Spain
Hungary	Turkey
Iceland	UK

\*Coalition defined as those countries willing to be listed as part of the coalition and have expressed public support for coalition's aims.

Unclassified



## Operation Enduring Freedom

### 71 Coalition Members

Albania	Eritrea	Kyrgyzstan	Senegal
Argentina	Estonia	Latvia	Serbia
Australia	Finland	Lithuania	Singapore
Austria	France	Mauritania	Slovakia
Azerbaijan	Georgia	Nepal	Slovenia
Bahrain	Germany	Netherlands	Spain
Bangladesh	Greece	New Zealand	Sweden
Belgium	Hungary	Nigeria	Tajikistan
Bulgaria	Iceland	Norway	Thailand
Canada	India	Oman	Tunisia
Chile	Ireland	Pakistan	Turkey
Croatia	Italy	Philippines	Turkmenistan
Czech Republic	Japan	Poland	UAE
Denmark	Jordan	Portugal	UK
Djibouti	Kazakhstan	Qatar	Ukraine
Dom Rep	Kenya	Romania	Uzbekistan
Egypt	KSA	Russia	Yemen
Ethiopia	Kuwait	Republic of Korea	

Unclassified



## Operation Enduring Freedom

### Conflict Support

- **43** countries provided access, basing, and/or over-flight rights

- **26** countries contributed military assets

Unclassified



## Operation Enduring Freedom

### Countries Currently Contributing Troops

- |            |               |
|------------|---------------|
| • U.S.     | • Jordan      |
| • Bulgaria | • Korea       |
| • Canada   | • Lithuania   |
| • Germany  | • Norway      |
| • Denmark  | • Netherlands |
| • Egypt    | • Poland      |
| • Estonia  | • Romania     |
| • France   | • Slovakia    |
| • UK       | • Thailand    |
| • Italy    |               |

**Total Troops: 13,212**

Unclassified





Forty-nine nations publicly declared their support to become part of the Coalition for the Immediate Disarmament of Iraq. Forty-five countries provided access, basing, overflight rights; and 24 countries contributed military assets in one form or another to operations in Iraq. Additional countries have joined the stabilization effort. As you have noted and Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz has noted, a total of 29 countries have now deployed approximately 23,000 troops for stability and humanitarian operations, and you can see in the next two columns our plans for the future.

We followed a clear strategy and that is we have tried to take the needs presented to us by the combatant commanders and the Coalition Provisional Authority and tried to go out and get other countries to help us meet those needs.

If I could do the same, sir, for Afghanistan: the international community is again working together in Afghanistan, with 70 countries joining the coalition in Operation Enduring Freedom. Thirty-four countries have contributed forces to Operation Enduring Freedom and to ISAF. In a milestone for NATO, NATO as an organization has recently taken over the lead role in ISAF after supporting NATO members Germany and The Netherlands in their cooperation in the force.

Fifteen NATO countries make up ISAF, contributing some 5,800 troops on the ground. You can see the main contributors to this force include Canada with 900 soldiers, France with 500, and the United Kingdom (U.K.) with 400 soldiers. So I think this idea that we are working with other countries is also extremely important.

Finally, a slide on countries contributing troops in Afghanistan. You will see the total down at the far right, 5,830. That has been a very important job that the Department has done, I believe, in support of our military operations.

In my statement, Mr. Chairman, I have talked about the importance of the Afghan National Army, the importance of provisional reconstruction teams, where our officers and military officers work together in Afghanistan, and we are proud of that and that is part of my written statement as well.

Mr. Chairman, you had the very important visit to Liberia and I know you also visited our embassy there and our people there. They were very pleased and proud that you had a chance to visit them as well. They also are doing an important job in Liberia.

Chairman WARNER. Could I just interrupt and say that yes, I did have that privilege. Ambassador Blaney told me a very interesting story. He said in the height of the struggle he had his simple Marine detachment, 8 or 10, himself, and maybe 1 or 2 others, and the embassy was being bombarded, the embassy was being riddled with bullets. Today the Ambassador lives in one room on the third floor with a bathroom adjoining, and that is all, his office and everything else, and there are .50 caliber machine guns hanging out of the windows protecting the embassy.

This is a great credit to the foreign service. The President sent him a message: You can bring down the flag; it is your call. He decided, together with his Marine contingent, to let the flag stay. As a result and with the intervention of our forces, the main threats have been quelled and we see the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the ECOWAS Military Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL), and eventually the United Nations bringing about stability in that region.

Thank you for mentioning Ambassador Blaney. Great credit is owed to him and his team.

Secretary GROSSMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and of course they will be very happy to hear that. Of course you said that not only here, but also when you were there.

I think it also goes to the point that Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz made and that the President has made so well, which is that if we are to win this global war on terrorism it is going to take all of the aspects of our Nation's power—diplomatic power, intelligence power, military power—working together.

Mr. Chairman, you have essentially taken my section on Liberia. We are working very hard to support the West African peacekeeping troops there. On August 1, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1497. The West Africans have, as you have seen, stepped up to this challenge and, led by Nigeria, over 3,000 troops from Ghana, Mali, Senegal, Togo, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau and Benin are deploying to the region with U.S. assistance and will likely be submitted—subsumed, I am sorry, into the U.N. mission.

We are looking to try to get that U.N. mission up and running by the 1st of October. To date, Mr. Chairman, we have committed over \$15 million to this effort and we are in the process of identifying additional resources to ensure that the ECOWAS force is able to fulfill its mission until the U.N. Peacekeeping Operation (UNPKO) is in place.

Chairman WARNER. That is needed and it is needed urgently. I think the correct decision was made by our administration to help the Africans solve their own problem.

Secretary GROSSMAN. Thank you, sir.

I will let General Myers talk a little bit about Bosnia and Kosovo, as you have, but it is very important that we went there and did a job. Our troops are reducing in number, but we still have important work there to do.

One final point about resources, and I join Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz in asking for your early and positive consideration of the President's request when it comes formally. I would also welcome your support for the State Department foreign operations budget request, which has passed the House and is awaiting floor action in the Senate.

Mr. Chairman, I can only conclude, as Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz did, that the world is a dangerous place. The President made it clear that all of us will do what it takes to make it safer and better by working to be rid of terrorists and tyrants who threaten the United States, their neighbors, and their own people. By fostering democracy and the rule of law, building coalitions with allies and friends, and pursuing regional stability and funding military aid programs and training, we are actively pursuing the President's national security strategy and, together with our colleagues at the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we are committed to these goals and will continue to work unceasingly to attain them.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Grossman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. MARC GROSSMAN

Mr. Chairman and other members of the committee, thank you for your invitation to appear today.

The State Department is committed to supporting, in every way, America's men and women in uniform. I thank you for your support of the 46,000 men and women of the State Department who defend our country every day in 258 diplomatic posts around the world.

After the defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan, State Department people volunteered to staff our reopened Embassy in Kabul, where they endured, and still do endure, hard living conditions and danger.

Thirty-three State employees joined General Garner in Iraq in April. Forty-seven of my colleagues are there now with Ambassador Bremer, and 22 more are scheduled to go out in the next few weeks. Altogether, 282 have volunteered to go since July. That so many people have gone or volunteered to go to Iraq is a tribute to the professionalism and patriotism of State Department employees, civil, and foreign service.

\* \* \* \* \*

Last September, the President signed the National Security Strategy of the United States. This document is the basis for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy as well as military policy. It says that the primary aim of America's security strategy is to make the world not just safer, but better.

In order to bring about political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity, the President has designated a number of tasks.

As Secretary Powell highlighted in his speech at George Washington University last Friday, these include strengthening alliances to defeat global terrorism, building cooperative partnerships with the other major powers, including Europe, Japan, Russia, China, and India, working with other nations to defuse regional conflicts, and preventing our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends, with weapons of mass destruction.

America is not alone in its desire for a better and safer world, and so at the President's direction we seek partners and allies because it enables us to better achieve our national objectives.

You asked in your letter about cooperation with individual countries, with NATO, the U.N. and other multinational organizations.

All NATO countries contribute to the global war against terrorism. Indeed, Afghanistan represents an historic first out-of-area operation for the Alliance as a whole.

We work with the United Nations on Iraq. The U.N. has a vital role to play in the reconstruction of that country, and the criminal bombing of the U.N. headquarters in Baghdad only further shows the importance of galvanizing international support for Iraq's reconstruction.

As the President announced to the Nation Sunday, we seek a new U.N. Security Council (UNSC) resolution on Iraq to build on UNSC resolutions 1441, 1483, and 1500.

This resolution should:

1) invite the Iraqi Governing Council to submit a plan and a timetable for them to write a constitution, develop political institutions, and conduct free elections, leading to the Iraqi peoples' resumption of sovereignty over their own country.

2) authorize a United Nations multinational force under a U.S. commander.

3) afford the United Nations a more comprehensive and active role in the transition back to Iraqi sovereignty.

We are also working with friends and partners around the world for a successful Iraq donors' conference in Madrid in October. This conference should further mobilize international efforts to help the Iraqi people reconstruct their country and rebuild their lives.

In addition to using structures like NATO and the U.N., we have reached out to our friends and allies, including many new partners, in order to attain the goals that are crucial to our national security and that of other nations in the world.

We are in constant coordination with the Combatant Commands to find out what is needed, and then we approach our friends to try to meet those needs.

We have sought troop contributions and for basing and staging rights, material support, overflight permission, and refueling.

The task of working with foreign governments intensifies with the termination of major combat, as both Afghanistan and Iraq have shown. In both these places we continue to call on our friends and allies to support stabilization and reconstruction. Many countries which were not in a position to offer combat troops have offered humanitarian and reconstruction relief.

As the President highlighted Sunday night, we do not underestimate the challenges: terrorists and Saddam loyalists have done great harm in Iraq; in Afghanistan, al Qaeda and Taliban fighters seek to regroup and have attacked Coalition and Allied Forces and NGO workers and others trying to stop the essential work of reconstruction.

Our work at the State Department has two other dimensions that are key: we are working with allies and partners to help them to solve regional conflicts; and working with partners to address the internal security problems that can lead to terrorism and other transnational threats.

\* \* \* \* \*

As you requested in your letter, I would like now to highlight some of the activities that I have just mentioned, in particular, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Liberia.

Iraq: Forty-nine nations publicly declared their support for our policy by joining the Coalition for the Immediate Disarmament of Iraq. A number of other countries quietly cooperated with and supported the military operation in various ways. In total, there were 45 countries that provided access, basing, and/or over-flight rights, and 24 countries that contributed military assets in one form or another for operations in Iraq.

Additional countries have joined the stabilization effort. A total of 29 countries have now deployed approximately 23,000 troops for stability and humanitarian operations in Iraq; three more countries are in the process of deploying additional troops. We are in discussion with approximately 10 other countries concerning additional potential contributions.

We have followed a clear strategy: we have taken the needs of the U.S. military and the Coalition Provisional Authority as we seek to help the Iraqi people build a democratic and secure Iraq and have then sought assets other countries might be able to provide to meet those needs. These contributions have not only been support for U.S. efforts. Other countries, such as Spain, Italy, and Ukraine have taken key roles in providing brigade headquarters in the U.K. and Polish divisions. Other countries have offered to take on support functions such as engineering that contrib-

ute to reconstruction. We continue to talk to a range of foreign governments about the possibilities for further contributions.

**Afghanistan:** In the wake of September 11, the international community worked with us in the fight against al Qaeda and the Taliban regime. Over 70 countries joined our coalition and over 34 countries have contributed forces to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and to the International Stabilization Force for Afghanistan. In an historic milestone for the North Atlantic Alliance, NATO as an organization has recently taken over the lead role in ISAF after supporting NATO members Germany and the Netherlands in their co-leadership of the force.

Currently, 15 NATO countries make up ISAF, providing some 5,800 troops on the ground. The main contributors to this force include Canada with almost 900 soldiers, France with more than 500, and the U.K. with approximately 400 troops.

It is crucial for Afghanistan's long-term security and prosperity that Afghan citizens themselves be prepared to take responsibility for maintaining peace and order in their own country. This will require a national army that is multi-ethnic, subordinate to civil authority, subject to rule of law and international norms of human rights. The Afghan National Army (ANA) Train and Equip Program, initiated for this purpose, will establish a central corps of sufficient size and military capability (10,000+ soldiers) to provide security for the June 2004 elections and eventually relieve the International Security and Assistance Force and OEF elements of security duties. With over two dozen countries contributing to the establishment of the ANA we have made significant progress toward our goal of a Central Corps by June 2004.

One crucial project is the establishment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). The U.S. has already set up three of these, in Gardez, Bamiyan, and Kunduz. The U.K. has recently opened a PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif, and New Zealand will relieve U.S. forces in Bamiyan later this year. The mission of the PRTs is to provide additional stability to provincial areas, allowing for increased reconstruction and assisting the expansion of central authority and linkage to local governments. Each team includes State Department and Agency for International Development (AID) officers working side by side with military personnel.

Against these efforts we face al Qaeda and Taliban fighters determined to regroup and to attack Coalition and Allied Forces, NGO workers and the international community. Recent attacks on the critical Kandahar-Kabul highway and killing of international workers show us the threat continues.

**Liberia:** The Liberian civil war has generated unrest and misery throughout West Africa. Hundreds of thousands of people are displaced internally and in neighboring countries. Participants in the Liberian conflict have destabilized Liberia's neighbors, and gross violations of human rights have occurred. With the departure of Charles Taylor and the decision by the parties to sign the Accra peace agreement, there is an historic opportunity to restore peace to Liberia and to the region.

On August 1, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1497, authorizing deployment to Liberia of a Multinational Force (MNF) under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter and a follow-on U.N. PKO. The West Africans have stepped up to the challenge, using their regional Economic Community of West African States, providing the MNF that will help restore order and separate the parties pending the arrival of U.N. peacekeepers. Led by Nigeria, over 3,000 troops from Ghana, Mali, Senegal, Togo, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, and Benin are deploying to the region with U.S. assistance and will likely be subsumed into the U.N. mission.

Because of this positive action by ECOWAS, and since the U.N. is planning to take over responsibilities from ECOWAS by October 1, there has been a decreased need for the U.S. to send troops. An Amphibious Readiness Group comprised of 3 ships and more than 4,000 service members is standing by off Monrovia to respond to emergencies, but our work has been primarily in logistics support and diplomatic coordination. We have assisted with the deployment and sustainment of the West African troops, and expect to continue to do so until the transition to the U.N. PKO is complete.

To date, the U.S. has committed over \$15 million for this effort. We are in the process of identifying additional resources to ensure the ECOWAS force is able to fulfill its mission until the U.N. PKO is in place.

**Bosnia/Kosovo:** The U.S. remains committed to ensuring peace and stability in the Balkans and remains an active participant in the NATO-led operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. Through intense diplomatic activity and coordination with our allies, we have been able substantially to reduce the number of U.S. troops in the region as the security situation in the region improves. In January 2001, the U.S. provided 9,600 of the roughly 56,000 troops in the Balkans. Today, the United States contributes 4,050 troops to those same missions—1,800 U.S. troops in Bosnia and 2,250 U.S. troops in Kosovo. The total size of the forces will drop below 30,000 by the end of the year. In recent years, the U.S. has generally tried to keep our forces in the

Balkans at approximately 15 percent of the overall, although, originally, we provided one-third of the forces in Bosnia. We continue to work within NATO to restructure and reduce the forces, lowering our contributions in line with the overall reductions of the Alliance. At present, the French, German, and Italian contribution to Kosovo Force (KFOR) surpass that of the U.S. In Bosnia, where the U.S. commands the Stabilization Force (SFOR), we are among the largest contributor of troops.

There are many other areas in which we work to support the President's vision in the National Security Strategy—North Korea, Colombia, the Philippines, Georgia—I would be glad to discuss these with you if you wish during the hearing.

Resources:

As the President indicated in his recent address, \$87 billion will be needed to accomplish administration goals in Iraq and address other complex contingencies. We welcome the opportunity to work with you to make that pledge a reality. We also welcome your support for our Foreign Operations budget request, which has passed the House and is awaiting floor action in the Senate.

\* \* \* \* \*

The world is a dangerous place. The President has made it clear that we will do what it takes to make it safer and better, by working to rid it of terrorists and tyrants who threaten the United States, their neighbors, and their own people. By fostering democracy and rule of law, by building coalitions with allies and friends, and by pursuing regional stability through funding military aid programs and training, the State Department actively pursues the President's goals of peace and security. Together with the Department of Defense and our military colleagues, we are committed to these goals and will continue to work unceasingly to attain them.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.  
General Myers.

**STATEMENT OF GEN. RICHARD B. MYERS, USAF, CHAIRMAN,  
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, ACCOMPANIED BY: MAJOR GEN.  
JAMES MATTIS, USMC, COMMANDER, FIRST MARINE DIVI-  
SION**

General MYERS. Chairman Warner and Senator Levin: Thank you for the opportunity to address the committee, and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for agreeing to put my written statement into the record.

I would like to first thank you for your continuing and, for that matter, tremendous support of our men and women in uniform. It is very important given the situation that we are in today.

When I came before you in July with General Pace, I made some points that are still true today. The first one of those is that we are totally committed to winning this war on terrorism, and the stakes could not be higher. Defeat means the destruction of our way of life that we forged over two and a quarter centuries. Victory will restore the sense of security that was shattered on September 11, 2001.

I also said that I am positive we are making great progress in the war on terrorism in Afghanistan, in Iraq, and elsewhere around the world. I have visited Iraq and Afghanistan recently, as some of you have, and every time I talk to a commander or, perhaps more importantly, to the captains and the corporals, they were all very confident about being able to accomplish the mission and the task they were given and about ultimate victory.

The third point I made back in July that is still true obviously is that our service men and women are doing a fantastic job. This is their moment in history to ensure that peace and freedom triumph over tyranny and terror.

Let me focus briefly on some of the accomplishments of the last few months. The coalition division led by the Polish military and consisting of more than 8,000 troops from 17 countries is now in place in Iraq and they are well under way in establishing their presence in that country. As Ambassador Grossman and Secretary Wolfowitz have said, 29 countries have troops deployed to Iraq. Many of them have very recently had to struggle for their own freedom and they all understand fully what is at stake.

It is vitally important that we have a broad coalition in Iraq. Why? Because it is in the interest of the world community for Iraq, now liberated from a brutal dictatorship, to emerge as a legitimate member of the world community.

Also when I last spoke to you, I mentioned the large number of Iraqi police that have been trained. I think in July we were saying 31,000. Those numbers have since grown. There are now more than 40,000 Iraqi police and thousands more Iraqis recruited for duty with the new Iraqi army, the Civil Defense Corps, the Facilities Protection Service, and the Iraqi Border Guard. So I think the total number today is over 55,000 that are on duty; and there are more in training. The numbers continue to grow and will grow.

These numbers highlight that the Iraqi people are eager to play a leading role in their own peaceful future. Iraqi police, among others, are already making significant contributions to preventing attacks and some of these Iraqis have given their lives in the service of their new free Iraq.

The recent acts of terrorism, such as the bombing of the U.N. headquarters and the mosque in al-Najaf, show a couple of things: first, that Iraq is still a dangerous place. They also show the desperation of the adversaries that we face. We are actively engaged in rooting out this threat, with more and more Iraqis coming forward with information and a willingness to help us.

I am equally positive about our progress in Afghanistan.

Remnants of the Taliban have made desperate attempts to regain control over sections of the country, but continued pressure from the coalition operations is thwarting their efforts. I believe that we are fully capable of meeting today's commitments while preparing for future threats. We are working hard to improve our warfighting capability, including focusing on transformation initiatives, reevaluating, as Secretary Wolfowitz said, the mix of capabilities that we have in our Active and our Reserve Forces, refining our deployment and mobilization processes, and many more activities.

Before I close, I would like to reiterate the importance, as Ambassador Grossman said, of the cooperative effort in this war on terrorism. General Abizaid and General Sanchez have said recently that the forces we are fighting in Iraq could not defeat a single company of our infantry. I believe they are right. But this is not just a military fight alone. It requires close cooperation between the Department of Defense and other government agencies, between U.S. departments and agencies, and those agencies of our allies and our friends, between the coalition that is in Iraq right now, and the people of Iraq and Afghanistan, who want to be free of violence and repression.

I think we need to take a moment and pause and just think about what this is all about. We are a Nation at war. We have been a Nation at war for almost 2 years. The stakes could not be higher. Certainly in my 38 years of service the stakes have never been higher. You may have to go back to the Civil War to find a time when the values that we hold dear have been threatened like they have been threatened today. Osama bin Laden said some years ago that what he wanted to do was reduce the United States to a former shadow of itself, and by implication the rest of the free world.

So what is it going to take to win this war? It is going to take patience. Every time I have come in front of this committee, every time anybody senior in this administration has talked about it, we have talked about the patience required. Why? It is a different enemy. It is a difficult enemy. It is not just military might, as we just talked about. It is hard work. It is hard slogging. We have made tremendous progress and we are winning.

To continue to win, in my mind we need three things. First is patience. The second is commitment. I can speak for the Armed Forces, I cannot speak for others. I have tremendous admiration for the foreign service and other government agencies that have been alongside us in this from the start. But I can tell you about our Armed Forces. We have never been more focused or more committed to winning this war. Failure is not an option. We have to win.

Other countries understand that. I just hosted my counterpart from Macedonia last week. Here is a country that a year ago, 2 years ago for sure, you could say was on the brink of chaos and of failure of their political system. But they have come out of that. They also understand the value of freedom, and that is why they have troops in Afghanistan and why they have troops in Iraq.

Are they a lot of troops? No. In Iraq they have I think 28 individuals, special forces. But they are not a large country and they are not a large armed force, and they have an internal problem they are trying to work. But they understand the value of freedom and they are with us. As Secretary Grossman showed you on his charts over there, there are many others that are with us as well.

Besides patience and commitment, the third and most important point is we have to have the will to win. This is a battle of wills. Boil it down to what it essentially is, it is a battle of wills. The terrorists think and have said they are going to win. They are absolutely wrong about that. They will not win. They cannot win. We cannot and will not let them win. They are not going to win as long as we have the continuing will of the American people and, for that matter, freedom-loving people everywhere.

If you need inspiration for patience and for commitment and for will, you can look many places. But, being a military person, I can tell you you need look no further than the men and women of our Armed Forces. In the last 2 years they have made tremendous sacrifices—personal sacrifices, family sacrifices, employer sacrifices for those Reserve component individuals that have been called to duty.

One final thought. Those that have been killed in action, wounded in action, and their families have sacrificed, of course, more than all the rest, and they are truly America's heroes. They have to be considered America's heroes because they understand what



this is all about. They have been out there and they have sacrificed.

Some of you I know have visited wounded servicemen around the country. You have seen them up here at Walter Reed and Bethesda Medical Center, and you know the inspiration we gain from them and their devotion to duty and their understanding of the mission. They have it and they understand.

So with that, I thank you for the opportunity to be here today. We thank you for the support we have gotten from Congress. All this would not have been possible if we had not had your support, and we look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Myers follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN. RICHARD B. MYERS, USAF

It is an honor to report to this committee on the state of our Armed Forces, our current military commitments, and ongoing operations around the world, as our Nation enters its third year of the war on terrorism.

I would like to start by thanking you for your great support of our men and women in uniform. What they are doing is vitally important. The stakes could not be higher: defeat means the destruction of the way of life Americans have enjoyed over two and a quarter centuries; and victory will restore the sense of security that was shattered on 11 September 2001.

We are winning the war on terrorism, but it will be a long fight, and requires our patience, our full commitment, and most importantly our will to win. Every day, U.S. service men and women, along with other U.S. agencies and our Coalition Partners, are making great progress disrupting terror networks, eliminating safe havens, seizing financial assets, and hunting down terrorists worldwide.

I have visited our troops in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in the region, as have many Members of Congress. I am convinced that our service men and women's sense of purpose is clear, their resolve is steadfast, and their morale is excellent. They have shown their commitment and will to win. We should all be very proud of their bravery and dedication to duty.

WAR ON TERRORISM

Here at home, our service men and women are also working hard to protect our own shores from future attacks. Two weeks ago, I had the opportunity to observe a bio-terrorism consequence management exercise, Operation Determined Promise 03, in Clark County, Nevada. U.S. military Active, Reserve, and Guard Forces along with U.S. Federal, State, and local officials did a magnificent job coordinating efforts to respond to a simulated terrorist attack.

We must be able to provide adequate defense within our own borders, and standing up U.S. Northern Command last year fully integrated our Armed Forces into the homeland defense role. However, when possible, the better military option is to take the fight to the enemy.

*Afghanistan*

In Afghanistan, we currently have nearly 10,000 U.S. troops and 8,000 Coalition Forces conducting security and stability operations in Afghanistan. Together with our Coalition Partners, we are training the Afghan National Army (ANA) and police in Kabul and the provinces, contributing to election preparations, building schools and clinics, and providing a secure environment to support the emerging private sector.

Most of Afghanistan is stable and secure, but pockets of resistance still remain, mostly in the South and East. The threat is primarily from the Taliban, in loose coordination with al Qaeda and Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin. The ANA is key to increasing stability and security in Afghanistan. ANA training is going very well. Ten battalions totaling 4,600 soldiers have been trained so far. The ANA is already patrolling the borders side by side with U.S., Afghani Militia, and Coalition Forces. Last week they were part of the forces that fought and successfully defeated a large number of Taliban forces.

We are in the process of expanding the number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan from four to eight, to provide coverage for more of the country. PRTs are improving roads, bridges, wells, clinics, and schools, and having a very positive effect on the lives of Afghani citizens in the outlying regions of Af-

ghanistan. I believe that with the Coalition's support, Afghanistan is on a steady road to peace, stability, and prosperity.

#### *Iraq*

In Iraq today, we have approximately 129,000 U.S. Forces and more than 22,000 Coalition Forces. Over 40 nations are providing various levels of support to the coalition in Iraq, and 29 of those are providing military forces. The goal in Iraq is to restore freedom, peace, and prosperity to the Iraqi people through the combined efforts of the U.S. Government, the Iraqi Governing Council, and the international community. The CPA has developed a four-pronged reconstruction strategy for Iraq consisting of increasing security, restoring essential services, creating economic growth, and helping establish a democratically elected government.

The threat in Iraq is from former regime loyalists and Ba'athists as well as foreign jihadists and other terrorist groups. U.S. and Coalition Military Forces are on the offensive against these threats. Every day, more Iraqi citizens are reporting suspected regime loyalists, and the locations of arms caches to Coalition Forces. To date, 42 of the 55 "most wanted" and approximately 100 of the top 235 wanted Iraqis have been captured or killed, and we are making good progress eliminating other terrorist elements. Terrorists are continuing to target humanitarian facilities, police stations, and other civilian targets such as oil, water, and electric infrastructure, slowing our efforts to repair damage caused by the war and by the neglect of the former regime.

In spite of these attacks, we are making progress restoring essential services in Iraq. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and the CPA are working with leading industry, agency, and international experts to assess and fix the short- and long-term requirements for Iraqi essential services.

There has been discussion about the need for additional troops in Iraq. I fully support CENTCOM's assessment that the answer is not more U.S. Forces in Iraq, but more focused intelligence, assigning more Iraqis to critical, more visible security roles, and getting the international community more involved—and CENTCOM is doing just that.

To improve security conditions in Iraq, we are training the Iraqi police force, a Civil Defense Corps, a National Defense Force, a Facilities Protective Service, and a Border Guard Service. There are currently over 50,000 trained Iraqis under arms working side-by-side with U.S. and Coalition Forces, and more coming onboard every day. As in Afghanistan, this will improve security in Iraq by allowing Iraqis to protect their own country. Working closely with U.S. Forces, Iraqi police are making significant contributions to preventing attacks, and some of these Iraqis have given their lives in the service of the new Iraq.

#### WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

The Iraqi Survey Group (ISG) continues to make progress in collecting new information on Iraq's WMD programs. Today, over 1,300 personnel are actively engaged supporting the ISG's strategy pursuing individuals with knowledge of Iraq's WMD programs and exploiting selected facilities. As Iraqis become more convinced that the former regime will never return, and more certain of the world's commitment to the reconstruction of Iraq, it is only a matter of time before we locate the remnants of all of Saddam's weapons programs.

#### KOREA

We currently have over 37,000 personnel assigned to South Korea. North Korea's weapons of mass destruction, missile programs, and weapons proliferation constitute a substantial threat to the peace and security of the peninsula, the region, and the world. While a diplomatic solution to the North Korean threat is preferable, our military forces remain ready for any contingency if called upon.

#### OTHER GLOBAL OPERATIONS

In pursuing our global efforts against those who pose a continuing and imminent threat to the United States and our allies, we continue to work closely with many other governments. Approximately 4,500 U.S. personnel under command of Joint Task Force-Liberia (JTF-Liberia) are deployed to the West African region to assist the ECOMIL Mission in Liberia. We are helping ECOMIL forces stabilize the environment, allowing humanitarian assistance for the people of Liberia and facilitating the transition to an U.N.-led peacekeeping operation, currently scheduled for 1 October 2003. JTF-Liberia consists of the IWO JIMA Amphibious Ready Group, the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, the 398th Air Expeditionary Group, and other supporting elements.

We have made good progress in the Philippines, where we have approximately 250 personnel working closely with the Armed Forces of the Philippines to enhance their counter-terrorist capabilities.

The nearly 1,500 U.S. Forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina supporting Operation Joint Forge, and the 2,000 Forces in Kosovo supporting Operation Joint Guardian, not only promote peace and stability in the region, but also enhance our ability to conduct counterterrorism operations in the Balkans.

U.S. Southern Command has over 2,000 personnel deployed to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and over 2,400 personnel deployed throughout Central and South America conducting counter-narcotics and counterterrorism operations. The U.S. has a strong national security interest in a secure, democratic, and economically viable Western Hemisphere.

Helping the Colombian Government become free from the grip of terrorist and narcotics trafficking groups is critical to securing the stability of the entire region. After my recent trip to South America, I believe that we are helping the Colombians achieve some real successes. The U.S. military's training and equipping of the Colombian Military is significantly contributing to their efforts to defeat terrorism and narcotics trafficking.

U.S. Forces are engaged throughout the world conducting bilateral and multilateral exercises with many countries to foster military to military relations that enhance U.S. national security objectives.

#### IMPACT OF U.S. MILITARY COMMITMENTS

We are a Nation at war. Our military forces are actively engaged to meet our national security interests by combating terrorism, providing peace and stability in many troubled regions around the world, and conducting military exercises with many different countries. U.S. military ground forces are currently experiencing a high tempo of operations. Selected high demand units resident in both the Active and Reserve Force are also heavily committed.

We must reexamine which military capabilities best reside with our Reserve and Guard components and which belong in the Active-Duty Force. Our goal is to minimize future demands on high demand units in the Reserve Force, such as civil-support teams, military police, and intelligence teams. We also need to ensure we have enough of a given specialty, regardless of whether it is in the active or Reserve component.

We are also reviewing our overseas basing requirements to ensure that they meet the needs of today's worldwide commitments, support the war on terror, and posture U.S. Forces to meet any future threats to our national security. For the most part, our current overseas presence and basing is representative of a Cold War strategy that evolved over the course of 50 years. In places like South Korea, the aging and failing infrastructure exacts a greater toll on readiness and quality of life of our forces each year. In other regions such as Europe, our broad array of installations may no longer provide us the flexibility it once did. Focused investments in military construction are needed now to overcome these challenges and enhance our overseas posture in meeting future military commitments.

Maintaining a high level of readiness for our forces, along with a decent quality of life, is key to meeting future threats to our national security. Predictability in the lives of our active and Reserve service men and women and their families is an essential quality of life issue we are addressing. To improve predictability, an Operation Iraqi Freedom force rotation policy was developed and communicated to the force. Competitive pay and benefits programs are also important to maintaining a high quality of life for our troops.

One of the reasons for our many successes to date in the war on terrorism is the unprecedented level of cooperation between our joint military forces and other Federal agencies. Another reason for our success is the continued support of our many allies—more than 70 countries since 11 September 2001. In order to maintain our momentum and defeat future threats, we must continue to improve on this level of cooperation.

Most importantly, our military success in the global war on terrorism depends on our service men and women. They bravely fight to protect our freedoms. I want to thank this committee for your continued strong support providing our Nation's best with the resources and benefits they need and deserve. Our collective will, commitment, and patience will defeat global terrorism and ensure our ultimate victory.

Chairman WARNER. General, that message is not just for the Senate or the American people. It goes worldwide. Your troops, wherever they are, under your command and your subordinate

commanders, whether it is Iraq, Afghanistan, Liberia, or the Far East, they are very proud of the leadership that you display today and have displayed. Thank you.

General MYERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WARNER. I will be very brief, colleagues, in three quick questions, because you have been generous in your time for me. Then each Senator will proceed for about 7½ minutes.

First I want to reflect on this issue of the United Nations. I personally support it, even though I do not fully understand precisely what is expected and what can be achieved. Secretary Grossman, these charts are impressive. There is a factual record of participation in Iraq and Afghanistan. Can you tell us what you, as a professional of long standing in this Department, would hope that the U.N. can bring which is not presently being done. Please dwell on the issue which concerns me, that is, while we would welcome enlarged U.N. participation, we cannot afford to lose the momentum that Ambassador Bremer and others now have under way, whether it is in dealing with electricity or water or the like. In my opinion, there is a direct correlation to that and the casualties we are taking and the attitude of the people.

So what is it that you would hope, in a very short response, that the U.N. will bring which is not present today?

Secretary GROSSMAN. Yes, sir, thank you very much. I will answer your question three ways. First, if we are successful in getting a U.N. Security Council resolution along the lines that we have proposed, I think three things will happen: first, that there are countries, for their constitutional reasons, for their legal reasons, for other reasons, that do not wish yet to send troops to help the Coalition effort in Iraq, and if we get a resolution that authorizes a multinational force under unified command more countries—perhaps Turkey, India, and Pakistan—will feel that they can send their troops in a way that they cannot today.

Second, Mr. Chairman, the United Nations brings to the political effort skills that we would like to have as part of the effort. The President talked about a vital role for the United Nations, and of course the great U.N. Special Representative Serge DiMello died in a building trying to bring that vital effort to life. So the United Nations can help us in elections, in helping constitution writing, in bringing a census, for example. All of those things are in the resolution, listed as the kinds of things that could help us and help the Coalition in Iraq.

I want to be clear, to your last point, that the resolution specifically talks about the United Nations working with Ambassador Bremer and with the Coalition. We think actually that if a resolution was to pass quickly and more troops were to come in a focused U.N. effort, that we would actually increase momentum rather than decrease it.

Finally, one more point, and that is the philosophy here. This U.N. resolution is not about transferring authority from the United States to the United Nations. It is about getting as much authority as possible, as quickly as possible, to the Iraqi people. I think as we go through the debate over the next week or so on this resolution that is an important point to keep in mind, sir.

Chairman WARNER. Do you wish to add to that, Secretary Wolfowitz? What is it that the U.N. will bring that we do not presently have? He has said that the resolution could give various nations the basis on which to bring troops and I hope contribute financially to this. Do you have a supplementary comment?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Absolutely all three of those things: help on the troops front, help on the political front, and help on the economic front. I think it is important to stress that, with respect particularly to the political front, that we got enormous help from the U.N. and by Sergio DiMello personally. It is not only a tragedy, it is an enormous loss to our efforts in Iraq that he was killed. He played a crucial role with Ambassador Bremer in standing up the Iraqi Governing Council, and it was not just advice and counsel, it was active work.

We have no desire to own this problem or to control it. Our only desire is what will get things fixed most rapidly, and you have to look at these pragmatically case by case. More resources are great, but too many hands on the steering wheel, especially in the military area, is not great. But I think we have reached a very good understanding with the Secretary General.

Chairman WARNER. You are prepared to make a sharing of the responsibility and the authority and the direction on that side; do I understand that?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. It is completely pragmatic and whatever works best, we will do.

Chairman WARNER. Fine.

Now, General, we talk about the unified command. A few days ago when Secretary Wolfowitz and General Abizaid were here that question was put to General Abizaid and he specifically said that he felt U.N. officers could be integrated. Although there is a unified command, they could be integrated into the framework in some manner.

Can you expand on what the U.N. can bring to the current command and control to maintain a unified command, but at the same time they feel they have a share of the responsibility, the accountability, and the direction?

General MYERS. Certainly, Chairman Warner. We have looked at this many different ways. First, let me just say that it will not be a problem to maintain this unified command. As I think was said earlier, generally under U.N. operations the countries with the preponderance of force have the leadership roles, and that will continue to be the United States, at least for the foreseeable future.

But in our Combined Joint Task Force 7 in Baghdad that some of you have seen with General Sanchez, he has a headquarters now that is populated with people from the U.K. and those countries that make up the U.K. division, and people from Poland and those countries that make up the Polish division. If there were other divisions that came in with the help of this resolution, the U.N. resolution, those countries would also have roles on that joint task force, where they participate then with General Sanchez and General Abizaid, for that matter, in their support of the Coalition Provisional Authority. This really should not be an issue.

Chairman WARNER. Fine, thank you.

General Mattis, I wonder if I might invite you to come up for purposes of questioning. We thank you for your service and your leadership in Iraq. Those of us that visited had the opportunity to be briefed by you right on the field where your troops are operating.

It was in that very spot, that very seat, that the former Chief of Staff of the Army was asked a question by this committee about troop levels. His response provoked a good deal of controversy. That controversy is legitimate. It continues to this day. It is a question that has to be reviewed from time to time by this committee.

I think you are in a position to give first-hand impressions and your own personal, professional, and military opinion about force levels now in Iraq and what you as a former commander think about the force level and what is needed for the future?

General MATTIS. Mr. Chairman, I speak as a division commander in the south central area and I would prefer to speak just in that area because I am not really familiar with some of the other areas. But it was my decision and my decision alone to send home 15,000 of my 23,000 troops back at the end of May. We had come out of Baghdad. I did not think I needed a heavy footprint down south after sizing up the situation.

I have had 3 months to live with that decision and I think if at any point I needed more troops I could have asked for them. But I have not needed them. The enemy over there, once we get the intelligence on them, and 95 percent of that comes from the Iraqi people to us, once we get it they are remarkably easy to destroy. It is mostly a fight for intelligence. They are a dangerous enemy, but it is nothing that a Marine platoon cannot handle.

So to bring in more troops and have a more oppressive footprint, the number of supply convoys it would have added—my way of thinking was if we needed more people on our side we could enlist more Iraqis, and we continued to do that all the way through. With 95 percent of our intelligence coming from them, sir, it has worked pretty well.

Chairman WARNER. Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Grossman, you have outlined some of the advantages of going back to the U.N., getting a key additional mandate from the U.N., and I surely agree with what you have indicated. We have known for months that a number of countries, such as Pakistan, Turkey, and India, would not consider sending troops unless they had a clear U.N. mandate urging them to do so.

Why have we delayed for months going to the U.N.? During this period we have seen a huge amount of violence. We have seen the jihadists pour into Iraq, responding to an argument that this is some kind of a western effort to dominate a Muslim country. The way to give the lie to that propaganda is for the U.N. to give the mandate which we are now apparently seeking, very belatedly, tragically belatedly.

But why the delay here? Why not months ago respond to the statements of those countries, such as Pakistan and Turkey and India, who could give us large numbers of troops relatively, that they need that new U.N. mandate?

Secretary GROSSMAN. Senator Levin, I would say a couple of things. First, I do not think we ought to underestimate the achievement of 23,000 troops from 29 other countries. Although I think all of us would have liked to have had more troops earlier from a Pakistan, from a Turkey, from an India, I think we have done extremely well in getting the 29 nations and the 23,000 troops that we have.

The second point, as this committee knows, there is always a disagreement about what constitutes a mandate. If you had asked me the day after the Security Council passed Resolution 1483, I would have said and I believe that Resolution 1483 is a sufficient mandate for countries to participate.

Senator LEVIN. But key countries told us it was not a sufficient mandate.

Secretary GROSSMAN. I understand, sir. But I am just giving—you asked me my perspective and that is that 1483 was a sufficient mandate. It turned out not to be true for a number of countries and so the President gave the Secretary the opportunity, with the full support of our colleagues, to go forward and get another Security Council resolution, and that is exactly what we are trying to do.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you.

General Myers, could you tell us about what we now have read, that the Guard and Reserve units serving in Iraq are going to have their tours on active duty extended so that they will serve a full year in Iraq, which is on top of the time required for mobilization and training and demobilization? This comes as a real disappointment, I know, to them, their families, and their employers, who were told that the total activation would be a year on active duty.

What is going on in this area?

General MYERS. Senator, as we have talked about before, in terms of the United States Army, a lot of their support, a lot of the combat support, combat service support, well over the majority of it, is in the Reserve component. As long as we have the active duty Army engaged as we do around the world and, to address your question particularly, in Iraq, then the Reserves are going to have to play a role.

It is a fact of life that we need the combat support, combat service support that these Reserve components provide. We are looking for work-arounds to do exactly as you said and I think as all the Joint Chiefs and the leadership in the Department believe, and that is we have to put predictability in the lives of our Reserve component and, for that matter, active component.

But we also have to realize we are a Nation at war and we have to do what it takes in this case to win. So that is what is happening. We need that combat support, combat service support to be with our Active Forces as long as they are in Iraq, and they will be extended to meet our policy goal of up to 12 months in Iraq and, given their mobilization and demobilization time frames on top of that, they will serve over 1 year.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you.

Secretary Wolfowitz, we have been asked now for a significant commitment for reconstruction. What specific commitments have we asked of other nations for the reconstruction effort financially?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I believe that so far we have on the order of—correct me—some \$2 billion, I think, that has been pledged by a variety of countries. That is still the product of just an initial effort. Secretary Powell is going to be going to a donors conference in October—where is it, Marc?

Secretary GROSSMAN. Madrid.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ.—in Madrid, looking for more. Obviously, in the context of what the President is talking about asking Congress for, we are going to be making a maximum effort to get other countries to contribute.

You raised the issue, Senator, about, I think your phrase was, giving up control or giving up ownership.

Senator LEVIN. I did not say “giving up”; I said “sharing”.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Fine, sharing.

Senator LEVIN. A significant word.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I think the more other countries are prepared to contribute, the more they are absolutely entitled to share in control over how resources are used. At the same time—we have seen this in Afghanistan, for example—if the system of sharing control gets too complicated, a lot of things that need to move quickly take too long. The road construction project in Afghanistan is an example.

In Iraq today we have been wrestling with how to stand up the Iraqi Civil Defense Force more quickly. There are very legitimate concerns on the CPA side. There are obviously huge military equities on the CENTCOM side. Because of the way we are organized, we can resolve those differences and those issues in a quick and efficient manner and, given the stakes on the security side, that is the kind of sharing of control I think we would want to be careful about.

But when countries are giving money they are certainly entitled to a say in how that money is spent.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you.

General, last week we read a report that there was an internal joint staff document on Operation Iraqi Freedom, strategic lessons learned, and it reportedly shows that President Bush approved the overall war strategy in August of last year, 8 months before the war was launched, but that planners were not given enough time to adequately plan phase four, which is the reconstruction phase.

Will you make that document available to this committee?

General MYERS. A couple points there, Senator Levin. One is that the work is not finished. There were several levels of lessons learned that we tried to capture for this effort. The first one, which is scheduled to be briefed to you by Admiral Giambastiani I think next week, is the operational level lessons learned, what happened in theater from General Franks' level down.

We also wanted to capture, if you will, the strategic lessons learned, what we learned in the Joint Staff, on the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) staff, in our inter-agency coordination. That work, the piece, the classified briefing that was leaked to one of the newspapers here in town, reflected work that is not yet complete. We are probably about halfway through that work. I am sure when we finish that work it will get to the Secretary of Defense and he will make that available to the committee.



Senator LEVIN. Will it be shared with us before it gets to the Secretary of Defense or will it be shared with us afterward? Either way, will we get a copy of that document so that we know what the views are of the Joint Staff unvarnished by the civilian leadership?

General MYERS. It is not a question of unvarnished. It is a question of having the facts straight, and that is why this whole effort has been a joint, as you would imagine, inside the building, Department of Defense effort. It is the OSD civilian staff, the Joint Staff, and, for that matter, the combatant commands will add to this as well. For it to be useful, I think, you need to have everybody's perspective in there.

By the way, and let me just tag on for a second, what a lot of people probably do not understand and why—and you do, I know; this committee does. You know why we have the finest Armed Forces in the world, and there are lots of reasons for it. One of the reasons is that we criticize ourselves harder than anybody else. We only have one standard in the U.S. military and that is perfection. Whether it is a flight debriefing that I used to participate in or any other debriefings of any exercises, the only standard we have is how could we have done this perfectly.

Some of what you see reflected in these reports, of course, is being very critical of ourself. It does not mean we were not good or that we could have gotten an A on the paper, but if A-plus was possible then we did not achieve a good paper. That is how we critique ourselves.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much.

Senator McCain.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to say before the questioning that I believe that we carried out this operation for good reason, that the United States of America, the world, and the people of Iraq are better off for having been liberated, and that history will show that when the mass graves continue to be uncovered and the brutalities of the Saddam Hussein regime are more fully revealed, that it was a wise and humane decision on the part of the United States.

However, I think it is important for us to remember my hero, President Reagan's, old adage: Facts are stubborn things. The facts as I see them, Mr. Chairman, are clearly that we underestimated the size of the challenge that we would face after the "military operations" were completed, the Baathist resistance, the former military people melting into the population, et cetera.

The decay of the infrastructure is truly staggering. You have to see the second largest city in Iraq, which is a total and complete slum, to appreciate the depth and expense involved.

Ambassador Bremer was correct when he said, I believe, it will require tens of billions of dollars. That was not anticipated before we went in.

Extending the Guard and reservists, which, quoting The Washington Post story this morning, "Some officials have expressed concern that this could break the Guard and Reserve system." That is another fact that we did not take into consideration.

No one believed that we would have to go to the United Nations in the degree that we have today.

Let me point out, Ambassador Grossman, that we like to have full facts. There are 29 nations that are contributing 23,000 troops. There are 28 nations that are contributing 9,000 and one nation that is contributing 14,000. That gives a little bit different perspective of the 29-nation coalition.

We have made great progress in the north and in the south, but there remain significant problems. The British made a tough decision in the last few days to increase the size of their commitment, not to call up Guard and Reserve, but to increase the size of their commitment in the same area that the General was talking about.

The Marines have decided to extend their commitment in Najaf rather than give it to the multinational Polish division, which has neither the charter nor the capability to do the job that our marines can do.

By the way, facts: The Pentagon had planned that there would be some 60,000 troops in Iraq today as a result of the progress that was foreseen.

So if I may quote The Weekly Standard: "What we are witnessing today is neither prudent multilateralism nor the normal gradual process of turning power over to Iraqis that we all expected to occur over time. On both the international and Iraqi fronts, the administration's actions are being driven by the realization that there are too few American troops in Iraq."

I think that that is an accurate statement. When we have to extend Guard and reservists on active duty, when we have to ask for international forces, when we have to do the things that we are doing, it is clear to me that we need additional troops and we need certain specialties—intelligence, civil affairs, Special Forces, marines—not just more tanks. That opinion is shared by a large body of opinion, not just my own.

It has been mentioned a couple of times, Secretary Wolfowitz, that there may be more casualties if we send in additional American troops. The General just referred to supply convoys that would be open to attack. Is that an accurate depiction of what you said?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Depending on what you send them for, I think that is right, Senator.

Senator MCCAIN. So we are going to ask for international troops to come in, in all due respect, General, who will also need supply convoys, and will tell them they will take the casualties, Americans will not take the casualties. I do not get the logic there.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Senator, the kind of thing, if I may—

Senator MCCAIN. Go ahead, please.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. The thing I meant is, a vivid example, we had three Americans killed and one very badly wounded when someone threw a bomb or a hand grenade out of the top floor of a hospital they were guarding. We are training Iraqis to guard hospitals. We are not talking about bringing in international troops to do that, either. I mean, there are a lot of dangerous—

Senator MCCAIN. What are we asking the international troops to do?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. The truth is on the whole, with I would say the exceptions of the British in Basra, the international troops

are going into areas that are relatively stable. The delay in Najaf is not a permanent one, or is it an expression of lack of confidence in the troops that are coming in there, which I believe are Spanish in that particular part of the Polish division, but rather that they are brand new troops and they came in in the middle of a particularly delicate situation, so we extended the overlap period.

But General Mattis can speak to it better than I, but there is a lot of confidence that the Polish division can handle that region, precisely because it is not as dangerous as other parts of the country.

Senator MCCAIN. People I talk to say it is extremely dangerous.

Secretary GROSSMAN, when do you expect these international troops? When would you expect the first contingent of international troops to arrive in Iraq?

Secretary GROSSMAN. Senator, it depends on how quickly we pass this U.N. Security Council resolution, and our objective is to—

Senator MCCAIN. That is true. One month, 2 months, 6 months, 2 years, 5 years?

Secretary GROSSMAN. Secretary Powell is going on Saturday to the meeting of the Permanent Five foreign ministers. We hope that that will make clear what people think about the resolution we have proposed. I think, as Secretary Powell has said over the past few days, we want to get this done some time before the United Nations General Assembly, which is the 23rd and 24th of September. So if that is done—

Senator MCCAIN. I would repeat: Do you have any idea as to when we could expect the first international troops to arrive in Iraq?

Secretary GROSSMAN. No, sir.

Senator MCCAIN. You have no idea. Thank you.

Secretary GROSSMAN. Sir, I only have no idea because it would depend upon the Security Council resolution. I can only say to you, sir, we are trying to get it passed—

Senator MCCAIN. So we cannot count on an immediate infusion of international forces into Iraq; is that correct?

Secretary GROSSMAN. I think what we can—I think I cannot tell you, of the three or four countries that are waiting for a Security Council resolution, precisely what day that they will come.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. I am not asking for precisely what day. I am asking a matter of—could you tell me years?

Secretary GROSSMAN. If the Security Council resolution passes, sir, in the next few weeks, I cannot imagine that it would be years.

Senator MCCAIN. That precision is not really satisfying.

General Myers, finally, could I ask you a question.

General MYERS. Can I comment on that question?

Senator MCCAIN. You can in the context of the answer to this question. You personally traveled to Texas to lobby the President on the need for additional international forces in Iraq. According to the Post report, you did so after visiting Iraq and hearing directly from General Abizaid that he urgently needed additional military forces from other nations.

Is not your support for the deployment of forces an acknowledgment we need more boots on the ground in Iraq?

General MYERS. No, Senator, it is not. I think I will stand by General Mattis's comments——

Senator MCCAIN. Let me just point out before we rely on the General too much, I have never heard of a commander in the field who requested additional help. I do not know of an occasion. So to put a Marine General who is in charge of a specific area of Iraq to discuss these issues, which are made by our civilian policy-makers, I think is not helpful to this hearing.

Go ahead.

General MYERS. Some facts. First of all, The Washington Post article was not factual in tone or content. I did not go to Crawford, Texas, to lobby the President for anything. I went as part of the Secretary of Defense's delegation to talk about a variety of national security issues. Of the 4½ hours or 4 hours we spent with the President, that might have taken 15 seconds to cover that piece. So the article is not correct.

I do believe we need to internationalize the effort. It is extremely important to do so. Why? I stated it in my opening remarks: This is an international problem. International terrorism is an international problem, and every time an Iraqi turns around they just cannot see a U.S. service member, because they do not want foreigners in their country and particularly there is some allergy from time to time against the U.S. So we need to internationalize it.

At the same time that we are saying we do not need more troops, what is happening? We have 55,000 Iraqis under arms. As Secretary Wolfowitz said, the largest part of this coalition right now besides us are the Iraqis, and more of those are going to come on every day. I am not going to swear to this number, but roughly in the summer of 2005 we will have at least 184,000 Iraqis under arms to do this mission, 184,000.

So that is part of the answer, and this is something the Iraqis have to take responsibility for themselves. We cannot do it for them. We could put every sailor, soldier, airman, marine, and coast guardsman we have in Iraq and it would not make this problem better. In fact, it could work just to the opposite. The more Americans in Iraq, the less Iraqis might feel prompted to come forward and furnish us that intelligence, which is what we need so badly to deal with the threat.

I talk to General Abizaid daily, several times a day. He talks to the Secretary daily or more frequently at times. This is not an issue of Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Wolfowitz, or any of the leadership in the Department of Defense saying, General, you cannot have more troops, or any pressure in that way. If they want more troops, they will get more troops. We are a Nation at war. We have the capacity, we have the capability.

I would just finally say, on the Reserve component piece, if we are a Nation at war, if the stakes are very high, then we are doing exactly as we want to do, as we are designed. We are using our Reserves.

By the way, they perform magnificently. We have to worry about the danger of what harm we might do long-term to our Reserve structure because it is absolutely essential to the way we do our work in this country. Having said that——

Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Chairman, I am very interested that the reason why we need international troops is because it is an international problem, not because we need more military assistance there.

General Myers, do you intend to ask, to recommend to the President, that we increase the size of our military forces in light of having to extend Guard and Reserve personnel?

General MYERS. What we are going to recommend, Senator McCain, is that we look at this mix, and we are only extending the Reserve component because that is where the capability exists today. The question we are asking ourselves is—and some of this may be reflected in the 2005 budget you will see in January, do we have the right mix? We have so much of this capability we need today, so many of our military police, so many of our civil affairs. I think every battalion except one is in—I may have it mixed up; it may be brigades—is in the Reserve component. So those are the things we will take to the President. I think we are a ways off from saying that we need more troops.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. I do agree with General Myers that the stakes could not be higher. My question is, if the stakes are as high as General Myers maintains and I am totally in agreement of, whether we are doing everything necessary.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the witnesses.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much.

Secretary Grossman, had you finished your observation on this very important colloquy?

Secretary GROSSMAN. Concerning the timing of the United Nations?

Chairman WARNER. If you have, we will move on to the next question.

General MYERS. I was going to answer in the context and if I may have just 30 seconds.

Chairman WARNER. All right.

General MYERS. In the discussions that we are having—and I say we; it is everybody at this table, the State Department, DOD—with our friends and allies, decisions made to commit troops to Iraq will be made by sovereign nations, so you can never predict their processes or how quickly. But I would anticipate that by the end of the year we ought to have more contributors to this.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you.

Senator Kennedy.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I would hope that General Myers and the others that represent the Armed Forces would again let our service men and women know how much we appreciate their courageous work and the skill in which they are trying to deal with an extremely complex situation.

There is obvious diversity on this committee, as we just heard from Senator McCain. I believe this was the wrong war at the wrong time. It was a go-it-alone policy. We had a policy in order to win the war, but it is quite clear we did not have a policy to protect our troops after the war is over. All during this period of time, we have a deterioration of our situation in Afghanistan, we have North Korea with all of its dangers in terms of nuclear weapons,

we have the development of Iran in terms of its nuclear power, we have an absolute deterioration in terms of the Middle East, with violence spiraling out of control. We are asked now to provide \$87 billion more in order to try to deal with the problems in Iraq and also in Afghanistan.

Now, General Myers, no one questions whether our troops possess the patience and the commitment and the will to win. We all assume that. The only question is whether the administration has a policy to stabilize Iraq. That is the issue. Minimizing the burden on our troops and delivering on the promise of democracy, that is the issue that is before the committee, not about the will, the patriotism, the determination of the troops. We know that and you know it, and the parents in my State know it as well, as more than seven young men have lost their lives. So we know about that.

Now, in the address to the Nation on Sunday I had hoped to hear acknowledgment from the President about our failures in Iraq, the war on terrorism, and the administration's concrete plans for setting the course right with our allies and through the United Nations. The administration has made a U-turn in its policy, but it does not know which direction it is going in, I do not believe.

The President has asked us for \$87 billion next year for our occupation of Iraq, essentially a blank check. The American people deserve to know the answers to the following questions: As Senator McCain has pointed out, what is the number of additional troops needed to prevent the sabotage impeding the U.S. reconstruction effort? What is the estimate of the duration of the U.S. military occupation and the likely levels of U.S. and foreign troop strength that will be required in the occupation? What is the estimate of the total cost of the occupation, the reconstruction, including the likely amount of international contributions? What is the schedule for restoring electricity and water and basic services to the Iraqi people? What is the schedule for the deployment of the Iraqi police and the Iraqi armed forces, and when will we know we have succeeded? When will we know we have succeeded and no longer need to support Iraq financially and militarily? American families want to know that. American families want to know, what is the long-term schedule for the withdrawal of foreign and American forces? They want to know that as well.

I believe we need to have the answers to those questions before we provide additional funding, at least in the areas of reconstruction. We are going to support the service men and women, but when you are asking for the tens of billions of dollars in reconstruction we are entitled to the answers to those questions.

Now, Mr. Wolfowitz, it is clear, as I mentioned, that the Bush administration was not ready for what took place after the Iraqi regime collapsed. As I said, we won the war, which we knew we would, but we did not have an adequate plan to win the peace.

Today we learned that before our war in Iraq even started intelligence experts had warned the administration to expect major armed resistance to our occupation. These experts in our government warned that the post-war period would be more problematic than the war itself. You and other officials in the administration responsible for this war were warned. Yet you put tens of thou-

sands of American troops in harm's way without adequate planning.

I am going to be interested in how that could have happened and who is accountable. But is it not unforgivable that we forgot the most important planning of all, the safety of our troops? What planning was done to provide for the safety of our troops, which is so inadequate at the present time?

I am not interested in your answer about how we prepared for food, how we prepared for massive refugee movements. I have heard all of that before. But I want to know, given the warning that the Defense Department was given in terms of the protection for troops, what was the planning? How do you possibly explain the inadequacy of that planning, and who is going to pay the price for the inadequacy of that planning?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Senator, it would take I think some 20 sessions to brief all the plans that exist that are being executed today, and you are interested, I guess, in plans for agriculture, plans for health. Plans for security alone——

Senator KENNEDY. What about the troops? That is what I am most interested in.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Let me get to that. The plans for security alone are absolutely crucial here, and we have gone from no Iraqis on our side when Baghdad fell to 55,000 out on the streets today, out guarding facilities, out getting wounded and killed, and we are growing that number rapidly.

You say we did not plan for when the war was over. The problem is that the war is not over. The problem is that the Baathist regime——

Senator KENNEDY. You mean in spite of the President's statement out on that aircraft carrier, when he made his statement, you are saying now the war is not——

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Go back and read the statement, Senator; you will see——

Senator KENNEDY. I listened to it. I heard the statement. I saw that banner that was there.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. He said it was the end of major combat operations, which indeed it was.

Senator KENNEDY. Okay, now you distinguish between the end of major combat and the end of the war. That is very interesting for service men and women that are out there, very interesting.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Senator, they know that they are fighting. They know that they are fighting terrorists and they know that they are fighting the Baathist allies of those terrorists, and they know that victory in this fight is crucial to winning the war on terrorism.

Senator McCain said, and I absolutely agree with him and the President agrees with him, that this battle in Iraq today is the central battle in the war on terror. These people fight—as General Mattis told me earlier, during the major combat phase it was those fanatic Baathists and the foreign terrorists who were our main opposition. They are our main opposition today.

But they are losing. They are on the losing end of history here because, unlike other wars in the past where people talk about resistance, this resistance does not enjoy the support of the Iraqi peo-

ple. That is a fundamental point. They are universally detested in the Shia south, which represents I believe some 60 percent of the population. They are almost equally detested in the north, which is a mixture—let me emphasize this—of not just Turks and Kurds, but Sunni Arabs.

The chief of police that we have found, who has done a fantastic job in Baghdad, is a Sunni Arab. He hates the Baathists. He spent a year in prison because he actually denounced Saddam Hussein. I asked him: Were you crazy to denounce Saddam Hussein? He said: I only said it to my best friend.

This is a regime that terrorized everybody, and there are still some thousands of them, not hundreds of thousands, but thousands are enough to cause a problem out there, threatening people, killing people, warning people not to cooperate with us.

But every time we get intelligence—and we are getting more and more intelligence—as I believe the general said, every time we get intelligence, all it takes is a platoon to go out there and clean them up. We are making real progress in that regard.

Getting Uday and Qusay was not only in itself a huge step forward, but it has encouraged a lot of other Iraqis to come forward with more and better information. We are on the winning side here. We have—I do not know how to measure the numbers. I would make a guess—I better not make guesses; you will tell me later I guessed wrong.

We do know that there are some thousands of Fedayeen Saddam. Those were the absolute killers. We do know that there were some thousands of the Special Security Organization. That is like the old Nazi version of the Gestapo. We know that there were some tens of thousands of members of the Special Republican Guards. That is again like the Nazi version of the SS.

These people are killers, and apparently they have decided to go on killing. We will capture them and kill them. We have been doing it in large numbers. At the end of World War II, when we had had 4 years to plan for the aftermath, we found that we had to keep going after more and more Nazis, and by the end of 1945 I read there were some 80,000 under detention.

We are not looking to have 80,000 former Baathists. We believe the number is smaller, and we can deal with it in a smaller way. But let us be clear to the American people. The overwhelming majority of Iraqis in the south are with us. The overwhelming majority of Iraqis in the north are with us. We believe that most of the Iraqis in the so-called Sunni heartland certainly do not want Saddam Hussein back and to some extent are being terrorized by his elements that are left over.

So we have the winning assets on our side, and the most important winning assets are the Iraqi people and the willingness of Iraqis to go out and guard posts where it is dangerous and fight and die and keep that regime from coming back and to wipe it out.

Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Wolfowitz, my time is up, but it is apparent to me that we were unprepared, not only unprepared in Iraq, but in terms of giving the adequate protection for American troops.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you.



Secretary WOLFOWITZ. If I can just say, we were prepared for many things, some of which did not happen, some of which did not happen because we were prepared to prevent them. There was an enormous amount of preparation and there is a stunning list of successes that our military and their civilian counterparts have accomplished. Let us not—confidence is part of winning. We need to project confidence and we have every reason to project confidence because we have done a fantastic job. We have liberated a country from a horrible dictator. We are cleaning up the remnants of that regime. We have the people with us. We will get the electricity fixed.

General MYERS. Senator, Chairman Warner, the safety of the troops issue, as you might imagine, is something that I think about and worry about quite a bit. My view is we did plan adequately for the safety and security of our forces, given that they had a lot of work to do after major combat operations were over. One of the biggest things you can do for troops engaged in this conflict is to ensure they have the proper rules of engagement. Now, the rules of engagement that we used on March 19 when we went across the line from Kuwait to Iraq are the same rules of engagement that they use today.

The other things you can do to ensure their safety are making sure they are properly led, trained, and equipped. We have done our best in that area. That does not mean there are not shortfalls in some equipment. But I can tell you, thanks to you and our supplemental in 2003 and our budgets these last few years, there are not many and we are able to fill the holes very quickly when they occur.

I think we have done the planning, Senator Kennedy, for our troops. I could not sit here if I did not believe we have done everything we can do, everything that General Franks wanted us to do, everything that General Abizaid wanted us to do. We have a very collaborative system at work where we talk very frankly, because we are dealing with our most precious treasure, and that is the blood of our sons and daughters. We do not want to lose one more than we have to lose.

So I think we have considered safety.

Senator KENNEDY. My time is up, Mr. Chairman, but there have been statements by Secretary Wolfowitz in the past that said, contrary to our expectations, no Iraqi army units came over to our side, the Iraqi police turned out to require a massive overhaul, and that the plans that were based on the assumptions that Iraqi police and soldiers previously loyal to Saddam Hussein would be responsible for the safety of our troops. It just does not make any sense.

Someone ought to be accountable for it. Someone ought to be accountable.

Chairman WARNER. Senator, we will get to that. I urge that we concentrate as a Nation now on reducing these casualties and turning this situation over to the Iraqi people. I think we are making progress.

Senator Inhofe.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me first of all respond to a couple of statements that have been made by two of the Senators up here. Senator Levin talked

about how the go-it-alone chickens have come home to roost. The senior Senator from Massachusetts stated similarly that we were going it alone.

Let me just give another perspective on that, because during this time I became very impatient because I felt we were getting beyond the point where something had to be done. I would suggest to all of those who might entertain the idea that the President was going it alone, listen to what he had said. On September 12 he addressed the U.N. He listed the decade of U.N. resolutions that Iraq had defied. He said, "All the world now faces a test in the United Nations, a difficult and defining moment: Are Security Council resolutions to be honored and enforced or cast aside without consequences? Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding or will it be irrelevant?"

When he said: "The United States President offers to work with other nations"—he was begging them, begging these other nations and the United Nations—"to meet our common challenge." He said: "The purpose of the United States should not be doubted. The Security Council resolutions will be enforced, the just demands of peace and security will be met, or action will be unavoidable."

Two months later on November 8, he again approached the U.N. Security Council, and they by a vote of 15 to 0 adopted a resolution giving him one more chance. By December 8, you have to do something. I was one of them who was writing the President, Mr. Chairman, and saying: "You have waited too long; this is going to have to be done. People are being murdered every day, people are being raped every day, people are being tortured to death every day." Finally he had to do it. But he did everything within his power to get the United Nations to go along with him.

First of all, let me just comment on some things that have not been said. You listen to the media and there are a lot of people in the media who do not want this to be successful. They would like to think the President is not doing a good job. They do not agree with him philosophically. They do not like anybody sitting at the table before us.

So they talk about the terrorists and the killing and the things like that that are going on. What they fail to say is that great strides have been made over there since the major hostilities stopped. Every hospital and clinic in Baghdad is now open. Schools are being reopened with textbooks, school supplies, and eager Iraqi students, eager to learn, never having had the opportunity. Today there is more electricity in Iraq than there was before the liberation. The water systems are operating at 70 percent. The Iraqis are participating in rebuilding water canals. Baghdad has its first ever city-wide garbage collection.

Now, you could argue that the condition of the infrastructure and the treatment of the people in Iraq is better today than it was before the liberation. Having said that, I do see some things that I think are significant. First of all, we need to talk about the troop morale. I say to my very good friend, the senior Senator from Massachusetts, if you are really concerned about what you brought up on troop security or troop protection, I suggest you make a trip to Iraq, which I understand he has not done and I have. You talk to

the troops and they say the protection is good; they are doing everything they can.

The troop morale is high. The message that I get from the troops who come up to me and seek me out is: "Tell the people back home that that handful of troops that complained about the cause and about the President and about the treatment, that they are wrong, that that is just maybe 5 or 6 people out of 140,000." That is the message that I get.

General Myers, you said they have the will to win. Those kids have the will to win. I have never seen anything like it.

I do have a concern, though, and it is one that I have voiced many times. I take your word for it if you say—and I think a good argument can be made, and you have made that argument—that we do not need more American troops on the ground, that our footprint is big enough, and it might have a detrimental effect if we have more of us and not enough of the other countries involved. That may be true.

But what I want to get to is the question that was brought up by the Senator from Michigan, and that is the condition of our Guard and Reserve. I have been talking about this for a long time. It is true that we can maintain the current level and maybe not go any higher, but to do this we have to continue to overwork, in my opinion, the Guard and Reserve.

I have spent a lot of time talking to them. They are dedicated. They are doing great work. But when this new policy was announced, I had an occasion to talk to a few people on the fact that these deployments will be 12 months and I understand now in addition to that there will be a training period.

So I would like to ask each one of you in the remainder of the time that I have to, number one, tell me if you disagree with the fact that we are going to have to do something about Guard and Reserve in order to keep the force end strength that we have right now. I thought when I chaired the Readiness Subcommittee of this committee during the 1990s that we cut back too far, going from 18 down to 10 divisions, going from 38 fighter wings to 20, going from the ships roughly at 600 to 300. I thought that was too much.

But I think right now we realize in order to meet the contingencies that might be out there that we have not met yet and to sustain the force that we have for a period of time, that we are going to have to do something to increase participation, to give some relief to Guard and Reserves. Now, I understand there are three ways of doing this that at least I am aware of.

I think it was the Senator from West Virginia that ordered a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study that just came into my possession this morning, dated September 3. One of the ideas was to increase the number of our divisions from 10 to 12. They said the size of a sustainable occupation force could be increased. In looking at their idea of increasing by two divisions, they said: "Recruiting, training, and equipping two additional divisions would entail up-front costs of as much as \$18 billion to \$19 billion and would take 5 years to accomplish." So I am taking that off the table to meet the current serious problems.

I see three ways that this can be done. I would like to get comments from you. Maybe there is a fourth way I have not thought

of. First would be, as you pointed out, Secretary Wolfowitz, to train foreign troops. I understand now the Iraqi troops are getting up to 55,000. That is a good number and I appreciate hearing that.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. That includes police, just to be clear.

Senator INHOFE. Yes, I understand that.

Second would be to move some of the military functions to civilians. I would like to quantify how many openings that might create in order to allow us to give some relief to the Guard and Reserve.

Then lastly, in the same CBO report that was ordered by the Senator from West Virginia, it said: "CBO also examined several other policy choices, including ending U.S. participation in peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Sinai Peninsula, and withdrawing marines from Okinawa." That being the case, that could open up for about 12,000 to 13,000, approximately one more division.

So from those three sources I would like to hear from anyone that would like to respond and, if not here, then do so for the record, what other choices there are and about how many troops this could release to give relief to our Guard and Reserve. Let us start with General Myers.

General MYERS. Senator Inhofe, the peak Reserve component mobilized for the operation in Iraq, the total we had mobilized during the operation in Iraq was 223,000 reservists. Today we have 173,000 reservists that are mobilized. As I have already said, the way it is, the facts are that we have a lot of our combat support, combat service support in the Reserve component.

As to the CBO study, I would not quarrel with the study. I think the study that was done—and I am not the expert on the financial piece of it. But in terms of what the Army could sustain steady-state anywhere in the world, not necessarily Iraq, it is probably okay. But what you have to realize about the CBO study is that it was using basically the peacetime parameters for operations tempo and personnel tempo. I think we have to ask the question, given the situation we are in right now, are those the right parameters to use? I would say no, they are not, that we are a Nation at war and that we expect more, at least temporarily, from our Reserve components.

Senator INHOFE. Let me just ask this to shorten this a little bit: Are you saying that our operations tempo for our Guard and Reserve is at an acceptable level today?

General MYERS. I am not saying that. What I am saying is, because I understand the sacrifices they are making and it is something that—I have a Guard and Reserve adviser at the two-star level that reports directly to me on the Joint Staff and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. My main task to them is: Tell us how we can put predictability in their lives and reduce the commitment of our Reserve component, because I think that is very important; and tell me if you see any signs that recruiting or retention of this very competent force is slipping in any way.

To date, we have not seen that. But I am not comfortable in that because there is always tomorrow and we are going to work them very hard.

Senator INHOFE. I would like to give some others an opportunity to respond to that. I would only say that this has sustained for a

long period of time. I am prejudiced by the fact that I have talked to them, the Guard and Reserve members, the ones who are losing their jobs, the ones who have had more deployments than they can handle.

Any other comments on this?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I guess I would just say two things. One, and I would be happy to submit more detail for the record, but I think that it is the broader version of the examination of the global footprint that you mentioned. I think there is some great relief for the overall strain on personnel that can be achieved in that regard.

Specifically with respect to your question about conversion, there are some 300,000-plus positions that have been talked about as potentially being done by civilians. The Services have very specifically identified 47,000. So far it has been approached with a peacetime mentality. I do not mean that critically, but just as electricity in Iraq has to be approached on a wartime basis, I think we need to look at the issue you are raising on a wartime basis.

Senator INHOFE. I appreciate that. I know I have gone over my time. But if I can get responses for the record, assuming we keep the same footprint in Iraq, and I think you have given a very persuasive argument to do that, the rest of the world is not standing still. There are other contingencies out there that we would have to respond to.

So I have always been a stickler that end strength—we may have enough for that particular contingency, but we need to expand our end strength. I would like to have your comments.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The information referred to follows:]

While some Services could have temporary gaps in certain active component capabilities, such as force protection, civil affairs, and intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance, additional legislated end strength increases are not needed. The law provides the Secretary of Defense with the authority to approve active end strength above the authorized levels to meet those requirements during a declared national emergency.

This empowerment, however, is the least palatable of our alternatives. For example, we are redistributing our skill mix to optimize force capabilities within existing end strength. Over 320,000 military manpower spaces have been identified as performing duties in specialties or situations that can potentially be performed by other kinds of personnel. The Department expects thousands of military positions to be made available through these military to civilian conversions. Those converted positions would then be reinvested to relieve burdened units and specialties.

We are also working to rebalance the active and Reserve components. We are taking skills that are now found almost exclusively in the Reserve component and moving them into the Active Force, so that we are not completely reliant on the Guard and Reserve for those needed skills. And in both the active and Reserve components, we are moving forces out of low demand specialties into high-demand capabilities.

Further, we are transforming our global force posture, increasing our worldwide capabilities while significantly reducing the number of forces permanently assigned in foreign countries. This will reduce the stress on the force by reducing the number of troops and dependents that are constantly being rotated in and out of foreign bases and facilities.

Given the flexibilities the law accords to the Secretary, currently authorized end strengths do not need to be increased.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Byrd.

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, General Myers, Secretary Grossman.

I did not believe that we should be an invader of a country that could not lift a plane in the war. I did not believe that Iraq or Saddam Hussein constituted an imminent threat to the security of this country. This is a war we should not have fought. It is a war to carry out the preemptive strike doctrine. That is what it really began with.

So now we are in Iraq, we are having real problems that we did not foresee, and we are trying to wrap the Iraq problems around the September 11 disaster that hit this country. We are trying to view everything now in the context of the war on terrorism which began under the preemptive strike doctrine. That is why we are in Iraq.

I was opposed to it. I thought we could achieve everything we were seeking to achieve just by using a little more patience, a word, General, that you have used. Hans Blix said that it would take months, but that the job could be done. I think with a little more patience we would have achieved much of what we have since achieved with tremendous costs in blood and in treasure.

The U.N. inspectors were doing their job. They were finding weapons. They were destroying weapons. I think if we had exercised that patience for a while longer we would have achieved our objective of disarming Hussein.

No weapons of mass destruction have been found as of this date. There may be at some point. There is no question that Saddam once had weapons of mass destruction. But I say it was a war we should not have fought, and I say again that it was a part of the preemptive strike doctrine.

I have not forgotten January 19, 2001, when Karl Rove before the members of the National Republican Committee stated that: "We could make this war on terrorism or homeland security, in essence, we could make that the strategic center of our election effort." I still see that statement that was made and I see much of what has been done in leading us into this war was in the context of that statement.

Mr. Chairman, Congress is willing to do what is needed to protect our troops from the dangers of post-war Iraq. I will support whatever funds are needed for the safety of our troops. That does not mean that we should be willing to accept every spending proposal that can be wrapped in the United States flag.

I am increasingly uncomfortable with this administration's posturing and pontificating on its promises in Iraq. The administration has adopted a strategy that to date has alienated many of our allies and called into question America's motivation for its drive to war. Now the President plans to ask Congress to provide \$87 billion for Iraq. This funding will be in addition to the \$104.3 billion that Congress has already provided to the Pentagon for Iraq, Afghanistan, and the response to September 11, and I for one will not simply rubber-stamp this request.

Congress has serious questions, the American people have serious questions, and we ought to have answers. I have questions about how these funds will be used. I have very serious questions about deploying our National Guard to Iraq for 12 months at a stretch, keeping those troops from performing important homeland security missions. In addition, the policy of reconstruction has

never been debated, it has never been thoroughly considered, and yet the administration wants Congress once again to hand over billions of dollars with little oversight or discussion. Congress is not an ATM.

We have to be able to explain this new, enormous bill to the American people. The first responsible step for dealing with this request is to hold hearings on this huge Iraq spending bill.

When the President spoke on May 1, he said: "Our coalition will stay until our work is done. Then we will leave and we will leave behind a free Iraq." Mr. Secretary, many Americans, no doubt many Iraqis, took this to mean that our troops would not have an endless mission in the region. But in recent days some of the President's senior advisers have begun to talk about a "generational commitment" to transform the Middle East into a region of peace and democracy. One cannot help but wonder if this means that generations of soldiers will serve in this volatile part of the world or if generations of Americans will be paying untold billions of dollars in new foreign aid.

So what does it mean to say that the administration wants to make a "generational commitment" to democratizing the Middle East? Does this mean a permanent military presence of tens of thousands of troops in the Middle East, just as we maintained in Western Europe during the Cold War? Does this generational commitment bind us to seeking regime change in more Middle Eastern countries?

The President also spoke about Iraq being the "central front" of fighting terrorism. If we really want to solve the problem, should not our central front be ending the violence between Israel and the Palestinians? How did Iraq suddenly become more important than peace in the Middle East? Is this not putting the cart before the horse?

Specifically, General Myers, you stated that there will be 184,000 Iraqis under arms by the summer of 2005. My question: How much will it cost the American taxpayer to build a new Iraqi army, a new Iraqi police force, a new Iraqi border guard agency, and all of those other types of institutions?

I might give a follow-on question: If you can foresee 184,000 Iraqis under arms 2 years from now, how many American troops will be there in Iraq at that time? If you can answer those two questions, General Myers.

General MYERS. On the last part first, how many American troops, I think whatever happens in Iraq is going to be event-driven and so we are going to have to see how we come along in a security way, how we come along politically with Iraqi governance, and how the economy comes along, and that will dictate to a large extent how many U.S. forces are in Iraq.

As General Abizaid looks forward, as I think he told members of this committee when he was over here briefing the full Senate up in Senate Room 407, he is willing to look out until March of next year, but beyond that, given the number of variables involved, he is not willing to estimate the number of troops. I think you can draw the conclusion, though, that if the estimated—and it is an estimate—of 184,000 Iraqi police and infrastructure protection services and civil defense corps and new Iraqi army, if it comes, if the

planning comes true and we have 184,000 on board, that there would be, obviously, a lesser need for U.S. troops.

But for the exact numbers, General Abizaid is the one I would rely on to give us those numbers, and he says: "I am going to go to next March and that is as far as I want to predict right now."

In terms of the cost of building this force, clearly there have been a lot of U.S. resources that have been used in the formation of the over 55,000 Iraqis that we have in some kind of uniform, armed and trained to support freedom and democracy in Iraq. I would have to get for you for the record the exact amount of how much we figure this is going to be a U.S. burden and how much is going to be shared by the rest of the international community.

I think Secretary Grossman has talked to that to some degree, that we expect to have donor conferences and so forth that are hopefully going to help with this financial burden. This is an international situation, an international crisis of terrorism, and I would expect the international community to step forward and help with funding this.

[The information referred to follows:]

[Deleted.]

Senator BYRD. That does not answer my question, of course. Surely there must be some estimates in the Defense Department, in the State Department, of how much it will cost the American taxpayer to build this new Iraqi army. How much are we spending now? How much are we paying now to the Iraqis? How much will it cost to build this new Iraqi police force? How much will it cost to formulate the new Iraqi border guard agency?

We must have some estimates floating around downtown. Do you not have any of those estimates with you, Secretary Wolfowitz?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Senator, we have estimates and I can get you more detail for the record. My basic recollection is the total estimate of Iraqi reconstruction—and "reconstruction" is a loose usage of the English language since in most cases we are talking about a country that was fundamentally neglected, rather than just reconstructing something that was destroyed in a war. Roughly \$5 billion goes to the combination of security institutions. When we are talking about what is basically an internal security problem, you need not only police and security forces, you need courts and you need prisons. That complex of things I believe runs on the order of an estimate of \$5 billion over some period of time, not necessarily 1 year.

We can give you the detail on which that estimate is based, and it is only an estimate at the end of the day.

But if I could also refer to your question about a generational commitment, the fact is—and this is the statement from General Abizaid that I quoted from some length in my testimony—that we are engaged in a global war on terrorism. As he said, it is a phenomenon without borders, and the heart of the problem is in the Middle East and we have to deal with the heart of the problem in the Middle East.

You are absolutely right that dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict is a major part of dealing with it. But you cannot, as General Abizaid would say, look at it through a soda straw. That is part



of the problem. Iraq has now become part of the solution in my view.

It is striking to me that the grandson of the Ayatollah Khomeini, that tyrant who took Iran back to the dark ages, his grandson is now in Najaf in American-liberated Iraq talking about the liberation of Iraq as an inspiration for the Iranian people.

[The information referred to follows:]

The Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2004 Emergency Supplemental Request for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and Operation Noble Eagle (ONE) was submitted September 17. The security portion of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Fiscal Year 2004 Supplemental Request to Rehabilitate and Reconstruct Iraq dated September 17, 2003, provides the detailed estimate of the cost of Iraqi security forces requested by the committee (TAB).

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**COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY**

**FY04 SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST**

**TO**

**REHABILITATE AND RECONSTRUCT IRAQ**

**BAGHDAD, IRAQ**

**September 2003**

**Coalition Provisional Authority  
FY04 Supplemental Request  
To Rehabilitate and Reconstruct Iraq**

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**Coalition Provisional Authority  
FY04 Supplemental Request  
To Rehabilitate and Reconstruct Iraq**

**Introduction**

Prior to the war, the President outlined an ambitious vision for post-war Iraq that could serve as a model to the Arab world. He described a secure and stable country, governed by a democratically-elected government and served by a robust and open economy. Whether Iraq embraces this future is, ultimately, up to the Iraqis. The Coalition, however, has an obligation to lay the groundwork for the new Iraq, and to leave the country with a real chance of fulfilling the President's vision. In order to support this commitment the Coalition Provisional Authority requires an additional \$20.3 billion in fiscal year (FY) 2004 and is requesting the Congress to provide these resources as emergency non-offset supplemental appropriations. Expedient approval of this emergency supplemental requires is critical for the Coalition to lay the groundwork for an Iraq governed by and for the people of Iraq, to serve as the model for democracy in the mid-east and to help fight the global war on terrorism by providing an alternative framework for governance.

This additional \$20.3 billion will finance the most critical needs for security and infrastructure that cannot be met with anticipated revenues from oil sales until the entire oil infrastructure becomes more robust. These needs are immediate and urgent. We are ready to begin execution of these funds before the end of 2003.

Highlights of this \$20.3 billion FY 2004 emergency supplemental request include

- \$2.1B to fund public safety including border enforcement, police, fire and customs and enhanced security communications
- \$2.1B to establish national security forces and the Iraq Civil Defense Corps
- \$0.9B to provide justice and civil society development
- \$5.7B to rehabilitate the electric power infrastructure
- \$2.1B to rehabilitate oil infrastructure and secure domestic consumption
- \$3.7B to fund repairs and improvements to water and sewerage services
- \$0.9B to fund repairs to facilitate and conserve water resources
- \$0.8B to repair transportation facilities and telecommunications infrastructure
- \$0.5B to upgrade housing, public buildings, roads and bridges
- \$0.9B to fund construct, repair, and equip hospitals and primary clinics
- \$0.3B to invest into private sector business initiatives and jobs training programs
- \$0.3B to assist refugees, provide for human rights and develop civil society

In each instance, our Supplemental request is designed to ensure adequate resources to put Iraq on the path to a secure, economically hopeful future. The programs in this supplemental are thus all based upon Coalition evaluations and estimates. They are all fiscally conservative numbers.

**Coalition Provisional Authority  
FY04 Supplemental Request  
To Rehabilitate and Reconstruct Iraq**

The Coalition Provisional Authority is requesting non-offset emergency supplemental funding to directly support the rehabilitation and construction of Iraq, and in particular, to invest in essential security and stabilization initiatives and urgent infrastructure repairs and requirements. Further, the coalition requests urgent passage of the supplemental to announce the United States commitment to provide one-for-one matching funds at the Madrid Donor Conference scheduled for 23-24 Oct 2003 and for donations which will follow later.

**Detailed Overview of Requirements**  
(Dollars in Millions)

**Security**

**Public Safety Requirements:**

Border Enforcement	\$150	
National Police Service	\$150	
International Police Training Mission	\$800	
Traffic Police	\$ 50	
Fire and Civil Defense	\$500	
Facility Protective Services	\$67	
Public Safety Training	\$274	
Nat'l Security Communications Network	<u>\$150</u>	
Subtotal Public Safety		\$2,141

**National Security:**

New Iraqi Army	\$2,000	
Iraqi Civil Defense Corps	<u>\$ 76</u>	
Subtotal National Security		\$2,076

**Justice:**

Technical assistance for investigations into crimes against humanity	\$100	
Security for Judges and Prosecutors	\$200	
Witness Protection Program	\$100	
Other technical investigative methods	\$ 10	
Prison system technical assistance	\$ 10	
Reconstruction & modernization of 26 detention and prison facilities	\$ 99	
Two new 4,000 bed maximum security prisons	\$400	
Subtotal Justice		\$ 919
Subtotal Security		\$5,136

**Infrastructure**

**Electricity**

**Coalition Provisional Authority  
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To Rehabilitate and Reconstruct Iraq**

Generation	\$2,900
Transmission networks	\$1,550
Distribution networks	\$1,000
Communications and control	\$ 150
Institutional strengthening	\$ 25
Security	\$ 50
Subtotal Electric	\$5,675
<u>Oil Infrastructure</u>	
Oil Investment	\$1,200
Oil products purchase	\$ 900
Subtotal Oil Infrastructure	\$2,100
<u>Public Works</u>	
Improve access to potable water	\$2,830
Reducing water losses	\$ 30
Improve sewer services	\$ 697
Improving solid waste management	\$ 153
Subtotal Public Works	\$3,710
<u>Water Resources</u>	
Pumping Stations	\$ 75
Standby Generators	\$ 75
Irrigation/Drainage Systems	\$ 130
Complete Projects Halted by War	\$ 130
Rural Water Supply Dams	\$ 25
Dam Safety Repairs	\$ 100
Water Pipeline and Treatment Plant	\$ 200
Environmental Restoration	\$ 100
Tidal Channel Flushing	\$ 40
Subtotal Water Resources	\$ 875
<u>Transportation &amp; Telecommunication</u>	
Civil Aviation	\$ 165
Ports	\$ 45
Railroads	\$ 303
IPTC network systems	\$ 124
Iraqi communications systems	\$ 109
Iraqi communications operations	\$ 89
Subtotal Trans/Telecomm.	\$ 835
<u>Housing and Construction</u>	
Housing	\$ 100
Public Buildings	\$ 130
Roads and Bridges	\$ 240
Subtotal Housing & Construction	\$ 470
<u>Health</u>	
Construct Pediatric Hospital in Basrah	\$ 150
Refurbish Health System	\$ 393
Repair/Replace Equipment	\$ 300

**Coalition Provisional Authority  
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Partnership for Health	\$ 7	
Subtotal Health		\$ 850
<u>Private Sector Development</u>		
American-Iraqi Enterprise Fund	\$ 200	
Expand Network of Employment Centers	\$ 8	
On The Job Training	\$ 35	
Market Oriented Specialized Training	\$ 110	
Subtotal Private Sector Development		\$ 353
Subtotal Infrastructure		\$14,868
<u>Refugees, Human Rights and Civic Society</u>		
Migration and Refugee Assistance	\$ 105	
Local Governance & Municipalities	\$ 90	
Property Claims Tribunal	\$ 30	
Update antiquated banking system	\$ 30	
Catch up business training	\$ 20	
Human Rights	\$ 15	
Civic Programs	\$ 10	
Subtotal Refugees, Human Rights and Civic Society		\$ 300
<b>Grand Total</b>		<b>\$20,304M</b>

**Overview of Appropriation Request**

Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction Fund	\$20,069M
American-Iraqi Enterprise Fund	235M
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>\$20,304M</b>

**Coalition Provisional Authority  
FY04 Supplemental Request  
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**Public Safety**

Although the coalition has made great strides to stabilize Iraq and enhance security, the Iraqi citizenship faces three levels of threats: the hardened criminals the previous regime let loose into the streets; the remnants of the old regime who have nowhere to flee; and foreign terrorists. Dealing with these security threats is our highest priority.

**Border Enforcement.**

**Bureau of Border and Customs Police:** Divided into three Sections of Patrol, Investigations and Detention & Deportation. Border and Customs Police enforce the immigration and customs laws and regulations along the border between the ports of entry and the interior of Iraq. Currently, facilities include a headquarters office, three regional offices and 264 border police stations. Each border police station accommodates 10 – 30 policemen. Our goal is to leverage technology to greatly reduce the number of border police stations, possibly by as much as 75 per cent. However, that effort will require that at least 50 new border police stations be constructed. The headquarters and three regional offices will require complete renovation, due to war damages, post-war looting and years of neglect. Further, because the previous border police used conscripts, almost all of whom deserted, a massive recruitment/training program must be implemented to develop a professional, reliable police service. The Investigation Section and the Detention & Deportation Section are elements new to the Border/Customs Police and will, consequently, have a massive impact on infrastructure and training. The current number of personnel is estimated to be about 4,000. An additional 2,000 should be immediately recruited. Total required personnel are 6,000.

**Bureau of Border Inspections:** Also divided into three Sections of Immigration Inspections, Customs Inspections and a Border Guard Section. Personnel will be assigned to 14 land ports of entry, three airport ports of entries, and two seaport ports of entries. Besides the ports of entry, are a headquarters and three regional offices. Consideration is being given to the establishment of secondary ports of entry. There are currently about 2,500 Customs Inspectors who inspect imported and exported products and about 350 Border Guards who perform perimeter and internal security of the respective port of entry compounds. Duties of Immigration Inspectors were previously conducted by elements of Saddam's security police, so the entire Section of Immigration Inspections requires basic law enforcement and specific immigration and nationality law training. We estimate that at least 2,500 Immigration Inspectors will be recruited and trained. Facilities at virtually each port of entry were damaged and/or looted and will require a significant amount of refurbishment. Total required personnel are about 5,350.

**Bureau of Nationality & Civil Affairs:** Like the previous two bureaus, it is divided into three Sections of Passport, Nationality & Civil Affairs (includes vital statistics), and Immigration. The Passport Section is responsible for the issuance of passports to Iraqi citizens and secure control of unassigned documents. The previous passport facility was completely destroyed and must be replaced. Because all previous employees were members of the security police, an entirely new workforce of an estimated 350 personnel must be recruited and trained. The Nationality & Civil Affairs

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Section is responsible for determining citizenship, issuance of national identification cards, and for vital statistics functions, such as the recording of births, deaths, marriages, divorces, etc. and will perform these tasks with about 1,400 civilian personnel working from 26 separate field offices in Baghdad, three regional offices and a headquarters facility. A proposal has been made to consolidate the 26 field offices into just two Baghdad facilities and all buildings require significant repairs due to neglect, vandalism and looting. The Immigration Section, consisting of an estimated 500 personnel will adjudicate petitions pertaining to both immigrant and non-immigrant visas and will forward decisions to respective foreign posts operated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Total required personnel are approximately 2,250.

**Summary of Border Enforcement:** When rebuilt, the Department of Border Enforcement will employ approximately 13,600 personnel. Of those, approximately 4,500 recruits for police type positions must be identified and trained as soon as possible. Beyond basic academy and refresher training, 75 long term advisors are required to ensure successful transition of border related enforcement into a single ministry. At least 53 Border Police facilities, 19 port of entry facilities, and 5 Nationality and Civil Affairs facilities will require refurbishment or complete construction. The total incremental cost to improve border and customs enforcement is estimated at \$150M. Without this investment, the nation continue to be at tremendous risk of penetration by members of terrorist cells and other subversive organizations; smuggling will continue to bleed the revenues necessary for the Iraqi economy to stand on its own and Iraq will not be able to control its borders.

**Police, Traffic Police and Motor Vehicles**

**General Police Forces.** An estimated \$150M is urgently required to recruit, train, equip and operate viable, sustainable policing services in Iraq, capable of dealing in a professional manner with all issues falling within their mandate. There are significant immediate costs to restoring competent, trustworthy police forces due to significant damage if not outright destruction Iraq-wide of facilities and looting of property, the training and equipping of a new police force, as well as associated operations and maintenance costs.

**International Police Training.** The coalition requires an estimated \$800M to immediately begin building an international police training force of 1500 to provide the level of professionalism and assistance upon which the Iraqi native police force will achieve. This force will support training and development of the Iraqi police with field training officers (FTO), and advisors to enable the new police to effectively apply the skills learned in classroom training. In addition, such a mission would provide "hands on" guidance to all levels of the Iraqi police forces to help them understand modern, democratically based principles of civilian policing.

**Traffic Police.** The Iraq Traffic Police has 5,200 officers and 27 Office buildings countrywide. They are responsible for the control of traffic, enforcement of traffic laws, and accident investigation. Their buildings, fleet, and equipment have been almost completely destroyed or looted, and will require funding priority near term to stand up operational capability to at least pre-war capacity. Estimated cost: \$50M



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**Fire and Civil Defense**

**Summary of Request:** \$500M is required to provide adequate fire service, civil defense needs, mine action requirements and to repair public safety facilities for the safety of the Iraqi people.

**Fire Service:** The Fire Service is the principal agency responsible to serve the security and safety needs of the populace by controlling the destructive force of fire, natural, and human-made hazards in an effort to diminish the loss of life and property. Firefighters are also the principal emergency responders for the entire country and serve the needs of over 26.2 million Iraqis. Firefighters also serve as the EOD experts for the country, responding to and mitigating the effects of all unexploded ordnance which litters the entire country. The department needs at least 20 fully trained and capable EOD units in order to minimize the paralyzing and destructive effects of misplaced ordnance.

The Fire Service currently stands at over 5200 full-time trained professionals that provide fire suppression and mitigation services for structure fires, petroleum industry incidents, and fire in nature (e.g. sulfur mines and agricultural fires). The country needs an additional 5000 firefighters in order to support its mission. There is a need for a national academy to train these men. Fire fighting and suppression services are delivered through the employment of equipment and personnel. The war and subsequent looting destroyed over 165 firehouses throughout the country. There are no tools or equipment in any firehouse. There is a need for major communication overhaul. There are no phones or portable radios to coordinate and communicate with. Major end items and support required near term include personal protective equipment, operational, maintenance, and training needs.

The greatest cost associated with the fire service comes from the need to purchase equipment to replace those items either destroyed by the looters during hostilities, or from ten years of minimal attention being paid to the operational maintenance of fire suppression equipment. Second, the lack of personal protective equipment (PPE) commonly referred to as "bunker gear" or "turn out gear" is non-existent. At over \$2,500 per complete set of protective gear (helmet, PPE, gloves, haligan tools, self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), footwear, pioneer tools, and high-angle personal rescue gear) the cost for outfitting the current fire personnel throughout Iraq is significant. Besides purchasing SCBA, money will also need to be spent on the operation and maintenance of the equipment to include fitting, sealing, seal repair, and recharging of the air tanks. Estimated cost: \$290M.

**Civil Defense:** Civil Defense is the main Iraqi agency responsible for all civil support during all emergencies. Civil Defense personnel must quickly respond to incidents emanating from the discovery of unexploded ordnance (UXO); improvised explosive devices (IED); and explosive remnants of war (ERW). They must possess the capability to respond to all natural and man made hazards and threats to include earthquakes, floods, epidemics, disease and WMD events. And they must provide emergency support to all aspects of an emergency to include command and control, operations, personnel and logistical support. To meet these requirements the Ministry needs a robust communications package of UHF, VHF, digital, mobile and FM

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capabilities. Logistics support include trucks, cots, tents, generators, lighting, stocked CD centers, medical equipment, blankets, food, hygiene material, wood, water, specialized engineering equipment, and a vast assortment of equipment to support the operation. Personnel need specialized training in Incident Command, size up, WMD, first responder, train the trainer, interagency workshops, UN request for Aid procedures, and other emergency management and disaster mitigation courses. Staff needs to be assembled from within governorates and across all ministries to work together, conduct coordination, and practice tactics and procedures. Estimated minimum cost: \$57M.

**Mine Action.** The national mine action authority in the Ministry of Planning is responsible for coordination of removal of all explosive remnants of war. This involves several organizations, both local and international. Our omnibus State Department partner is RONCO, but we also fund numerous NGOs such as Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA). \$61M is required to sustain 12-15 more local and or international organizations already part of the Oil for Food Program (OFF) in the north or working contracts in the central and south. This will include the governance piece of the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA), Iraqi Mine Action Center (IMAC) and three Regional Mine Action Centers (RMAC) already formed or paid for in the 03 budget through State. Iraq is the most heavily mined and UXO contaminated country in the world with 100s of casualties per month. The other telling problem is that they block or impede almost all other sector's development from transportation, reconstruction, electricity, education, agriculture etc. Estimated minimum cost: \$61M

**Public Safety Facilities:** Public Safety Facilities Repair, Remodel, and Refit in the post-conflict period following cessation of major combat operations, significant looting, vandalism, burning, and wanton destruction of public safety facilities occurred. Work must continue on the refurbishing of facilities to include glazing, painting, electrical, plumbing, and HVAC work. Office furniture, equipment, computers, and telephone systems will also need to be brought into the facilities. Significant cost will be required near term for repair, remodeling, refurbishing, refitting, operations, maintenance, and training needs. Estimated minimum cost: \$92M.

**Facilities Protection Service (FPS)**

**FPS.** Facilities protection is critical to the reconstruction of Iraq and therefore a high priority to the CPA. Without a safe working environment, workers will be reluctant to return to the workplace. Facilities cannot be refurbished until there is protection against continuing vandalism and theft. If these issues are left unresolved, reconstruction will stall. To achieve adequate facilities protection would require \$66.7M for two separately managed programs.

**(1)The Facility Protection Program:** FPS is currently a federated program under which Ministries and Governorates each form their own fixed site security forces that operate under Ministry control in accordance with standards established by the Ministry of Interior. Ministries are currently working FPS costs into their individual budgets. Approximately 20K FPS guards are required to deploy countrywide by Jan 2004 to protect structures, contents and assigned personnel.

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With the current decentralized model for FPS funding, security issues are in competition with other important aspects of Ministerial budgets.

By centrally funding FPS requirements, the CPA ensures critical security needs are properly resourced. Under this scheme, Ministry of Interior is funded to administer the FPS account, disburse FPS funds to other Ministries, run a training program for FPS guards, and provide administrative and operational oversight of the FPS program, to include certifying guards and private security firms and inspecting FPS operations countrywide. Ministries will hire guards and administer their FPS programs IAW Ministry of Interior guidance.

Basis of estimate: Centralized funding for salaries (\$24M - \$100/man/month ave), uniforms (\$1.2M - \$60/person), MoI training program and FPS administration (\$15M for both), vehicles for selected Ministries (\$2.64M - 80 pickup trucks), communications (\$3.63M for 400 handheld radios and 200 Thurayas), badging (\$2.0M - 18 sites) and tribal pay for tribes along power lines and oil pipelines (\$1.056M), mandated Regional Operations Center in each Governorate (\$7.2M - 18 sites). Estimated minimum cost: \$56.7M.

**(2) The FPS Professional Standards and Training Program:** The FPS Professional Standards and Training Program. This program regulates FPS activities of each of the ministries, other public agencies and the activities of private guard companies. Facilities protection was originally provided by a unit within the police department. To many, this unit was perceived as a corrupt and unprofessional organization that was part of a larger scheme to misappropriate public resources. If facilities protection is to have the trust and confidence of the Iraqi people, a separate office is necessary with oversight authority and to establish, regulate and inspect the standards and training of the guards of the public facilities. \$10M is required to develop a program office with a staff of 48 to provide administrative and operational oversight, to train and certify guards, and to inspect guard operations for all of Iraq.

**Public Safety Training.**

**Training.** \$274M is required to provide initial training to ensure the success of the overall reform of all departments within the MOI: Department of Border Enforcement, Iraq Police Service, Traffic Police, Facilities Protection Service and Fire & Emergency Services. The CPA seeks to reconstitute these departments while increasing the professional standards of law enforcement officers and emergency service personnel within its ministry. All MOI training programs (for existing personnel and as well as all new personnel) will be developed and presented in a manner consistent with the principles of democratic policing (service in a free society) through an educational philosophy that is based on international human rights standards.

The CPA seeks to use a Public Safety construct to achieve the training goals for all MOI departments throughout Iraq. This concept has two primary benefits. First, the basic training programs for most of these departments are similar, and many in-service and/or advanced training courses will require multi-disciplinary participation. All of these departments must work together in order to provide the best possible protection and

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service to the citizens of Iraq, and therefore it will be important for them to train in a cooperative environment. Second, the utilization of Public Safety Academies, as opposed to numerous specialized academies, will provide for economies of scale reducing training costs significantly while ultimately increasing the effectiveness of the law enforcement /emergency services functions.

The requested training is for the following organizations in the MOI: IPS, Traffic Police, Customs and Border Police, Customs and Border Investigators, Customs Inspectors, Immigration Inspectors, Detention and Deportation Officers, Border Guards, Passport Officers, Nationality and Civil Affairs personnel, Facilities Protection Service guards, and Fire and Emergency Services personnel. This request does not duplicate training provided by the International Police Training requirement.

To support this effort, at least three Public Safety Academies must be built/refurbished (Baghdad, Mosul and Basrah), outfitted (furniture, operational equipment and supplies, training equipment and supplies), staffed and maintained. Reform courses will be conducted for all existing MOI police, traffic police, DBE personnel, fire and emergency service personnel country wide as well the delivery of in-service and advanced/specialized courses – approximately 60,000 existing MOI police and emergency personnel. The CPA as a part of its exit strategy will begin to develop the indigenous training capacity (Iraqi trainers) in all departments through the creation and delivery of comprehensive Instructor Development Programs (train-the-trainers). Further, it is possible that new basic recruit training will be conducted outside the country for approximately 34,000 police/traffic personnel in the next two years. Also, approximately 8,000 new DBF personnel will need to be trained, along with 5,000 new Fire and Emergency Services personnel.

**Iraq National Security Communications Network.**

National security and first responder (police, ambulance, border and customs, key facilities protection, fire and civil defense) communications network with 911 dispatch capability for Iraq. Given Iraq's vulnerable security position, and complete lack of communications capabilities locally and nationally, a security and first responder operational communications network is imperative in the near term. Network would include a dispatch "911" capability so citizens could call one number in the event of an emergency instead of the current Iraqi system of separate numbers for each of the first responder assets, police, fire, or ambulance. This dispatch capability would be operated regionally. The master site based at the national command center in Baghdad would receive and oversee all of the information and data relating "911" and other regional as well as national contingencies.

This network concept spans all the major population centers connected via a fiber backbone. This effort will be directly managed by the Ministry of Transport and Communications (MOTC), as well as the CPA communications support office. The MOTC has affirmed that it is able to support this network and provide the fiber that is required to link all of the centers and bring them back to Baghdad. The majority of the fiber is already in place and currently being reworked to be stood up over the next two

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months. Time is of the essence because of the complete lack of interoperable communications throughout Iraq.

Regionally, security forces are suffering due to the lack of communication in the hands of the Iraqi police, who are supposed to be performing patrolling duties but are reluctant to do so as they have no means to call for assistance. Fire and ambulance service, while not a matter of national security, is a matter of public health and safety and also dependent on an effective communications network for its ability to respond quickly. This in turn would instill confidence in the general security and services, and in turn the government providing them. \$150M is needed to implement this network. Costs include installation of communications infrastructure and equipment, to include (but not limited to) hand-held radios, base stations, repeaters, communications towers, with associated installation, training, operations and maintenance costs. Separate network costs to support the first responder requirement are addressed in the Transportation & Communications section of this supplemental request.

**National Security Forces.**

**Summary of Request** Iraq's military forces were decimated in the war and the surviving leadership was too closely tied to the Baath Party. An entirely new military structure is necessary to help stabilize the country and to demonstrate to the people that a professional military is part of the foundation of a constitutional democracy. \$2,076M is required to fund the equipment acquisition needs of the New Iraqi Army, Support Agency/HQ, and Civil Defense Forces. This force is quickly growing from 4,000 toward a goal of 40,000 (3 divisions, 9 brigades and 27 battalions, including 3 heavy). Our goal is to have this force operational by August 2004.

<b>New Iraqi Army (NIA)</b>		
NIA Facilities		\$745.4M
NIA Equipment		\$879.3M
NIA Operations		\$205.3M
US Contract Training		\$164.0M
Purchased International Training		\$ 6.0M
Subtotal		\$2,000.0M
<b>Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC)</b>		
Operations	\$ 39.5M	
Salaries	\$ 18.9M	
Vehicles & minor procurement	\$ 17.2M	
Subtotal ICDC		\$75.6M
<b>Grand Total</b>		<b>\$2,075.6M</b>

**New Iraqi Army (NIA).** After the transfer of full sovereignty to an elected government, Iraq will need to have a militarily effective force for the defense of its territory that is non-political, representative of the country as a whole, and committed to protection of the country, not the perpetuation in power of a particular regime.. Further, from the point of view of developing a working constitutional government in Iraq, it is

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important that such a force be under law-based civilian control and subject to public and parliamentary oversight. To form the foundation for such a force, the US and its coalition allies have begun to establish a New Iraqi Army that embodies these principles. The first battalions are already in training. As the units of this army become operational, they will participate directly in military operations in Iraq, led by Iraqi officers, and, like other coalition forces, under overall Coalition operational command. They will perform critical military tasks, including protecting the borders, route and convoy security, and control of territory, thereby reducing the burden on US and other coalition military units and speeding the day when those units can be relieved of security tasks in Iraq.

\$2,000M is required to have 9 brigades (27 battalions) of the NIA fully operational by 2005. This program provides funds for US support for the costs of training, facilities, and equipment for a basic Iraqi ground force of 9 motorized infantry brigades, plus costs for setting up the necessary administrative support structures, reopening the military academy to provide a source of young officers, purchasing advanced training for military and civilian leaders, and standing up a new ministry of defense in consultation with the emerging Iraqi governmental authorities. Iraqi funds would be used to pay costs of salaries and subsistence. The initial equipment will make maximum use of commercially available military and civilian items. An initial armored and mechanized force (armored brigade) is also to be set up and will consist of one armor battalion, one mechanized battalion, and one mobile artillery battalion. Our intent is to use recovered and refurbished equipment to fill the equipment needs where possible. This also includes the re-establishment of depot repair and refurbishment of facilities within Iraq. Rolling Stock, engineer equipment, combat support and combat service support resources, crew-served weapons systems, and individual soldier equipment is also to be acquired. Also included is \$137.2M for an Army Aviation Element. These prices are based on provision of a small number of helicopters (generally second hand) and procurement/refurbishment of a small medium lift capability, i.e., C130 equivalent. Together this will provide mobility through an Army Aviation element. Includes costs associated with purchase of necessary support equipment, e.g., GSE.

Overall strong attention and focus will be applied to using existing Iraqi resources to provide and maintain the equipment sets desired. Without this equipment, graduated battalions from the New Iraqi Army Training Center in Kirkush will have no equipment and will be meaningless units, incapable of offering assistance to Coalition Forces to provide stability. Other significant components of the NIA include:

**NIA- Contract Training.** An existing contract is in place to provide trainers to the New Iraqi Army training base at Kirkush, Iraq. \$164M additional contract funding is required (included in the \$2B) for further refinement and additional curriculum for the training mission. Continued funding support of the New Iraqi Army is critical to establishing a military capable of defending the post-regime nation of Iraq from emerging threats. The trained light infantry division plus armored brigade would free up US Army and Marine Corps units and their support elements.

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Coast Guard. Included in the \$2B requirement is \$81.9M for a small coast guard force. Piracy, slave trading, terrorism and smuggling on the rivers and costal waterways of Iraqi are of great concern to the coalition. For this reason a modest funding requirement has been raised to combat these activities and protect vital Iraqi assets. Funding is based on refurbishment of existing vessels and the procurement of a small number of support craft, plus the equipping of a Naval Infantry Battalion to support critical port and on load/off load facilities. The requirement includes \$41M for facilities, \$37M for equipment and \$3.9M for operations.

NIA- Iraqi Manned Defense Support Agency. Included in the \$2B requirement for the NIA is \$22M to set up the Iraqi Manned Defense Support Agency (DSA) in order to provide executive and support services to the New Iraqi Army and to lay the groundwork for the eventual establishment of a new Iraqi Ministry of Defense. Funding includes necessary equipment purchases (\$3.5M) such as vehicles and automated command and control information technology systems. Also included is \$2.5M for one year of operating costs.

Without this funding, the Coalition Provisional Authority will have to increase the Coalition staffing of the OSA office to administer the NIA. As the Iraqi Ruling Council grows in strength and ability to assume responsibility for post-regime Iraq, a functional Ministry of Defense, built on this foundation, will be critical to develop capability to deal with internal and external threats.

NIA- Professional Military Education Military Academies. The New Iraqi Army will need a professional Officer and NCO Corps and thus education facilities and equipment to train them. This \$51.4M (included within the \$2B) requirement will allow vehicles, training equipment, and training systems to help develop this professional Officer and NCO Corps. The requirement includes \$46.2M for facility refurbishment, \$4.4M for equipment and \$0.8M for operating costs. Without these resources, the newly trained Iraqi armed forces will not have professional leadership trained in the ways and understanding of the role of the armed forces in a functional society. Coalition Forces will be forced to provide force structure to lead these leaderless units. Those Iraqi's who are appointed or promoted into leadership positions will not have a new professional paradigm to draw from and will naturally revert to the behavior and traditions derived from the former regime.

NIA- Military Education and Training. A crucial part of developing the nucleus of a professional Officer and NCO Corps is giving them the opportunity to attend overseas training in the professional development institutions of the different Coalition Partners. Embedding core values essential to a post-regime Iraq will take place during this overseas training of key Iraqi military personnel. \$6M is required (included within the \$2B) to send the best and brightest to professional military schools to better learn principles of civilian control of military, and the role of the military in a democratic society.

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***Iraqi Civil Defense Corps.*** The Coalition Provisional Authority urgently requires \$75.6M to develop a military support organization in each Iraqi Governate. Each of the 18 governates will be assigned one battalion (approximately 600 strong) of a new paramilitary force called the Civil Defense Corps. These battalions will assist Coalition Forces in bringing stability to Iraq. They will be lightly armed and will be trained to act as guides, interpreters, conduct searches, and man checkpoints. They will require minimal training and will be trained and operate predominantly in their home areas.

Costs for these forces are mainly salary (\$18.9M for 18 battalions at \$70k/month plus special allowances) and subsistence, fuel, and other costs (\$39.5M annual cost). An additional \$17.2M is required to properly equip this force. The major procurement requirements are for 2 'jeeps' and 12 cargo trucks per battalion at \$244K per bn), communications gear (99 platoon net and 25 company and battalion net radios per battalion at a cost of \$132.5K per bn), basic 'tented' infrastructure (overhead cover, ablutions, plastic furniture, and secure storage containers for each battalion at a cost of \$15.1K per bn) and personal protective gear (cold weather gear, helmet and body armor for each member at \$.5K per person). Vehicles are needed to speed ICDC response, particularly in rural sectors, ensure public perception of ICDC cooperation with Coalition Forces, and reduce ICDC reliance on Coalition transport. Radios are required to increase the flexibility and responsiveness of ICDC units and to reduce ICDC reliance on Coalition communications equipment. Basic Barracks Infrastructure is required to provide ICDC with suitable locations at which units can muster, train, secure stores, and, equally importantly, develop their identity. Finally, helmets and body armor are prudent personal protection items given an ICDC mission set that includes crowd and Riot Control, Route and Convoy Security, and Fixed Site Security.

Once trained and operating, these battalions will be a significant force multiplier, increasing the effectiveness and potentially freeing Coalition Battalions in their area of operations. Without these elements, Coalition maneuver battalions must continue their deployment to provide stability.

### **Justice and Civil Society Development.**

**Summary of Request.** Reforming the Iraqi justice system, including prison system and courts, is prerequisite to improving confidence in justice outcomes for the country and laying the foundation for a constitutional democracy. After decades of corrupt Baathist party rule, the following investments are critical to reforming the system and establishing the rule of law.

Technical assistance for investigations into crimes	
against humanity	\$100M
Security for Judges and Prosecutors	\$200M
Witness Protection Program	\$100M
Other technical investigative methods	\$ 10M
Prison system technical assistance	\$ 10M
Reconstruction & modernization of 26 detention	



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and prison facilities	\$ 99M
Two new 4,000 bed maximum security prisons	<u>\$400M</u>
TOTAL	\$919M

**Technical Assistance for Crimes Against Humanities Investigations.** The Iraqi Justice system lacks the technical expertise needed to conduct investigations related to the systematic commission of crimes against humanity by the former regime. Specifically, assistance is needed in forensic analysis, document analysis and financial analysis. In the prosecution of crimes against humanities it is critical to have expert testimony to establish the commission of the crime and command responsibility of higher officials. This expert testimony is dependent upon an accurate and complete investigation. Thus, forensic analysis is needed to corroborate testimony concerning the manner in which killings were conducted. This expert evidence is critical in corroborating the testimony of persons having knowledge of the crime in order to establish the witness's credibility. Similarly, the analysis of documents showing the command structure of the regime is needed in order to prove knowledge and criminal responsibility by members of that command structure. Finally, financial analysis is needed in order to demonstrate the squandering of state assets for the personal benefit of governmental officials. These resources are not available in Iraq, and the investigation of these crimes is a massive undertaking. The technical assistance for humanitarian investigation was based on a cost of \$200,000 per expert for a minimum 500 experts and investigators. This cost includes an estimated salary of \$100,000 for each expert and a logistics cost of \$100,000 for each expert for a total of \$100M for 500 experts.  
**Estimated Minimum Cost: \$100M.**

**Security for Judges and Prosecutors:** Iraq is facing regular attacks by foreign terrorists and members of the former regime. As a government is formed, these matters need to be addressed in the criminal justice system. To the extent possible democratic societies use the criminal justice system to prosecute terrorists located within their borders. When this occurs, the Justice system then becomes a source of attack. Under the prior regime, the Justice Ministry was marginalized and controlled by the state. Thus the Ministry of Justice now has insufficient resources to address the security requirements faced by a Justice system that is the target of terrorists precisely because it is being used to combat terrorism. Consequently, judges and prosecutors need to be supplied with personal security details and the physical structures of the courts need to be hardened against terrorist attack. None of these items are currently in place and the judges and prosecutors in Iraq present an inviting target to the terrorists. Consequently, a massive undertaking is needed to strengthen the Iraqi court system so that it can fairly adjudicate these cases. This task requires a massive undertaking.

The Security Program cost estimate was made based on a pilot security program that was established on an emergency basis for the central criminal court of Iraq. That program, which provides security for 15 judges, costs \$10 million on an annualized basis. In order for the security program to be effective, it needs to be extended to more than 15 judges as well as making modifications to the infrastructure of the courts. This amount comes to approximately 50,000 per judge and includes vehicles, security details, weapons

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and communications capability. Thus, funds in the amount of \$20 million would provide security for approximately 400 judges and prosecutors. There are currently 860 judges and prosecutors in Iraq. The courts in Iraq need to be hardened with a variety of physical and technical security measures, including X-Ray devices, bomb detection devices, protective blast walls and other physical and improvements. There are 130 court buildings in Iraq, and this proposal would allocate approximately 1.3 Million per courthouse. This security package is thus reasonable and would enable the judiciary to function free of fear and intimidation. **Estimated minimum cost: \$200M**

**Witness Protection Program.** Not only is Iraq facing daily attacks from terrorists, organized crime is flourishing in the disorder created in the aftermath of the war. Organized crime members and terrorists function in a similar manner even though their motivations are different. Indeed, terrorist organizations often fund their activities through organized crime. In order to effectively prosecute these offenses, witnesses to the commission of these offenses are required. These witnesses can not be developed unless there is a mechanism in place to protect them. Consequently, a witness protection program is needed in order to allow victims as well as criminals who become government witnesses to testify without fear of being killed by the remaining members of the organization against whom they are testifying. Without an effective witness protection program, it is simply not possible to prosecute these cases.

Protecting witnesses is one of the single most expensive components of criminal prosecutions in that it involves short term and long term protection. The witness must be relocated far outside the danger area, which may involve international relocation for terrorism and organized crime cases. This estimate is based on \$200,000 per person per year. This would allow for 100 families with an average of five persons each to be relocated for a total cost of \$100M. **Estimated minimum cost: \$100M**

**Other Technical Investigative Methods.** Although the prior regime used technical means to gather information, this was not done for the purpose of securing admissible evidence for a criminal prosecution. Long and bitter experience with terrorism and organized crime has demonstrated that technical evidence gathering is critical in the investigation and prosecution of these activities. Because in a democratic society these crimes should be addressed through the due process system of the Courts, the ability to gather such evidence is required in order to prove criminal responsibility. Iraq has become a focus for terrorist activity, and the use of unclassified technical means of gathering evidence is critical to the successful prosecution of these cases. An initial allocation of 10M for this purpose will enable the Iraqi government, under coalition supervision, to start using this unclassified technical evidence gathering means. This cost estimate is based on an extrapolation from a similar \$1M dollar package that was used in Kosovo, which has one tenth of the population of Iraq. **Estimated minimum cost: \$10M**

**Prison System Technical Assistance.** This request is for 100 international prison experts for six months, to identify suitable establishments for reconstruction, training and monitoring of prison operations in accordance with international requirements. The

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technical assistance requirement is based on a six-month cost of \$100,000 per expert for a minimum 100 experts and investigators. This cost includes an estimated salary of \$50,000 for each expert and a logistics cost of \$50,000 for each expert for a total of \$10M. **Estimated minimum cost: \$10M**

**26 Detention and Prison Facilities for Juveniles and Adults.** Prison facilities are a vital component to the credibility of the criminal justice system and essential in establishing the security of Iraq. This expenditure provides for the new build, reconstruction and modernization of 26 adult and juvenile detention and prison facilities. This expenditure would provide a wider geographical coverage than under the previous regimes. It would ensure that the establishments conform to international accepted standards. They would increase prison capacity by 10,000 (i.e., from 11,200 under current plans to 21,200) and free military resources currently tasked to operate detention facilities. At least local 4,800 jobs would be created in the prison service. The estimated average cost per facility is approximately \$2.3 million, \$0.5 million in start up costs and \$1 million in initial operating costs). **Estimated minimum cost: \$99M**

**2 New 4,000 Bed Maximum Security Prisons.** This spending would allow two new maximum security prisons to be constructed in accordance with international standards, with inbuilt security features that reduce staffing costs and achieve economies of scale. These facilities would house 4,000 prisoners each (8,000 additional prison beds) and would take four years to construct. Funding is needed immediately for engineering and design and to start construction. **Estimated minimum cost: \$400M**

**Electricity.**

**Summary of Request.** The electrical power infrastructure in Iraq is in a perilous state. Without significant investment in the immediate future, the situation will actually deteriorate further. The CPA has been managing the sector since the war and fully understands the problems. The UN, which has been active in the sector since 1996 and working with the World Bank, has recently completed a needs assessment of the electrical power infrastructure. We are fortunate to have the results of this assessment which match our own findings. To make significant progress in a short period of time, the following investments must be made immediately into the electric power infrastructure.

Generation	\$2,900M
Transmission networks	\$1,550M
Distribution networks	\$1,000M
Communications and control	\$ 150M
Institutional strengthening	\$ 25M
Security	\$ 50M
TOTAL	\$5,675M

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**Generation.** The level of generating capacity in Iraq, at present, varies between 3000 MW and 3300 MW. The estimated demand is 6500 MW and is expected to increase significantly as the economy grows, industry is restarted and oil production increases. It is hard to overstate the problems caused by the shortfall between generating capacity and demand of approximately 50%. It is the major cause of discontentment of the Iraqi population and, quite apart from the physical discomfort, is preventing industries, factories and oil refineries from operating. This exacerbates the problems inherent in having large numbers of people without employment or an income.

The lack of generating capacity and the geographic location of that capacity has created major differences in the power distributed to people in different parts of Iraq. In particular, the citizens of Baghdad have suffered disproportionately, as generating capacity is concentrated in the South and North. These imbalances have led to political divisions between the areas that are net generators of power and those that are net recipients.

As a means of sharing power between consumers, deliberate load-shedding is being used where local lines serving a neighborhood are switched off, so that other lines may be switched on. Although there is no alternative at this time, this practice causes much greater wear on the components of the already decrepit electrical power infrastructure.

Generation levels are low because the power stations were targeted during the Gulf War of 1991. In addition, the sanctions that followed meant that it was very difficult to procure materials to maintain power stations properly. Management practices also deteriorated, including acting under political pressure to maintain generation levels rather than to undertake long overdue maintenance work. Although some improvements were made under the UN Oil for Food Program, the timescales, costs and the level of verification required under this scheme made progress slow.

The result is that almost all power stations in Iraq are in very poor condition, generating well below their rated level and are extremely unreliable. Unplanned outages are daily events. Without urgent remedial action, the situation could get much worse. An intensive program is now underway to increase generation levels to pre-war levels, stated as 4400 MW, by undertaking repairs to power stations and through other actions to put into production units not currently in production for various reasons. There are three main means of increasing generation within Iraq:

- Rehabilitation of existing power stations and providing adequate spare parts
- Installation of new gas turbine power stations
- Construction of new thermal power stations

The most cost-effective means of increasing generation is to rehabilitate existing power plants – both gas and thermal units. Rehabilitation results in the generating units being restored to a condition close to that when they were first commissioned. Because there is no requirement to perform either engineering design or civil construction work, the costs and timescales are very much less than building new plant. We intend to rehabilitate a significant proportion of the total generation capacity, prioritizing those that are not in service at present.

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Gas turbine units can be installed within a 3 to 7 month timescale. We intend to install and commission at least eleven 40 MW gas turbine units in a number of strategic sites before the end of 2003. In addition, we plan to build some larger gas turbine power stations, of 150 MW capacity, to meet short to medium-term demands. Gas turbine units may also be run on several types of fuel and we shall ensure that we are not overly dependent on the availability of certain fuels.

Thermal power stations are more expensive and typically take up to three years to build. However, they are capable of providing high levels of generation, using fuels such as crude oil or heavy fuel oil (some of which are waste products). They are also comparatively cheaper to maintain. As such, thermal power stations will form a vital component of Iraq's electrical power generation capabilities. Several thermal power stations have been under construction for many years, with progress interrupted by wars and by delays in the UN MoU program. We shall review the status of each thermal power station construction project and, where continuation makes financial and technical sense; propose to complete the work under an accelerated timetable. In other cases, we need to commence construction of new thermal power stations and ensure that sufficient funding is in place to enable completion. The costs associated with each area of increased generation are:

Rehabilitation of existing power stations	\$1,000m
New gas turbine generation	\$800m
New thermal power stations	\$1,000m
Maintenance	\$100m
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$2,900m</b>

**Transmission networks.** Transmission networks perform the task of transporting power from where it is generated to the area which it is consumed. In Iraq, the transmission networks are comprised of the 400 KV network, with its 22 substations, and the 132 KV network with approximately 200 substations. Before the recent war, the transmission networks were in a degraded but operable state. Inadequate maintenance and poor operational procedures had resulted in corroded power lines, damaged towers, switchgear with frequent faults, damaged transformers, and a multitude of other faults which degrade network performance and that risked the safety of Electricity Commission staff.

Since the recent war, continuing acts of looting and deliberate sabotage on a vast scale have reduced the capabilities of the transmission networks to a point where the national grid barely functions. The network, as it currently stands, is highly unstable resulting in frequent blackouts, and is incapable of delivering sufficient power from power stations to population centers, most notably Baghdad.

Some 400 KV power lines have been almost completely destroyed. For example, the Coalition Forces recently surveyed 1175 km of lines and found 623 downed towers out of a total of 2554. However, in total, it is hard to provide accurate figures of the number of towers and miles of power lines that it will be necessary to replace. Although all Iraqi line repair crews are fully deployed to repair power lines, it is evident that the scale of the task is far beyond their capacities. Therefore, we urgently need to

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bring in international engineering firms specializing in this type of work, to repair the lines and substations.

As generation capacity increases over 2004 and beyond, the transmission networks will also have to be increased in capacity. This shall necessitate the implementation of new lines and new substations. We intend to use the services of specialist consultants to analyze the electrical power infrastructure so as to design changes to the transmission network, especially the addition of new infrastructure. Our estimates for work urgently required to restore the transmission networks with adequate spare parts, and to add capacity to support additional generation are based on our surveys and those of the UN/World Bank assessments.

Repair of 400 KV lines	\$200m
Repair of 132 KV lines	\$300m
Expansion of 400 KV lines	\$250m
Expansion of 132 KV lines	\$250m
Rehabilitation of substations	\$300m
Additional substations	\$250m
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$1,550m</b>

***Distribution networks.*** Distribution networks deliver power carried over the transmission networks to local areas. The distribution networks were relatively unaffected by the recent war but were in a highly deteriorated condition beforehand. Equipment is operating without adequate electrical protection and is generally overloaded. The majority of 33/11 KV substations suffer from the effects of being switched too frequently (due to load shedding), a lack of maintenance and insufficient augmentation to cater for new load. There has also been, and continues to be, damage to distribution networks caused by acts of looting and vandalism.

We intend to commence a program of rehabilitation and replacement of distribution network infrastructure. However, it must be recognized that the scale of the problem is such that this program will have to take place over several years. Based on the information supplied by the UN/World Bank assessment, we anticipate the costs of the work we need to undertake until the end of 2004 as being:

33/11KV substation rehabilitation and development	\$150m
33KV network rehabilitation and development	\$56m
11KV network rehabilitation and development	\$185m
Distribution transformer rehabilitation and development	\$125m
0.4KV network rehabilitation and development	\$204m
O&M material and equipment	\$180m
Vehicles, machinery, training, studies and review, etc	\$100m
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$1,000m</b>

***Communications & Control.*** The lack of an automated monitoring and control system means that it is not possible to effectively monitor power distribution or enforce

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load shedding plans. This lack of monitoring capability has impeded CPA's efforts to re-establish an effective and efficient electrical sector in Iraq. The Electricity Commission requires a Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) system to provide this monitoring and control capability. SCADA is a distributed system that collects data from individual power substations, and delivers it to a central monitoring and control centre. It consists of several components, including:

1. A National Dispatch Center (NDC) to provide national oversight of the electricity network;
2. One or more Regional Control Centers (RCC's);
3. Multiple Remote Terminal Units (RTU's) located at the 400 kilovolt (KV) substations and the 33KV substations. These RTU's capture critical data from the substation equipment;
4. Communications equipment to deliver data from the RTU's to the RCC's and NDC. Communications between the substations and the NDC will be provided via a fibre optic network, a radio network, or microwave network, or a combination thereof, in order to minimize costs. Several communication networks already exist in varying states of repair and capability in Iraq, and these will be utilized if possible.

The SCADA system will be implemented extremely rapidly in order to gain management control of the distribution of electricity in Iraq. Such an implementation depends upon the timely provision of funds in order to procure the equipment, personnel and other resources required to perform this task.

This SCADA system will provide critical improvements to the management of the electricity grid in Iraq. It will permit the accurate monitoring of the electricity grid of Iraq on a national basis. In addition, it will assist in the assessment of equipment failures by providing remote alarms and warnings. Finally, it will assist in the fair and equitable distribution of electricity to the Iraqi population. The cost of the full SCADA system implementation and associated communications infrastructure is estimated at \$150m.

**Institutional strengthening.** The Electricity Commission is institutionally very weak. In order to build an effective organization capable of managing the continued operation and development of the electrical power infrastructure in Iraq, we wish to invest in strengthening the institution. This shall be done by rehabilitating the buildings, providing consultants embedded within the organization, developing a Master Plan for continued development, and investing in extensive staff training. The estimated cost of providing this program is \$25m.

**Security.** There is little point in investing in transmission line repairs if they cannot be secured. The Coalition Forces are overstretched and cannot provide adequate security to electrical power infrastructure. Moreover, they will not be in Iraq indefinitely. Therefore, other arrangements must be made. It is our intention to strengthen the existing Electricity Commission Power Police and to augment their capabilities with contracted helicopter surveillance. The estimated cost of providing an improved service is \$50m.

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**Oil Production.**

**Summary of Request.** The coalition has assisted the Iraq Ministry of Oil in making progress towards reestablishing pre-war production levels. However, we must do more to lay the foundation for the national economic recovery, and to ensure that Iraq has the revenue for a self-sustaining government. Factors that must be addressed include continued repair of war damage and repair of looting damage. At the same time, continued terrorist sabotage activity is hampering progress. The funds requested will be used to repair the infrastructure, counter the terrorist threat to protect the current investments, and to compensate for the losses that are a direct result of previous successful terrorist attacks. Once production has stabilized, funds will then be used to continue to improve the Iraqi petroleum production systems with the ultimate goal of restoring pre-war production levels.

**Detailed Overview of Requirements**  
(Dollars in Millions)

**Oil Investment**

**Requirements:**

Rapid Pipeline Repair Capability	\$ 55	
Topping Plant Acquisitions	\$ 125	
Port Facilities Upgrades	\$ 9	
Petroleum Distribution	\$ 68	
Infrastructure Security	\$ 60	
Personnel Security	\$ 8	
Qarmat Ali Water Plant	\$ 125	
Qarmat Ali Water Study	\$ 5	
Retain Subject Matter Experts	\$ 5	
Oil Reservoir Management	\$ 40	
Pump Station and Pipeline for North Ramalia	\$ 40	
Repairs to NGL Plant	\$ 15	
Repairs to LPG Plant	\$ 50	
Repairs to Bulk Storage	\$ 20	
Infrastructure Repair	\$ 575	
Subtotal Oil Investment		\$ 1,200

**Oil Products Purchase**

**Requirements:**

Petroleum Product Imports	\$ 900	
Subtotal Oil Products Purchase		\$ 900
<b>Grand Total</b>		<b>\$ 2,100</b>



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**Oil Investment**

**Rapid Pipeline Repair Team Contract.** Multiple acts of sabotage and looting, and mechanical failure due to historically poor maintenance have resulted in extended downtime on main pipelines. There is a need to extinguish any associated fire and effect repairs to the pipeline without allowing the remainder of the line to drain. The pipelines range in diameter from 8 to 46 inches and are used to carry either crude or refined products. Failure to repair these pipelines results in significant lost revenues to the Iraqi people...as much as \$7 million per day in the case of the Iraq-Turkey crude oil pipeline. Funds will be used to provide a quick reaction pipeline repair team in order to return pipelines to operational condition within 96 hours of notification that the area is secure. **Estimated minimum cost: \$55M**

**Topping Plant Acquisitions.** Import of refined petroleum products is currently costing \$3-4 million per day. Acquiring additional Topping Plants will have a direct effect on reducing this outlay, and thereby reducing the future need to appropriate funds for these imports. Topping plants are the first step in the process of converting crude oil to refined petroleum products, and can provide diesel, LPG and kerosene directly from crude in remote locations. In several cases, there is a need for refined products closer to the oilfields than to the established refineries. Acquisition of 4 "Topping Plants" to be placed strategically throughout Iraq will ensure quicker, cheaper, and more efficient delivery of refined products to the end users. This will have the direct effect of reducing the need for imports, and reducing the need for additional funds for imports. **Estimated minimum cost: \$125M**

**Port Facilities Upgrades.** As stated previously, there is an urgent need for additional imports of petroleum fuels. A large part of the task will involve the use of port facilities. While some of the port infrastructure currently exists, there is a need to ensure safe operations for the downloading of hazardous materials - gasoline, diesel and kerosene. Funds will be used to upgrade these facilities to meet the targets for imports. \$6 million will be used to dredge the Khawr Az Zubayr waterway. \$2 million will be used to remove sunken vessels impeding traffic. \$1 million will be used to hire a barge to unload confiscated smuggling vessels. **Estimated minimum cost: \$9M**

**Petroleum Distribution Requirements.** The vulnerability of the pipelines has created the need to establish redundancy in the petroleum distribution system; namely, enough trucks to meet distribution requirements when interruptions in pipeline flow occur. Funds will be used to purchase 200 fuel tankers and 250 Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) trucks to meet this need. **Estimated minimum cost: \$68M**

**Oil Infrastructure Security Requirements.** As stated before, security of the oil infrastructure is a key concern. Even with quick repair of damaged facilities, losses due to terrorist activity can easily total in the tens of millions of dollars. Investments made to thwart these attacks will certainly pay for themselves. Funds will be used to train and equip an oil infrastructure security force. The purpose of this force is solely to protect the

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oil infrastructure, and will not duplicate other security efforts being undertaken. Current security is provided by coalition forces and an inefficient assortment of local security services. **Estimated minimum cost: \$60M**

**Personnel Security Requirements.** Funds will be used to provide continuous personal security for the Minister of Oil and his Director-Generals, as requested by General Abizaid in his 28 August memo to the Secretary of Defense. The life of one of the Director-Generals was threatened as recently as late August, so this is a critical requirement. **Estimated minimum cost: \$8M**

**Qarmat Ali Water Plant.** Repair of the Qarmat Ali Water Plant and associated Cluster Pump Stations (CPS) is required to provide water injection for the Southern Rumaylah oil fields, a process critical to maintaining current production rates and preventing damage to the reservoir during production. Funds will be used to provide the necessary equipment, materials, and personnel to complete emergency repairs to restore oil production to pre-hostility levels. Failure to complete this work will adversely impact oil production rates, and will drastically affect long-term production of this oilfield. **Estimated minimum cost: \$125M**

**Qarmat Ali Water Study.** In order to make the most efficient use of the Qarmat Ali Water Plant, and decrease the likelihood of causing costly, permanent damage to the oilfield, an extensive geologic study is required to determine the appropriate locations for the injector wells. Funding this study will result in a significant return on investment in terms of both higher production rates and lower lift costs. Failure to fund will result in continuation of current inefficient practices and potential damage to the oilfield. **Estimated minimum cost: \$5M**

**Retain Subject Matter Experts.** Bringing Iraq from zero production using antiquated systems to full production using modern technology requires the assistance of those with specialized training and considerable experience in the oil industry. Like many of the other requests, this funding will directly impact the speed with which production and exports reach pre-war levels. **Estimated minimum cost: \$5M**

**Oil Reservoir Management.** Modern techniques and technologies are available to improve the location and management of oil reservoirs. Making use of the assets available will maximize production from existing reservoirs, find new reservoirs, and ensure optimum production from all petroleum sources. This investment will improve efficiency and ultimately increase the total available supply of oil. **Estimated minimum cost: \$40M**

**Pump Station and Pipeline for North Rumalia.** Process water is essential to the operation of the Degassing Stations and the NGL plant in the North Rumalia Oil fields. Current source of process water for these facilities is the Qarmat Ali Water Treatment Plant, which is under reconstruction. When reconstruction is complete, water from Qarmat Ali will primarily meet the demands of water injection and process water will

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still be inadequate. Due to the poor condition of the water treatment plant and the deteriorated state of the existing pipeline network, the current system will not be able to meet peak demands for process water in North Rumalia. The new pump station and associated pipeline will meet process water needs in North Rumalia. This new network will be isolated to allow Qarmet Ali to meet the demands for water injection more efficiently. With a new pump station and pipeline, production from the North Rumalia fields will be more reliable. **Estimated minimum cost: \$40M**

**Repairs to NGL Plant:** The Natural Gas Liquefaction plant is currently receiving repairs that will make the plant operable, however, it will still be in extremely poor condition. The poor condition of this plant will result in unstable production of feedstock to send to the LPG plant. Rebuilding a gas turbine compressor, repairing the water system, replacing excessively worn fin fans and replacing electrical cables will make the NGL plant more stable and slightly increase production. This work will increase the reliability of LPG production from the LPG plant **Estimated minimum cost: \$15M**

**Repairs to LPG Plant:** Current repairs to the LPG plant will make the plant operable to produce OCT 03 LPG goals. In order to make pre-war production of LPG, another LPG unit must be brought online. This requires replacing missing motors and installing new cable that was looted after the war, rebuilding the burnt control room, and replacing looted electrical switchgear. These repairs will make it possible to achieve pre-war LPG production. **Estimated minimum cost: \$50M**

**Repairs to Bulk Storage:** Repairs are needed at the Bulk Storage facility. Work includes replacing damaged chillers, refurbishing utilities and reworking the control room. **Estimated minimum cost: \$20M**

**Infrastructure Repair.** The restoration of the Iraqi oil infrastructure is critical to the overall success of the Coalition Provisional Authorities mission. The oil infrastructure provides for the generation of significant revenue for the Iraqi national budget and delivers refined products to fuel the economy and the quality of life for the Iraqi people.

In June 2003 Task Force Restore Iraqi Oil (RIO) and the Ministry of Oil (MOO) completed a Rough Order of Magnitude for the restoration of the Iraq Oil Infrastructure and initiated a funding request. A workshop was conducted in July with RIO and the MOO with the end product being the Restoration of Iraqi Oil Infrastructure Work Plan. This plan included the project management plan, scope of work as defined by the list of 220 projects and a rough order of magnitude budget estimate for each project.

This work plan is an integrated plan that was carefully developed and coordinated with every MOO operating company and TF RIO. The plan was developed with the focus being to restore the Oil Infrastructure to pre-war production levels. Each project in the work plan has an impact on the restoration of the infrastructure and an impact on production levels.

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The Work Plan has been sub-divided into three phases. Phase One projects are to be complete by October 2003, Phase 2 by December 2003, and Phase 3 by March 2004.

Phase 2 and 3 combined represent eighty projects. These projects will provide for a 20% increase in production of crude which represents conservatively \$12 million per day of revenue for the Iraqi people.

Several other critical projects need to be completed, but are longer-term projects that were not included in the aforementioned Work Plan. Funds could be used to complete improvements to the Upstream (ground to refinery) and Downstream (refinery and beyond) sectors of the oil industry as well as complete long delayed repair of 1991 war damage. Projects proposed include the following:

*Upstream Sector.* Improvements in the upstream sector include enhancements to the export system that will increase the flow capability, thereby, increasing export capacity. The funding will also initiate the development of new oil and gas fields. New oil fields in both the north and south regions are planned to produce no less than 250K barrels per day. Development of two new gas fields, both north and south, will provide natural gas to meet power generation requirements, lessening the use of diesel and residual oil. The fields will provide liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) for the domestic market in the amount of 200 million standard cubic feet per day.

*Downstream Sector.* Funding will allow the commencement of the planned new refinery that will increase domestic refinery capacity by 70K barrels per day to meet the increasing demand of the local market and to reduce import requirements. Improvements will be made at current refineries to add new reforming units. These units improve the quality of domestically produced gasoline, thereby reducing the need for environmentally damaging tetra-ethyl lead additives. Hydrodesulfurization units will also be added to lessen the content of sulfur in diesel to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions to the atmosphere. Expansions to the northern gas processing plant by the addition of a new processing train will increase the capability to meet the needs of the newly developed fields in the upstream sector. Increased storage capability for products and LPG will be initiated to stabilize operation of the refineries and gas plants to meet seasonal demand and improve distribution efficiency. Distribution will also be enhanced by an improved product pipeline network that will reduce road transport with its inherent inefficiencies and hazards.

*Repair of 1991 war damage.* The supplemental funding will allow the rebuilding of the lubricating oils plant in the Baiji refinery to meet the increasing market demand for these products. Additionally, rebuilding of product storage tanks at the Basrah refinery and at some of the product distribution storage depots will allow a more stabilized refinery production operation as well as avoiding seasonal shortages as product demand fluctuates.

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These investments will accelerate the growth in Iraqi export dollars, and thereby shorten the period during which the Iraqi government will be reliant on international aid.

**Estimated minimum cost: \$575M**

**Oil Products Purchase**

**Petroleum Product Imports.** Interruptions to the flow of crude to the refineries, difficulties at the refineries themselves, and interruptions to the flow of refined product to the cities have created the need to import more petroleum products than originally projected. Funds will be used to cover the difference between Iraqi demand and refinery production, and to establish and maintain a 30-day reserve in all major products to ensure no interruptions in basic services due to future terrorist activity. The main products required are Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG), used for cooking; kerosene, used for heating in the winter months; benzene, for auto fuel; and diesel, to fuel larger equipment and power generation. Failure to provide any of these will directly affect the quality of life of the average Iraqi. \$600 million will be needed in the first quarter to compensate for the large difference between demand and production, and to build the 30-day reserve. \$300 million will be required for the remainder of the fiscal year to compensate for continued production shortfalls while maintaining the reserve. **Estimated minimum cost: \$900M**

**Public Works.**

**Summary of Request.** \$3,710M is required to meet critical water and sanitation requirements. Our overall priorities in implementing the various public works programs are:

1. Providing potable water.
2. Improving efficiency of the distribution system.
3. Improving sewerage facilities and solid waste management

Although our immediate thrust concentrates on the restoration of conditions to pre-war conditions, we also intend to emphasize improving and expanding services and coverage in all governorates. Our initial requirements to help the Iraqi people improve their public works include

Raising potable water access across Iraq	\$2,830M
Reducing water loss from 60% to 40%	\$ 30M
Increasing sewerage service in cities to 15%	\$ 697M
Improving solid waste management	\$ 153M
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$3,710M</b>

Different assessment studies by International organizations have all agreed that the above public work programs are the best way to improve the performance of the sector and the living conditions of Iraqis. This work should commence as soon as possible and be pleted by the end of 2004.

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Currently, the responsibility for the delivery of basic municipal services is centrally controlled in terms of budget allocation and priority setting. Over time the responsibility for basic services will be devolved to the governorate and the municipality level. These programs will also help develop the capacity of governing authorities, and demonstrate to local authorities and the central agencies (such Ministry of Finance and Public Works) on proper administrative procedures for major public works.

**Raising potable water access across Iraq 90%**. \$2,300M is required to provide potable water access to most of Iraq. Our plan to reach that level involves first working up to 75% access, then working further improvements to reach 90% access for cities, towns, rural areas and villages.

The coverage figure in urban areas at this time is approximately 60% however the supply is not 100% of the time and the quality is suspect. The existing supply system is stretched to its limit and system strengthening/master planning is required before coverage can be increased by any significant percentage. Master plans have to be completed before accurate figures on the incremental costs of service coverage can be given. Infrastructure required will include larger feeder water mains, service reservoirs to balance daily and hourly flows and the provision of dividing and control valves to allow the creation of supply zones and mains to be shut down for repairs and maintenance. The estimated cost to increase urban coverage to 75% is \$1,000M and is based on extending coverage to 2.7M people at a per capita cost of \$370/capita for water treatment and network. This per capita cost estimate is based on theoretical analysis using a hypothetical residential area.

To raise coverage levels across the country to 75%, supplies to rural areas and villages will have to be improved. Many small towns and villages are served by tankers coming many miles to provide potable water on a frequency of once a day, once every 2 days and in some cases once every 10 days. To improve coverage will require the installation of treatment plants capable of treating saline water (reverse osmosis), reticulation systems and additional tankers. To achieve the coverage target approximately 2.2M additional people in rural areas will have to be served. Four techniques have been identified for serving the additional people. Details and costs are:

Extension of existing urban systems	\$370/capita
The use of compact units plus local reticulation	\$186/capita
Tankering potable water to them	\$373/capita
Using well to supply water	\$267/capita

Estimates have been made of the population to be served by the different supply methods and the total cost of the program has been estimated to be \$530M.

To raise supply levels across the country to 90% will require improvements in supplies to cities, towns, rural areas and villages. To improve coverage across the nation, we intend to install treatment plants capable of treating saline water (reverse osmosis), reticulation systems and additional tankers. The increased populations served by this program are:

- Urban 2.7M people
- Rural 1.3M people

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Using the per capita construction costs quoted above the cost of raising universal coverage of potable water to 90% is \$1300M.

**Reducing water loss from 60% to 40%.** Reducing water losses in an arid environment is a national priority. Water losses are currently estimated at 60% of the potable water produced from the water treatment plants. \$30M is required to repair the water distribution networks to ensure that safe water (free of pathogens and other harmful chemicals) actually reach families is a priority. This will also require a full inspection and mapping of the networks. Reducing water losses has a three fold effect of:

- increasing coverage because there is more water available;
  - reducing operational costs because less water is required; and
  - reducing the risk of illness because leaks into the system are repaired
- preventing the contamination of potable water.

An initial reduction to 40% (\$30M) involves the rectification of visible leaks. There are approx. 15,000km of water main in Iraq and using consultants' studies the cost per kilometer for the rectification of visible leaks has been estimated to be \$500/km. The cost of the program is estimated to be approximately \$30m allowing for the variables in the network and the scale of the leaks likely to be encountered.

**Increasing sewerage service in cities to 11%.** The current coverage across Iraq is estimated at 6%. This situation is unsatisfactory in that wastewater can come in contact with children causing illness and death. As water supply increases the situation will become more critical as more water becomes available adding to the amount of wastewater with the potential to spread disease. CPA requests \$697M as initial seed funding to increase sewerage service to 11% in urban areas which will involve extending treatment facilities and collection systems within cities. This will require innovation in treatment techniques such as aquaculture and alternative collection system such as low pressure systems. The funding will be used to test treatment and construction techniques so that larger sewerage programmes will be more effective.

To increase the coverage to the target of 11% translates to an additional 0.9M people being served. The cost per capita for providing sewerage services has been estimated to be \$775 of which \$570 is for the collection system and \$205 for treatment. The estimated cost of the program is \$697M.

**Improving Solid Waste Management.** There is no overall solid waste management strategy for Iraq. \$153M is required to finalize a strategy which must include the construction of correctly designed landfill sites, equipment to operate the landfill site, regular collection of solid waste requiring vehicles, education campaigns to sort rubbish at source and demonstration/startup recycling plants. Recycling can help to protect the environment, generate employment, and reuse valuable nutrients from food-waste and sewage for safe utilization in horticulture, aquaculture, forestry and food production. More needs to be done to ensure the safe management of medical and

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industrial waste as these pose a serious health hazard to those who work with waste and to children who play in unprotected landfills. These more hazardous wastes need to be treated at source.

The capital cost of such a program has been estimated based on 50 landfill sites at \$0.5M/site, \$0.5M/site for operating equipment, 40 collection vehicles for each site at \$50,000/vehicle and six demonstration plants at \$0.5M each. The total cost of the program is estimated to be \$153M.

### **Water Resources.**

**Summary of Request.** The water resources infrastructure in Iraq suffered some damage after the war due to looting and vandalism, however, the overall functionality of the system was not significantly affected. Still, investment in this sector is strategically important to the Coalition both immediately and over the long term. To meet our immediate objectives, CPA requires \$935 M to repair and improve water and sewerage services.

Agriculture and irrigation sustain the lives of a large sector of the population and water supply is essential to prosperity. Although many of these initiatives increase the condition or service beyond prewar conditions, investment in the projects included below will clearly demonstrate a commitment to the people of Iraq in important and visible ways.

**Pumping Stations.** \$75M is required to replace pumps and electrical control appurtenances for 125 priority pumping stations (of 270 stations). Each pumping station has, on average 4-6 pumps for the purpose of reliability, maintenance and operational flexibility. Pumps vary in size, capacity and lift, but average cost is \$125K per unit (includes pump, motor, starter and control box) [600x\$125K=\$75M]. Approximately half of the inventory (600 pumps) require immediate replacement with western standards equipment. Maintenance, refurbishment, and replacement of irrigation pumps have been largely neglected since 1980. New equipment delivered and installed under FFO contracts is of low quality and reliability.

Replacement of irrigation pumps on a large scale will demonstrate to the people of rural Iraq that the Coalition is dedicated to improving their lives and livelihood. This project is needed immediately as farmers throughout the country are negatively affected by the current situation. This project would improve the current system beyond the pre-war condition.

**Replace Standby Generators.** \$75M is needed to replace standby generators for key pumping stations, barrages, and dam sites. There are about 100 key points (of ~300) in the vast system of reservoirs, barrages and pumping stations that require backup generators to assure electricity for running the pumps, providing municipal water, irrigation, lifting the gates on barrages, and operating other essential emergency equipment. The standard 750Kw generator costs ~ \$750K [100units x \$750K = \$75M] Minor site work (construction) will be required.



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Generators are necessary to return the operation and reliability of pump stations to prewar standards throughout the country. The current state of the national power grid does not allow pump stations to function adequately. Pump stations require continuous power to operate and the grid currently provides three hours on and three hours off, at best. Lack of reliable, continuous electricity from the grid has caused a significant reduction in irrigation pump service and benefit to farmers.

The installation of this equipment will demonstrate the Coalition's commitment to the rural areas of Iraq. There is a common belief that many people are worse off now with respect to public services, than prior to the war. This would reverse that trend.

**Rehabilitate irrigation and drainage systems.** \$130M is needed to rehabilitate old operating irrigation and drainage systems for improving water use efficiency and water quality. Every existing system needs major rehabilitation, consisting of cleaning irrigation and drainage canals; replacing regulators and sluice gates and lining irrigation canals with concrete to reduce water losses through infiltration. There are 20 projects which serve approximately 500,000 hectares which, when rehabilitated, would result in water savings of 25-35%.

Maintenance and refurbishment of the irrigation infrastructure has been neglected since 1980. This requirement would increase the efficiency of water delivery and use throughout the country to higher than prewar levels. Projects would be concentrated in the southern Governorates and can be started immediately.

This effort would directly benefit the agricultural community by improving the efficiency and reliability of water use. As a nation, Iraq could determine how best to allocate the water conserved, either to additional irrigation, municipal and industrial uses, or ecological/environmental restoration. This project would signal strong support for hundreds of thousands of rural Iraqis whose support is critical to the success of the coalition. The many village and tribal leaders need clear examples of improvement to gain the confidence and backing of their members.

**Completion of 10 major irrigation/drainage projects.** \$130M is required to complete construction of 10 major ongoing irrigation and drainage projects. Numerous worthy projects were initiated during the past few years which need completion. Five major irrigation projects will have concrete lined canals for water savings, and will be connected to 5 drainage canals to ensure that saline water flows to the main outfall drain (MOD) and the sea, reducing the salinity loads to the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. The total new irrigated area is approximately 400,000 ha.

Projects would open new, more productive areas to agriculture, allowing less productive land to be retired. This would result in a net savings of water and increased production. Projects would also have a positive environmental impact, by reducing high salinity return flows into the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers.

**Construct 11 rural water supply dams.** \$25M is required to initiate construction of 11 rural water supply dams in Western Al-Anbar governorate desert (roughly \$2.3M per dam). There are many semi-nomadic desert dwellers, with villages and livestock dependent on the sporadic flows of ephemeral streams during a short rainy season. There

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is a need for small dams at 11 sites to provide water for villages and livestock. Engineering and design can begin now with construction following immediately thereafter.

These projects would more than double the prewar amount of water available to the villages and herdsman of western Iraq, who suffer from water shortages. This project would demonstrate to the people of the western desert that resources are distributed fairly. Building trust and allegiance in this vast, remote region is strategically important because this area borders Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.

**Rural Groundwater Supply Projects.** \$60M is required to initiate rural groundwater supply projects in Kurdish region (~100 villages, average cost \$2M x 30 clusters = \$60M). Many villages in the north, particularly in the Kurdish areas depend on groundwater for village and livestock water supply. Groundwater availability varies, and the villages that are clustered together can maximize their supply reliability and availability by interconnecting the systems and building a common storage tank and distribution system. There are numerous such clusters of 3-5 villages that can be interconnected. Engineering and design can begin now with construction following immediately thereafter.

Connecting water supply systems would provide a measure of insurance against mechanical failure or groundwater availability in any single village. The project would improve water supply to greater than prewar levels. Investment in the north of Iraq is important to demonstrate the commitment and fairness of the coalition.

**Dam safety repair and major structural rehabilitation.** \$100M is required to make repairs identified by a Corps of Engineers Dam safety team which completed an assessment of 16 dams and barrages. The critical repairs are currently underway to return structures to prewar levels. Dams and barrages requiring repair are distributed throughout the country with the large dams in the north, and other structures along the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. Many shortcomings are readily repairable with little design or lead time required. For more significant work, engineering and design can begin now with construction following immediately thereafter.

Completion of this work would ensure the overall safety and reliable operation of the water control infrastructure in Iraq above prewar levels. Investigation of questionable practices and repair of structures would put to rest numerous recurring concerns that coalition forces have discovered. For example, Constructed over layers of soluble gypsum, Mosul Dam is particularly import to address.

**Basra/Umm Qasr water supply pipeline and water treatment plant.** Currently, water to Basra only, flows through an open, 260km long canal, only half of which is concrete lined. There are large evaporation losses along the way, and saline water infiltrates into the water supply. A pipeline would effectively reduce water losses by 33%, ensuring reliability and quality of supply. The savings in water would be sufficient to supply Umm Qasr as well. Engineering and design is ongoing, but \$200M is required to initiate first stage construction (an additional \$800M is required to complete the plant.)

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This project would provide higher quality raw water to Basra, the second largest city in Iraq. Umm Qasr, historically receiving poor quality, highly saline water, would also benefit. This project would purchase the necessary pipe from the factory in Basra, employing several hundred workers.

**Environmental Restoration (Euphrates).** \$50M is required to reconnect the Euphrates River, which is contained within a 200km dike system, to villages via regulators and culverts. A major flood control levee system was built along much of the lower Euphrates River. The effect was to cut off access for the numerous villages and farms to flood waters and floodplains for their livestock and irrigation of palm trees. Box culverts and regulators would be installed at regular intervals to serve the villages, and provide easy access to the Euphrates waters. Only limited engineering and design is required and sites are independent, so this project is ready for immediate execution.

This effort will benefit the lives of tens of thousands of citizens who will regain access to the Euphrates River and floodplain for farming and livestock. This access will rectify the actions of the former regime and improve the lives of the people along the lower Euphrates well beyond their prewar condition.

**Environmental Restoration (Hawizeh Marsh).** \$50M is required to construct regulators on Kasara Escape and Al Sweeb River to establish control of outflow from the Hawizeh Marsh (2 regulators at approximately \$25M each). Kasara Escape and the Al Sweeb River carry the discharge from the Hawizeh Marsh to the Euphrates River near Qurna. Installation of control structures (regulators) would allow management of the outflow and hence the water level within the marsh. This increase in control will greatly assist the effort to expand the Hawizeh Marsh by improving the efficiency of water use. While the marshes will likely never cover the same vast areas that they once did, water conserved can be used to maintain optimum water levels in the existing marsh and/or allocated to former marsh areas for restoration purposes. Engineering and design can begin now with construction following immediately thereafter.

Completion of the regulators would be a significant first step in the investment to restore the marshes of southern Iraq. This project would be seen as a positive move by the Coalition to rectify some of the environmental and socioeconomic tragedies of the past 25 years. These regulators, as part of a larger effort, will improve the environment and the lives of Marsh Arabs beyond prewar conditions.

**Basra Channel Regulators – Tidal Channel Flushing.** \$40M is required to flush out canals in Basra. A network of canals extends throughout the city of Basra. All of these canals contain stagnant water and debris and present a health hazard to a large number of people. This project would allow the natural rise and fall of the tidal cycle to flush out the canals at frequent intervals. A series of six gates are needed where each canal joins the Shatt Al-Arab. Because the canals can be separated as individual loops, a pair of gates, one at each end of a loop, can be alternately opened and closed when the tide rises and falls, thus creating a current to flush the canal. This project is ready for execution pending the availability of funds.

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This project would improve the health and environment of tens of thousands of citizens in Basra, a long neglected city. This end state would be an improvement over the prewar condition.

**Transportation and Telecommunications.**

**Summary of Requirements.** The Coalition requires \$835M to restore transportation and telecommunications to basic levels of service. \$513M is needed for transportation (civil aviation-\$165M; ports-\$45M; and railroads-\$303M) and \$322M for telecommunications (IPTC & CPA Network Systems Architecture Planning & Analyses - \$124M; Iraqi communications systems - \$109M; and Iraqi communications operations - \$89M).

**Civil Aviation.** \$165M is required to complete airspace and airport opening: Funds will be used to complete the reopening of Baghdad and Basra airports. In addition, there are approximately 120 airports in the country of Iraq including the major airport, Mosul, to the north. No funds have been made available in the current year budget for any airport with the exception of Baghdad and Basra. Funds will be used to repair the infrastructure, obtain avionic equipment, and train aviation personnel to international standards and to provide safety and security systems. A more detailed listing for each of these categories follows.

**Infrastructure:** Funds will be used to repair control towers, repair sewage and electrical systems, water system repair, refurbishment of runways and taxiways, fuel system repairs and basic cosmetics (parking lots, escalators, glass/glazing, etc). Estimated minimum cost - \$95M.

**Avionic Equipment:** Funds will be used to purchase, control tower console/radio replacement, install precision approach path indicators, install and provide maintenance for radar systems at Basrah and Mosul, to repair/replace ILS landing systems at various airports, install fiber optic cables for communication equipment, to repair/install airfield substations and lighting vaults, and install AFTN communications systems. Estimated minimum cost - \$40M.

**Training:** Iraqi aviation personnel require training to meet the minimum international (ICAO) standards. Personnel include air traffic controllers, flight standards, equipment technicians, mechanics, ramp personnel, aircraft safety inspectors, etc. Estimated minimum cost - \$10M.

**Safety/Security systems:** Funds will be used to conduct security assessments, install internal and external security systems meeting ICAO standards, purchase ground support equipment, purchase crash, fire and rescue equipment, install airport surface detection equipment, repair/replace airport. Estimated minimum cost - \$20M.

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**Ports.** \$45M is required to fix serious shortcomings at the the port of Umm Qasr which is a vital transportation node in the Iraqi economy. The port of Umm Qasr is without electric power from the grid. It lacks water for vessel servicing, habitability and fire protection. It lacks perimeter fencing and security lighting. While some aspects of this are being addressed by specific Bechtel taskings, the port requires additional equipment for handling cargo both container and break bulk. The current level of port activity is not sufficient to fund these urgently required needs.

**Railroad.** \$303M is required to restore the railroad to a functioning system. Funds would be spent to repair, rehabilitate the following areas of rail infrastructure.

Rehabilitation/Restoration of Buildings and Other Facilities: Serious looting and vandalism in the immediate aftermath of the active fighting, and extending to the present time, has left the railroad virtually devoid of the tools, machinery and spare parts necessary to maintain their plant and equipment. Fewer than half of the fifty mainline locomotives received in 2002 are still in operating condition and the number shrinks almost daily. Hundreds of older, but still potentially useful, locomotives sit out of service. Passenger cars have had air conditioning and other equipment removed and interiors vandalized, all with no means to repair. Freight cars sit out of service for lack of parts as simple as air hoses. Buildings have been looted to the extent that roofing has been torn off and door and window frames removed. Estimated minimum cost - \$70M.

Repair/Renewal of Track Structure: The track structure has suffered from a combination of severe neglect ever since the first Gulf War, coupled with what money there was being largely wasted on ill-advised new construction schemes. Virtually the entire railroad is in a state of deferred maintenance, some so severe as to present a serious risk of derailment. In addition, mechanized track machinery has mostly all been looted and vandalized so as to make it unusable. Two bridges remain out due to war damage. What little emergency funding has been made available is being spent on the very worst section, but overall the condition of the track structure continues to deteriorate. Estimated minimum cost - \$125M.

Replacement of Signal and Communications Systems: The mainline is being operated using a jury-rigged radio network set up by the Army. There has already been one collision, resulting in a fatality that would have been avoided had the signal system, which used to exist, been in service. In addition to the obvious safety issues, the lack of signals and communications put severe limitations on the capacity of the line. At present, the line between Umm Qasr/Basrah and Baghdad only has the capacity for one additional pair of trains though there is the potential for significant new business on the line. Estimated minimum cost - \$65M.

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**Repair/Acquisition of Locomotives and Cars:** The rolling stock situation is alarming due to the lack of repair facilities and spare parts. There are twenty new locomotives of the 2002 order still at the manufacturer's plant waiting for payment. Prompt acquisition of these locomotives would help avert a short-term crisis. A critical commodity in winter is LP Gas and additional specialized cars to transport this product are sorely needed. Passenger equipment is in a deplorable state and presents a seriously negative public image. Estimated minimum cost – \$ 25M.

**Development/Acquisition of Intermodal Facilities and Equipment:** A major source of possible new business is the handling of intermodal containers. The port of Umm Qasr has the potential capacity for handling a significant increase in container traffic, and international container traffic could develop to and through Turkey to continental Europe. At present, Baghdad is the only inland point capable of loading and off-loading containers, and even there it is done very inefficiently using a 50ton crane. Inland container terminals must be built at selected locations and equipped with suitable handling equipment, and additional container cars acquired, if the railroad is to be successful in developing this important business. Estimated minimum cost – \$15M.

**Bridges.** The Ministry of Transportation and Communication's initial assessments of the Railroad bridge network in Iraq has revealed that only 2 bridges (the Akashat and the Al-Fattah) will need to be funded for repair. Estimated minimum cost - \$3M.

**ITPC & CPA Network Systems Architecture Planning & Analyses (\$124M).**

**CPA Enterprise Systems – LAN/WAN/PSTN.** The CPA Communications intends to launch comprehensive technical and business process studies of CPA and ITPC operations. The objective is to provide a detailed systems study that will lead to needed systems architectures prior to undertaking network design and construction. The output of these studies will feed directly into capital upgrades of the Iraqi public telephone network. Many current and planned systems upgrades, such as increasing fiber optic trunking, linking into international gateways, standing up packet switched data networks (for high volume transactional data and Internet traffic), and wireless cellular networks require immediate expansions to the Iraqi switching and transmission systems infrastructure. In addition to supporting planned increases in network traffic, yet additional infrastructure is required to support background networks for managing these networks. These new systems include operations support systems and billing support systems. The CPA requires a parallel, yet modest, investment to stand up Enterprise Systems for supporting the management of the Iraqi PTT (ITPC) and what will be its newly established regulatory agency. Estimated minimum cost: \$54M.

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**CPA Enterprise Systems – Applications.** This increment of investment capital and direct expense is aimed at bringing modern business automation into the business infrastructure of the Iraqi telecommunications environment. These investments include reengineering Iraqi PTT business practice around COTS Enterprise Software systems. These systems go by a variety of names such as Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP), Supply Chain Management (SCM), and Customer Relationship Management (CRM). These names all connote the automation of business processes. The amounts requested include computer equipment, intrapremises networking gear, and enterprise level software licenses for both network-based, and premises-based software applications. The CPA will engineer links between its governmental operations to the ITPC and Postal Commissions, with links to regulated commercial telephony service providers. Estimated minimum cost: \$27M.

**Postal IT Architecture and Systems.** The Postal system of Iraq remains antediluvian. Seed investments of Information Technology will allow the Iraqi Postal authority to reengineer its business practices and to support them with automated systems such as letter and package bar coding, establishment of ZIP codes, letter and package tracking systems, and linkages into financial accounting systems. Estimated minimum cost: \$9M.

**WiFi Capabilities for ITPC.** These investments will allow the ITPC to build wireless Internet Protocol (IP) networks to support its internal business operations. The IP network will link into its public network and to Wireless Fidelity (WiFi) networks for mobile users. The WiFi network will, in turn, promote capabilities provided by unregulated service providers, but with provisions for security and network management unavailable in the former domain. Portions of these monies will be used to build prototype capabilities at CPA headquarters and field locations for supporting intra-ministerial communications. Estimated minimum cost: \$19M.

**CIO Function – Operations.** The CPA MoTC Communications organization is being increasingly seen as the organization to manage intra-ministerial and intra-agencies communications and information management. As such, this Chief Information Officer function requires bringing standardized business processes and office automations systems to harness the information stovepipes now being built in the rush of post-war action. The CIO will manage all standard IT functions including those currently being provisioned by DoD and its Defense Agency (DISA) and support contractors. The CIO will manage all voice and data services at the Tiers 2 and 3 levels, and, upon request, build interfaces to those Tier 1 systems managed by Joint Coalition Forces. Estimated minimum cost: \$15M.

***Iraqi Communications Systems (ITPC and Other Ministries) @ \$109M.***

**Public Safety Information Services Network IOC.** The Ministry of Interior has requested the development and stand-up of an enhanced services, wireless network. The network will be used by “Security and First Responders”, including police, fire, and EMT teams. Little or no capabilities exist within the Iraqi infrastructure either for centrally-

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dispatched communications, nor point-to-point communications. The Iraqi Self-Defense Forces are also prospective clients of the Public Safety Network as they stand up and eventually relieve Coalition Forces. The funds for this program will focus upon validating systems concepts being developed jointly among OSD, CJTF-7, CPA (MoTC) and other CPA ministries. Upon systems validation, CPA will oversee the rapid build out of an operational network using either publicly available wireless networks, or special purpose government funded networks. Estimated minimum cost: \$73M.

Commercial TV and Radio: Management and Licensing. Under the purview of CPA resides the commercial broadcast network over open airwaves and what will be an emergent rebroadcast (cable) network over fixed wired media. The funds will be used to restart and expand commercial broadcast operations, including installing modern broadcast transmitters. Behind the camera, funds will be used to modernize the business practices of the regulated television and radio industry. Funds will also be used for spectrum enforcement. Rogue broadcasters will be licensed, have their spectra moved, or altogether shutdown. Estimated minimum cost: \$10M.

Numbering Schema and 911 Initiative for IPTC and Independent Wireless Service Providers. Funds will be used to develop a nationwide numbering scheme for Iraq, and a "911" emergency response system. (Note: Outside of the USA, the 911 name goes by "112".) The Iraqi ITPC will be first to implement the nationwide numbering scheme that will stand up country, area, and city codes. Concurrently, the commercial wireless service providers will build 911 response features into their systems, at their own cost. Estimated minimum cost: \$4M.

Replacement of Back-up Generators for Outside Telecom Plant. Site surveys have revealed that significant numbers of emergency diesel generators have either been looted or remain inoperative due to lack of maintenance and spare parts. Preliminary economic analyses suggest scrapping the remaining inventory of ITPC owned assets. Funds will be used to by computer automated generators for providing immediate power needs and for anticipated growth requirements in central offices and local loop plants. Estimated minimum cost: \$22M.

**Iraqi Communications Operations (Miscellaneous @ \$89M).**

Iraqi-FAA Operations. Upgrade Baghdad airport facilities to modern aviation standards. Conduct Engineering studies at other major Iraqi airfields. Build and modernize departure and in-route air traffic control (ATC) center communications. Funds will form a pool to support the communications need of industrial ministries which depend upon the publicly switched network. Estimated minimum cost: \$14M.

Technical and Management Training for ITPC. Train personnel on vendor-specific equipment for wired network upgrades, and for reprogramd Iraqi workers to the newly licensed wireless service providers. This training will fall outside of programs instituted by the Ministry of Education. Estimated minimum cost: \$5M.



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Emergency Repairs and Payment to ITPC Network – Not Elsewhere Specified. As the ITPC continues site surveys to battle-damaged switching centers and sabotaged trunk lines, the bill to repair or replace this equipment continues to rise. Funds request are for a CPA-managed reserve that will be used to restore essential services and network upgrades required to support interfaces into privately owned networks and into international gateways. Estimated minimum cost: \$70M.

### **Housing and Construction**

Housing. There has been virtually no housing activity across Iraq over the past 20 years. There is a need for dramatic increase in the scope of Government funded housing projects. \$100M is required to dramatically increase the amount of housing activity underway and to give a strong initial push to the Housing sector. Our intent is to initiate work leading to the initiation of construction on at least 3,528 new houses over the next year. This construction will be a significant challenge in that it will require the development of a housing infrastructure to supply local water, sanitation, and electrical capacity that does not currently exist.

We expect that this initial effort will be augmented with a greatly increased rate of construction activity in the year following, as the construction infrastructure becomes more robust and able to accomplish an increased rate of home production, despite dramatic increases in the cost of construction materials.

\$100 million dollars will create 7 housing communities, totaling 3,528 housing units, as well as the supporting infrastructure such as basic services, roads, a primary school, two secondary schools, a clinic, a place of worship, and a market in each community. This amount will address 0.35% or a tiny fraction of the total housing need in Iraq; however, this may be enough to start an effective housing program, which will require an approximate \$2 billion annual budget. This amount will also enable the Ministry of Housing and Construction to develop and implement a short term housing program that will lead to long term success and stability. This short term housing program would hire architects and engineers to begin the master planning and design for each major city in Iraq, begin construction of several affordable housing communities throughout the country, provide the ministry with the resources to invest in home financing and mortgage insurance programs that will encourage investments from the private sector, and invest in developing the resources and capabilities of the housing construction industry in Iraq.

Iraq faces a housing crisis and has a current need for more than a million housing units; although, this need will not be met in the short term, construction of new housing projects will show the Iraqi people that both the Coalition forces and the new Iraq government are taking immediate steps to address their housing issues. The policies implemented by the former government resulted in a society dependent on the government. Also, Iraq has experienced three wars within the last 20 years. Over these 20 years, Iraq has been ruled by an oppressive regime and has lacked a social housing program to address the issues of the urban poor, normal population growth, and internally displaced families evicted from their homes due to ethnic strife. The housing shortage

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continues to be exacerbated by the return of large numbers of refugees and ex-patriots to Iraq. If these housing issues are not addressed quickly and effectively, the homeless population in Iraq will continue to grow and threaten the security and stability of Iraq. More and more families will become desperate for shelter and lose faith in the new Iraqi government. The Ministry of Housing and Construction (MOHC) has already started the construction of 1,008 housing units in Iraq and has coordinated with the United Nations (UN) to begin construction of 7 housing projects that would create 504 housing units each or 3,528 total housing units. These UN housing projects will be funded under the UN Oil-for-Food program. The \$1.6 million housing budget for 2003 is well short of what the new Iraqi government will need to develop an effective and successful housing program. The supplemental budget would fund the construction of 7 additional housing communities in cities throughout Iraq making a positive impact in each of those areas. With the additional supplemental funding, the current housing program would begin construction of 8,064 total housing units throughout Iraq. These new housing construction projects will illustrate to the people that the new Iraqi government is making progress and cares enough to address their housing concerns and issues. In addition, this supplemental funding would create additional housing construction projects employing approximately 14,815 laborers over a 20 month period and infuse money back into the Iraqi construction industry. The new Iraqi government must continue to address these housing issues effectively by showing concrete results in the form of new housing communities since it is both a social and economic problem. Failure to do so will result in political and economic instability throughout Iraq, as the people will continue to feel that their government does not legitimately care about their problems.

The \$100 million supplemental budget will support the current housing program and start construction of approximately 7 communities or 3,528 housing units throughout Iraq. The housing program will incorporate proper urban planning and design so that housing areas and zones can be identified and existing urban areas can support continued expansion and growth. This program will accommodate anticipated increases in the population over time and avoid overcrowding that leads to high levels of unemployment in cities. This program will also fund the Ministry of Housing and Construction's ability to design new projects, contract funded projects, and provide construction oversight and program management for next year's anticipated housing construction effort. Over time, the private sector's role in the housing industry will grow while reducing the government's role in directly building these complexes. Until then, there is an immediate requirement to support designing, contracting, providing oversight, and program management for next year's anticipated housing construction effort in order to develop a successful and effective long term housing program that will contribute to Iraq's economic and social stability.

**Public Buildings.** There are many requirements for Public Buildings across Iraq. This has been an active area which can be further accelerated. \$130M is required to dramatically accelerate our schedule to define contracts, which are currently undefined as a result of direction to Iraqis to re-start previously ongoing contract work early in the construction efforts within Iraq. The supplemental will also allow the Ministry to continue ongoing work or initiate new work at an even faster rate as a result of increased

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infrastructure capability and equipment purchases. There are also requirements for improvements to Ministry of Housing and Construction facilities across the Governates and Regions of Iraq. These improvements, new equipment, and new facilities, will provide significant new capabilities to the Ministry to support improved construction rates. The facilities will also provide appropriate protection for new equipment and construction infrastructure necessary to support resurgence within the construction industry in Iraq, protecting an investment necessary to jump start the Construction Industry.

If this additional \$130 million is not funded it will prolong the disruption to the government operations and thousands of governmental employees of Iraq, have an adverse ripple effect on the overall economy and slow down the transition to the new Iraqi government. This effort really only is a stopgap measure and does not fully provide for the full needs of the reconstruction of the Iraqi building infrastructure. The economic consequence of not funding this supplemental budget request will have immeasurable indirect costs in the continued degradation of the employee's work places and family life's.

This \$130 million will fund the following types of projects:

- 1) 1,325 basic repair projects at \$40,000 each for \$53 million. This basic repair work will put a building back in operation after years of neglect and deferred maintenance.
- 2) 140 refurbishment projects at \$250,000 each for \$35 million. This refurbishment work will allow for the upgrade of currently obsolete building components and limited construction.
- 3) 6 major reconstruction projects at \$7 million dollars for \$42 million. These major reconstruction projects will replace all of the buildings comments to current international safety and building standards.

These projects will allow these public buildings to successfully meet the overall operational and serviceability needs of the building occupants. The various building components that will be maintained, repaired or replaced in these projects will be: general cleaning, doors/ frames/ hardware, windows/ glazing, walls, floors/ walkways, stairwells, plumbing, plumbing fixtures, painting, electrical power, light fixtures, electric fans/ HVAC systems and other construction incidentals.

**Roads and Bridges.** Investments in the amount of \$240 Million must be made on Iraq's Road and Bridge infrastructure as a prerequisite to begin the economic redevelopment of the nation. A robust transportation network is imperative for efficient movement of essential products such as fuel, wheat, water, construction materials and equipment, and other supplies which fuel the economic foundations of Iraq. The current disrepair caused by lack of maintenance over an extended period of time affects over 74,000 KM of major highways and

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local road systems. In addition, a total of 32 bridges are currently damaged and will not adequately support the high volume of transportation required to support national recovery. We have determined the necessary repairs and system improvements for recovery from the 15 years of neglect and minimal improvements will cost \$12 Billion. The proposed \$240 Million for the Supplemental Budget for FY03 will provide enough money to fund the remaining War-damaged Bridges on the Priority Projects list and invest a significant amount of funds into Expressway 1 for critical equipment and paving of gaps in the project that are deteriorating due to military convoys. The \$240 Million is only 2% of the total Road and Bridge repair, maintenance, and system upgrades required, but this amount will nonetheless make a significant down payment on beginning the required recovery effort.

Expressway 1, the major north-south route in Iraq (an absolutely vital asset) is a 146 KM stretch of road that has never been completed. Many portions have deteriorated such that they will require significant repair and rehabilitation in order to support any sustained amount of traffic. This same highway is also in need of major rehabilitation and maintenance north of the capital city. Similarly, local roads and bridges are the essential lifeline for farmers to bring goods to market yet they have not received adequate maintenance or construction for decades.

There are many bridges throughout Iraq that have not been properly maintained or repaired. It is estimated that 160 bridges may, because of war damage or poor maintenance, become unusable within the next year unless immediate maintenance and repair is accomplished. Funding should be focused on repairing and maintaining safe and sound bridges and roads that will support the long-term growth and development of Iraq. This will be accomplished through a two part program. Part one, the Main Artery Road and Bridge repair Program, will begin repairs and maintenance on roads and bridges which traverse the most highly traveled corridors across Iraq. Composed of 700 major bridges and 42,000 KM of the largest highways, these form the backbone of the Iraqi transportation system. Part two, the Governate Road and Bridge Repair Program, composed of approximately 600 bridges and 32,000 KM of secondary and rural roads, will address the road network which supports the manufacturing areas and rural communities which play such an important part in Iraqi commercial activities. With the proposed Supplemental Budget for the FY03, we will be focused on Priority Bridge Projects and Expressway 1 and spend \$20 Million dollars to start emergency repairs on some of the 160 critical bridges in Iraq.

The Iraqi Ministry of Housing and Construction, working with their counterparts from the Coalition Provisional Alliance and the Governates, have determined that the following funding areas will be required for repairs and maintenance as discussed previously but also will provide for badly needed new roads, highways and expressways. While the total funds for the proposed Supplemental Budget Request in FY04 is \$240 million which is only 2% of the total amount required, it will make a dramatic initial impact to support of the recovery of the Iraqi road and bridge system.

- In order for Iraq to complete projects started before the war, it will cost \$174 million dollars to make emergency maintenance repairs and return the transportation system to prewar capacity. This includes \$100 million for Express Way # 1, \$16 million for emergency maintenance, \$28 million to complete ongoing projects started in FY03 and \$30 million to complete war damaged projects started in FY03.

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- Concurrently with these projects, work will begin on an additional \$66 million in rehabilitation, maintenance, and new roads and bridges to address 15 years of neglect and poor planning. This will be distributed as follows: \$20 million to conduct additional maintenance for structures and roadways to a minimal level of service; \$10 million to rehabilitate intercity and rural roads in the governorates; \$10 million for new intercity and rural roads in the governorates; \$10 million for rehabilitation of highway and expressway systems including roads and bridges; and \$16 million for the addition of 20 km of new roads that connect towns, hamlets and market centers among each other.

A comprehensive review of the Iraqi Highways, Roads and Bridges infrastructure, that combines the efforts of the Ministry of Housing and Construction with the Governorates, will help set a new direction on how Capital improvement in the National Highway System and local Roads and Bridges are allocated and disbursed. The CPA Ministry of Housing and Construction has projected a required \$1.253 billion of funding for the Roads and Bridges program in 2004. The \$240 Million Supplemental Budget Request for FY03 will provide an immediate boost to this effort and provide the trail blazing through the projected difficulty of implementing such a massive and critical program in Roads and Bridges. While these funds are only a fraction (2%) of the funds required, they will reverse a trend of marginal spending and bring roads and bridges back to a safe operational condition where economic growth is not deterred by poorly maintained highways or neglected local road systems.

### **Health**

**Summary of Request.** \$850M is required to bring health care in Iraq up to pre-sanction standards, but updated to current technologies. The pre-war standard is untenable due to the abysmal erosion of health care over the past 14 years (only an average of 4% of facilities saw any rehabilitation or reconstruction in the past 14 years). Health care vital statistics and purchasing power adjusted health care expenditures in Iraq trail many Countries in the region. For example, while Turkey has an estimated infant death rate of 46 per 1000 live births, this statistic for Iraq has been reported to be as high as 108 per 1000. In addition, as many as 13% of all Iraqi children die before they reach the age of 5. Without the requested funds, the Iraqi people will continue to suffer from substandard health care. The three main areas of emphasis are:

Major new children's hospital	\$150M
Refurbishing pediatric hospitals, primary health care services and outreach	\$393M
Repair/replacement of equipment	\$300M
Partnership for Healthcare	\$ 7M
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$850M</b>

**Major New Children's Hospital.** \$150M is required to start basic construction on a tertiary pediatric treatment facility in Basrah. Other than the low life expectancy, no other Iraqi negative health statistic stands out like those related to infant, maternal and child health. With over 41% of the total population being 14 years old or younger, there

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is not only a need now for specialty services for this population, but the population distribution indicates that there will be a significant "baby boom in Iraq within the next 7 to 10 years. This request is for funds to build a state-of-the-art tertiary care children's hospital in Southern Iraq. The hospital will be designed to handle top level care for pediatric oncology, plastic surgery, burn treatment, specialized surgeries and high risk pregnancies with the latest technologies in radiology, ultrasound, physical therapy and other procedures. This facility will be the base for cutting edge research and post-graduate development for Iraqi physicians. This effort will create a pediatric hospital that will be a visible sign of the transformation of the health care system in Iraq. Total cost of this facility is estimated between \$500M to \$700M depending on the final number of tertiary specialties offered. Capital and benchtop equipment, general medical supplies and equipment, general logistics supplies and equipment, salaries for consultants, salaries for support staff and other requirements will come from donors or other sources of funding.

**Hospital Refurbishment.** \$393M is needed to reduce infant and childhood deaths by 50% through the provision of services that can address the underlying causes of these dismal statistics. New efforts to be undertaken throughout the country to provide those necessary public health efforts that can have definitive impacts on early mortality and morbidity (immunization, nutrition counseling, clean water and appropriate sewage disposal activities). Major shortfalls of all pediatric and primary health care facilities tend to be with major structural subsystems. The medical gas system is largely non-existent or need extensive repairs. This supplemental aims to refurbish and reequip every one of the 1200 primary care clinics in Iraq and 5 regional maternal and pediatric referral centers in Basra, Al Najaf, Erbil, Baghdad and Mosul. The result will be a network of clinics that will have the capability to provide those basic maternal and infant support services so critical to positive birth outcomes. In addition, when they identify high risk cases, they will finally have the ability to transfer the case to one of the 5 regional centers of excellence for maternal, infant and pediatric care. Our strategy is to rehabilitate 200 of the 240 hospitals and 900 of 1200+ Primary Health Care Clinics. Major structure subsystems are all in dire need of repair, rehabilitation or expansion (water/sewage, electrical, HVAC and med gas especially). Cost of construction is 1/10<sup>th</sup> of US standard per sqft in general construction, 1/5<sup>th</sup> in specialized medical construction and 8/10<sup>th</sup> in specialty construction. Materials for health care are not indigenous and will have to be imported which will raise the low cost of construction in this country to European construction cost levels (up to 80% of US health care construction costs in specialized areas such as OR, radiology, laboratory etc).

**Equipment Replacement.** \$300M is required to repair the deplorable state of the nation's 240 hospitals. Early studies indicate that as much as 50% of the equipment in these facilities is in desperate need of repair or replacement. All equipment is poorly maintained. This includes everything from; incinerators to dispose of medical waste, x-ray machines, in hospital lab equipment and especially generators. While a nearly emergency effort is underway to supply generators, the initial effort will only cover 30 to 35 hospitals, then quickly expand to 150 hospitals. Training staff to use this equipment is

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equally important. Iraq lacks credentialed, skilled bio-medical engineers and technicians and has a significant shortfall of technically up to date engineers and technicians (skill sets run to pre-sanction levels). We estimate that 100% of current staff will require retraining. An additional 25% staff increase is required to properly man these hospitals. This equipment and associated training effort should provide a much needed upgrade to the remaining facilities and if basic infrastructure services such as sewage and potable water can occur at the same time, the hospitals in Iraq may more closely come to resemble "hospitals" in many parts of the rest of the world.

**Partnership for Healthcare.** \$7M is required to facilitate the establishment of partnerships between American health care organizations/leaders and selected Iraqi healthcare centers. We envision a consortia of health care institutions in the U.S., international donors, and U.S. government agencies for the purpose of providing professional education, technical advice and support, equipment, supplies, pharmaceuticals, and managerial expertise to selected Iraqi healthcare centers. This modest investment will bring immediate returns in the form of improved public health, accelerated modernization of Iraq's medical schools, community hospitals and clinics, and establish long term relationships between elements of the American health care system and those in Iraq who will lead it to a democratic future.

**Private Sector Development.**

**Establish an American-Iraqi Enterprise Fund.** \$200M is required to capitalize an Iraqi-American Enterprise Fund. This fund would operate independently from the US Government under the guidance of a Board of Directors. The primary purpose of this fund would be to promote the private sector development of Iraq. To accomplish this, the Fund would invest in a wide array of private enterprises, disseminate western business know-how, and assist business to play an appropriate role in shaping public policy. Estimated minimum cost: \$200M.

**Expand network of Employment Centers.** Iraq has 27 cities with a population exceeding 100,000. Funding was approved in 2003 for 5 centers. Each Employment Center would serve the unemployed by offering aptitude and ability testing, job counseling, job search assistance, and referrals to employment and training opportunities. Funds would cover 22 new Employment Centers at a cost of \$350,000 each. Estimated minimum cost: \$8M.

**On-the-Job Training for Private Sector Employment.** CPA requests \$35M to offer private sector employers a subsidy to cover the on-the-job costs of training newly hired workers. De facto a wage subsidy, this should provide a major incentive to private employers to increase their employment. These funds are to be executed through the American-Iraqi Enterprise Fund.

Program design elements: Private employers would be eligible to receive a subsidy, averaging \$ 25/month, for wages paid to newly hired (through local Ministry of Labor offices) workers. Subsidies would range from 25,000 Iraqi dinars to 50,000 ID per

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month per worker, depending upon the wage, occupation and intensity of training. Subsidies would last four to six months. Employers who do not retain the workers after the subsidy ends would not be eligible for future participation.

Cost calculation: \$25/worker x 100,000 enrolled = \$2.5 million/month wage costs (= \$30 million/year). Four to six month enrollment duration implies 2.5 yearly turnover = 250,000 newly hired workers. Plus \$5 million for program administration, intake, referral, and monitoring of wages/worksites. Estimated minimum cost for a one-year program: \$ 35 million.

**Market- Oriented Specialized Training.** \$110M is required to fund four separate employment training programs.

1) **Basic Computer Literacy Training.** \$40M is needed to increase productivity of the Iraqi workforce and facilitate a qualified labor force for emerging private sector jobs. At 250 locations throughout Iraq, each with approximately 20 desk-tops, provide currently employed (first priority) or unemployed (second priority) workers introductory computer skills; program is envisioned as half-day training for one month, allowing two shifts per day at each location = 10,000/month.

Cost calculation for a one-month course for 120,000 trainees: Capital costs, including 5,000 computers, = \$ 15 million; instructional salaries = \$20 million; operating expenses = \$5 million. (Providing each student a \$25/month stipend would add \$3 million, plus admin costs). Estimated minimum cost: \$40M.

2) **Specialized Computer Training.** Funds to drive up productivity of the workforce by developing market oriented skills. At approximately 50 locations in Iraq, each with 20 places, provide public and private sector employees with enhanced computer skills relevant to their jobs.

Cost calculation for of three-month, afternoon/evening courses for 9,000 trainees: Capital costs = \$4 million; instructional salaries = \$9 million; operating expenses = \$2 million. Estimated minimum cost: \$15M.

3) **English as a Second Language (ESL).** \$30M is required to increase productivity of Iraqi workforce, and ease Iraq's integration into the world economy. At 250 training locations, each with 20 spaces, provide half-day ESL instruction for six months to each participant.

Cost calculation to provide intensive (4 hours/day) ESL to 20,000 Iraqis for six months: Capital costs = \$5 million; instructional salaries = \$20 million; operating expenses = \$5 million. (As above, providing a stipend adds \$3 million). Estimated minimum cost: \$30M.

4. **Modernize Vocational Training Institutes.** The Ministry of Labor has six vocational training centers (Arbil, Mosul, Kerkuk, Baghdad, Najaf, and Basrah) which are well-located, but with antiquated equipment and curriculum unsuited to a new Iraqi economy. Updated at a cost of \$25M, they would serve both employer needs and as train-the-trainer locations for staff of the 265 Ministry of Education vocational education facilities.



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Cost calculation of new curriculum development, equipment, materials, and train-the trainers activities for six existing vocational training centers: \$3 million per location for curriculum, equipment, training materials, supplies; \$1 million per institute for staff development; = \$4 million per institute plus \$1 million for central planning/coordination. Estimated minimum cost: \$25M.

***Refugees, Human Rights & Civil Society.***

**Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA).** CPA must respond to the immediate protection and assistance needs of Iraqis and support the eventual return of over 500,000 Iraqis from neighboring countries and over one million internally displaced persons (IDPs) through international and non-governmental partners.

**Current and Planned Activities:** To date, the State Department Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration PRM has allocated nearly \$40 million to International Organization (IO) and Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) partners. An additional \$26 million to be provided to UNHCR, IOM, WFP, UNSECOORD, and a number of NGOs is pending Congressional Notification, but has been approved by CPA and OMB to support humanitarian assistance activities. Anticipated large-scale returns have not yet begun, but are expected in 2004. CPA is working on a national strategy, which includes a significant refugee and internally displaced persons (IDP) return component. Even if conditions are not ripe for significant refugee returns early in 2004, we expect that over one million Iraqi IDPs will require immediate support and hopefully integration to new communities and that refugee returns will commence in large numbers when security conditions dictate. Ambassador Bremer and CPA will rely heavily on UN and NGO partners to implement an orderly and voluntary repatriation operation; these partners will rely on support from State and USAID. Insecurity and access remain challenges for the international relief community and some UN/NGO staffs have drawn down. However, by 2004, we expect security to improve and staff levels to be restored, if not increased, in order to implement programs as the repatriation operation gets underway. We will be launching a major effort to secure international funding for reconstruction activities in Iraq. That effort will only be successful if adequate security assurances are offered. Those same assurances will describe the conditions necessary to support significant refugee and IDP returns.

ICRC has been present and active in Iraq without interruption since 1980. Although major hostilities have ended in Iraq, ICRC's work is far from over. In recent months ICRC had been building up a large-scale operation to ensure protection and assistance for Iraqis. The murder of one of its delegates in July led to tightened security for the organization and temporarily reduced staff in country, but work has resumed to visit detainees, trace family members, and implement major water and sanitation activities. We expect ICRC's program to remain at current levels in 2004, if not expand in order to implement its mandate under the Geneva Conventions.

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**Partners**

United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) – coordinates and facilitates CPA-led refugee and IDP returns. Refugee returns will come primarily from Iran, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. IDP returns will be coordinated closely with IOM in the north. Assistance includes registration, non-food items, construction materials, quick impact reintegration programs, seeds and tools (for rural dwellers), and other assistance. FY 2003 USG response -- \$31M. FY 2004 -- \$50M.

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) – implements major protection and assistance activities, including tracing, prison visits, missing, family reunification, water and sanitation, and some health activities. FY 2003 USG response -- \$10 million. FY 2004 -- \$26M.

International Organization for Migration (IOM) – transports refugee and IDP returnees in the region in addition to facilitating overall IDP returns in southern Iraq. Will continue to assist with the return of Third Country Nationals. FY 2003 PRM response -- \$6.63M. FY 2004 -- \$6.5M.

Other International Organizations (IOs) – provide key complimentary assistance (health, education, water and sanitation, security, coordination) to returning refugees and IDPs as well as the coordination and security functions necessary for the implementing agencies. FY 2003 PRM response -- \$3.6M. FY 2004 -- \$10M.

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) – assume key roles in health, shelter, food distribution, water and sanitation, and reintegration activities connected with expected large-scale returns. As in other repatriation operations, we expect to support those NGO activities filling gaps in the provision of UN assistance. Projected FY 2003 response from PRM -- \$1.5M. FY 2004 current funding -- \$10M. Additional FY 2004 -- \$12M.

<u>Partner</u>	<u>Est. Add'l '04 Needs</u>	<u>PRM Contribution</u>
UNHCR	\$200M	\$50M
ICRC	\$100M	\$26M
IOM	\$25M	\$6.5M
Other IOs	N/A	\$10M
NGOs	N/A	\$12M
PRM Admin	\$0.5M	\$0.5M
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$105M</b>

**Local Governance and Municipalities:** The innovative decentralization processes initiated in each of the Governorates in Iraq since April 2003 has brought a new sense of local ownership and prioritization for the delivery of services. The primary challenge facing the Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works now is to coordinate these new local political structures – the Governorate and Municipal Councils – with the existing decentralized Ministry administrative network so that development proposals and investments can reflect local priorities, and payments can flow to pay for the local

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administration, together with the coordination of essential maintenance and capital projects that are required to restore especially the water and sewerage services (funded elsewhere) and the municipal services of garbage collection, cleaning and road repairs. These works also need to be seen in the context of longer term planning of urban development and the forecasting of capital investment required for a workable and efficient built environment in all the towns and cities in Iraq, and belonging to the people of Iraq.

In order to provide the decentralized service delivery functions of the Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works more effectively there is a need to invest in both people and facilities. There is a need to develop better public access to information locally through Public Information Centers that can provide electronic communication for all local services – planning, municipal services, water and sanitation administrative systems that gives the public the ability to participate in the affairs of service delivery, local government and its oversight. These Centers will require restructured physical space and equipment, including reference libraries and general information in each of the 266 Municipalities across the country. In addition the Ministry and the local government staff will require computer links to back up this service, and training to be leaders in local service delivery. **Estimated minimum cost: \$90M.**

**Property Claims Tribunal.** The fabric of Iraqi society is torn by on going land disputes linked to the actions of the prior regime. These disputes center around land taken by Ba'th party members and then sold to potentially innocent bona fide purchasers, with the result that two innocent persons may claim the same property, i.e., the person from whom the land was originally taken and the person who purchased the land not knowing that the seller obtained it through the despotic action of the prior regime. The former regime forced thousands of Iraqi citizens from all ethnic backgrounds from their homes, land, and other property without adequate compensation, including in some cases, demolition of entire villages. Iraqis currently face complex legal problems that have emerged from disputed ownership suits resulting from the former regime forcing legal owners to give up their homes, land, and other property and the subsequent sale and expropriation by the regime of these assets. Resolving property claims, legally and peacefully, will be complex and expensive, but will also play a critical role in addressing some of the most egregious actions of the former regime. Spending on land title regularization will ensure uniform standards across Iraq, and ensure that land claims are resolved in a fair and equitable manner. A tribunal is required to work on resolving those claims and to provide funding to partially compensate the innocent person who will no longer have possession of the property. This process would help right a wrong and also generate considerable good will toward the coalition. Estimates are based on the ongoing adjudication costs in Iraq. **Estimated minimum cost: \$30M**

**Update antiquated banking system.** The Iraqi banking system was nearly destroyed during post war looting. Numerous banks were stripped, vaults looted, and some burned. To support national payment systems, electronic movements of funds, and to create trust in checking accounts which are little used, the coalition seeks to develop and implement a modern system that features networks, integrated databases, and file

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servers that allows accountability of transactions, monitoring of all aspects of the budget, accurate and timely reporting of data from field offices and collated to date. This will allow for greater efficiencies of manpower where currently thousands of workers do manual reporting by pen and paper. The system would not only integrate the entire banking system but would also allow foreign capitalists greater insight into bank records thereby taking their concerns into consideration for greater accessibility and improved infrastructure, which allow them to invest capital in Iraq. Purchases include equipment, training, transference of old records to new databases and infrastructure development. **Estimated minimum cost: \$30M.**

**Catch-up Business Training.** Develop and train cadre of business and entrepreneurs in business fundamentals and concepts that were missing in the former Iraqi regime. Classes would include management, budgeting, capitalization, cost accounting, leadership, ethics training and leadership. Mid level managers throughout the country have a general lack of knowledge on what is considered western business practices. As Iraq opens its doors to direct foreign capital investment it will need managers and leaders who understand those concepts. Average cost of 4 week course is \$10,000 per pupil. Program depends upon a preponderance of foreign teachers who have experience in this area. **Estimated minimum cost: \$20M.**

**Human Rights (Office of Human Rights and Transitional Justice Projects).** Iraq has undergone decades of trauma due to brutal regime of Saddam Hussein. We require \$15M to support Iraqis to begin the reconciliation and healing process through programs already identified and being developed.

**Research into Past Atrocities:** Although Ministry of Justice funding will focus on the investigation of key Ba'ath officials for criminal accountability, the vast majority of all research and documentation of past atrocities will take place outside of the justice system, for healing, truth and reconciliation, and historical record. To accomplish this, it is essential to fund testimony-taking projects, the establishment of a physical document archive, training for Iraqis to take testimony and scan documents for information on past atrocities, and local initiatives to establish memorials and museums. To begin the process of researching and documenting past atrocities, the Office of Human Rights and Transitional Justice, through the newly created Ministry of Human Rights, seeks to fund the following specifically defined.

- **Documentation and Memorial Workshop:** to bring in 8-10 leading experts and past grantees for two days on the establishment of a National Archive of Documents for Past Atrocities, and Memorials and Museums to document past atrocities. Each expert would bring 2 local Iraqi to the table as well to discuss who will take leading role in particular projects. (September) Anticipated cost: \$.04M.
- **Abu Gharaib Memorial:** We are working to establish a memorial and museum at Abu Gharaib with local Iraqi NGO participation. Desire to put out an RFP 9/03. Anticipated cost of memorial: \$0.5M.

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- Memory Foundation: Fund Documentation portion of Kanan Makiya's proposal to create a national information center and museum as CPA's contribution to the creation of a National Archive for Documents of Past Atrocities. Anticipated cost: \$1M
- Athletes Committee: Memorial or Conference to document and tell the world about past atrocities committed against Iraqi athletes. Anticipated cost: \$.05M
- Witness Database: This database will provide information on atrocities committed in the past, and witness contact information. Anticipated cost: \$0.96M.
- Document Database: This database will provide information on atrocities committed in the past that is contained in documents. Anticipated cost: \$0.96M.

Mass Graves/Missing Persons: To strengthen local capacity on exhumations and to assist families in the reconciliation process, we anticipate the following:

- Forensic Anthropology Training Programs to train local communities in forensic exhumation. Anticipated Cost: \$0.94M
- Equipment for Iraqis to use in Forensic and Local Digging which strengthens the local-capacity to perform exhumations. Anticipated Cost: \$1M
- Family advocacy (for families with victims) programs to ensure that families who have lost loved ones advocate for legislation which provides them with needs and closure; and psychosocial counseling programs to train local trainers in community-based counseling. Anticipated Cost: \$0.7M
- Assist Iraqis in Development of Iraqi National Bureau for Missing Persons. Anticipated cost: \$1.5M
- Fund for investigative / documentary purposes. Funds to purchase videos, and photos of past atrocities currently being sold in Baghdad. Anticipated cost: \$0.5M

Human Rights Ministry: To foster a culture of respect for human rights and dignity in Iraq, and to assist the Iraqi reconcile with atrocities committed by the former regime.

- Establishment of a Human Rights Commission. Establish an independent human rights commission which will question the government. Anticipated cost: \$1M
- Develop a Human Rights Civic Education Program. To train Iraqis, in schools and at the community level, in fundamental human rights. To increase public awareness through brochures, publications and news releases. Anticipated cost: \$2.1M
- Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Assist Iraqis in developing regional truth and reconciliation commissions. Anticipated cost: \$2.5M
- NGO Coordination and Development: Start-up funds for local NGOs. Anticipated cost: \$1.25M

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**Civic Programs.** One of the hallmarks of a democratic society is a vibrant civil society that holds government accountable, organizes citizen participation in government, and empowers traditionally underrepresented groups to participate in governance. **\$10M** is required for the following programs.

Women's programming -- \$5M. To give women the skills necessary to participate in public life, to include civic education campaigns, women's resource centers throughout Iraq, leadership training and exchange programs.

Youth programming -- \$2M -- to expose youth to new models of civic participation through exchange programs, youth groups and University programming.

Civic education -- \$3M. Programs to promote new ideas and concepts, such as democracy, civil society, rights and responsibilities of citizenship. Building consensus on these ideals is the first step in transformation to democratic society. Programs to include book distribution, posters, pamphlets, speakers tours, for a, etc.

Senator BYRD. Mr. Chairman, this is eating up my little bit of time.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I am sorry, Senator.

Senator BYRD. Let me ask you a question that perhaps you can answer. With \$20 billion being requested for the reconstruction costs in Iraq, how much of that money will be awarded to compa-

nies such as Halliburton with ties to the administration that do not have to compete for government contracts? Who will be in charge of approving these reconstruction contracts?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. This is obviously—let me make a point. I think this is the first time I know of when we have talked about a supplemental before we came to Congress with a specific proposal. We want to consult with you, Senator, and with your colleagues about details. But I am quite certain the basic principle has to be competitive bidding and, as I think Senator Levin raised the issue earlier, if we want foreigners involved in this process, then we also have to consider how those processes are open fairly to everybody.

We did some things before the war that had to be done in secret and on a classified basis. We are obviously out of that era and the most open, transparent bidding process is presumably the goal. At the same time, in particular areas like electricity we also have to make sure that we do things rapidly, because getting electricity up and fixed quickly is part of creating the conditions in which our troops can draw down and our troops can be safer.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator Byrd, very much.

Senator BYRD. Thank you. Obviously there are going to be a lot of questions. This is the first time that we have had an opportunity to have a hearing on a supplemental. This is the Armed Services Committee. We have always had this rush, rush, rush when these appropriations requests come to Congress. I hope we will have hearings in this case. The American people are entitled to it.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator Byrd. I think this hearing will be a foundation for the follow-on work by the Appropriations Committee, where you are the senior member of the Democrats.

Yes, General, you wish to make a comment?

General MYERS. Chairman Warner, I would like to make just one response to Senator Byrd. Of the \$87 billion, \$66 billion is essentially for U.S. forces. We spend today in Iraq about \$4 billion a month. We spend in Afghanistan and the rest of the war on terrorism about a billion dollars a month. So the majority of the supplemental goes to U.S. forces.

As Secretary Wolfowitz said, of the \$21 billion that has been characterized for Iraq reconstruction, Afghan reconstruction, and so forth, about \$5.5 billion is for the security forces that you asked me about earlier. I would only end by saying that we think you get great payoff for those dollars. I think it is going to turn out in the end a lot cheaper to have the Iraqis defending their country and providing security in their country than it is for us to have our forces deployed there to do it.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, General Myers.

Senator Roberts.

Senator ROBERTS. Mr. Chairman, I do not mean to be obstreperous, but my colleague to my left has a watch and has timed people as we have gone through this, which means he will probably kick me at 7½ minutes. But I note that those on the other side of the aisle have averaged about 12, 13, 14, in this particular case 20 minutes. I thought this was 7½ minutes apiece. I am not trying

to find fault with the chairman, but I think that we all ought to try to do a little better in regards to the timing and the witnesses.

I want to start off by saying this: "Sir Winston Churchill said upon hearing about the attack on Pearl Harbor, 'Silly people,' that was the description many gave in discounting the force of the United States. Some said how they were soft, others they would never be united, that they would never come to grips, they would never stand bloodletting, that their system of government and democracy would paralyze the war effort." Let me repeat that: "that their system of government and democracy would paralyze the war effort."

Sir Winston said: "Some said that now we will see the weakness of this numerous but remote, wealthy and talkative people. But I had studied the American Civil War, fought out to the last desperate inch. American blood flowed in my veins. I thought of a remark made to me years before: The United States is like a gigantic boiler. Once the fire of freedom is lighted under it, there is no limit to the power it can generate. It is a matter of resolve."

Mr. Chairman, I think we have a leaky boiler.

My question is, to the Secretary or to any of the panel: Do you have the sense that the Iraqis, be they former regime members or ordinary citizens, are watching closely what we do and say here today in Washington in regard to their future, not to mention some rather harsh criticism, and the future of our efforts there? Could the Baathists and the foreign jihadists and the Fedayeen and the common criminals and the Sunni extremists gain currency with Arab nations and their leadership from the idea that we have a lack of resolve and a reduced commitment to us or our allies? What are the stakes?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. The stakes are enormous, and they do have a lot of access to what goes on here. I think it is very important that we be able to—we are a democracy. That is our strength as well as produces this lively debate.

I do think it is important, as I said earlier, that we be able to project confidence, and there is an enormous amount of success to project confidence about. We succeeded in the major combat phase of this war with a speed that astonished everyone, I would say including ourselves, with casualties that were miraculously low. We avoided the catastrophe of an oil well disaster that would have had an environmental impact for decades. We avoided a humanitarian crisis and the hundreds of thousands of people that we planned on feeding and providing tents for, did not need it. We avoided a huge refugee crisis. We avoided Turkey and Iran intervening in Iraq. We avoided the kind of thing the intelligence community warned us about at great length, of a possible major city fight in Baghdad or some other city.

The list goes on of the things that we have succeeded in doing, and the young men and women out there today doing this job are just magnificent and they bring American ingenuity and American courage—

Senator ROBERTS. Mr. Secretary—

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. We should be confident.

Senator ROBERTS.—I appreciate that, and I apologize for interrupting you. But I want to know what the government leaders of



Kuwait, Qatar, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and others, who time and time again when I have met with them as member of a congressional delegation, as has the chairman, as with others, they question our resolve. They question our resolve, and that is the thing I am trying to get at.

I want to also announce as the Chairman of the Intelligence Committee that staff is now carefully scrutinizing past testimony regarding post-combat predictions and also analysis, not so much to affix any 20–20 hindsight blame, but to assess how the intelligence community can achieve the analytical product and the warnings that will enable us to meet the necessity of conducting and winning what I consider to be an anti-guerrilla warfare operation.

Now, we can involve the U.N., that paragon of virtue in regards to action from a military standpoint. They do fine things from a humanitarian standpoint, I understand that. We can get more international troops. I know that we have 1,400 marines in Karbala who are doing everything from repairing bridges to fixing schools to providing security, and they will be replaced by 450 Bulgarians. I am not trying to perjure the effort of Bulgarians, but it seems to me that you have to have troops that can actually do the job rather than just saying we need international troops.

We can certainly recruit and train more Iraqi police and military and defense corps. But we have to have better intelligence to enable us to detect and deter and, yes, preempt—yes, preempt—all these growing hostilities.

Could you tell me whether the \$5.6 billion that is going to be allotted to the intelligence community, and we intend to find out in the intelligence community, is this a matter of policy, is it a matter of resources, or is it a matter of ability? How can we do this better? Because all this relies on better intelligence.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Senator, I could not agree more on the importance of intelligence. General Abizaid would say—I do not know if he would rank them exactly, but his two top priorities are intelligence and more Iraqis, and to some extent more Iraqis means more intelligence. We need better intelligence on the terrorists and the Baathists who are fighting us. We are looking at how we can improve our methods today. I think we have made great strides in the last couple of months, but we need to go further and faster.

I would encourage you to look at that. I must say our experience since the beginning of the Afghan war is that General Franks and now General Abizaid are stitched together very tightly with their intelligence counterparts. There is terrific communication there. They have had terrific support and in my experience they have put enormous planning effort into everything the intelligence people have warned them about.

Senator ROBERTS. Let me just say in terms of the warning that it was alleged earlier in terms of the policymakers by the intelligence community that we knew that this was going to be a lot tougher. That story starts out and says, “Although general in nature,” and we are quoting one congressional aide, one congressional source, a senior administration official, one administration official. There is a paragraph here, “There is not universal agreement about the clarity of prewar intelligence that was forwarded by the

CIA and its counterpart agencies at the Pentagon and the State Department. Some administration official said the intelligence was murkier than others now depict it.”

You cannot get the whole jigsaw puzzle. You cannot connect all the dots. Different things happen. It seems to me—my time has expired.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much. I think it is important, colleague—I respect your views, but Senator Byrd does have a key role with regard to this \$87 billion, and I had visited with him prior to the hearing. All of us do, but he has a heavy responsibility and his support will be needed.

Senator ROBERTS. If I might, Mr. Chairman, it is not that so much as the average of 12 minutes on the other side and about 7½ on this side, why I raised the issue. I am not trying to perjure or point fingers at anybody else.

Chairman WARNER. I do intend to run a fair hearing. I believe Senator McCain had an extra minute or 2. But anyway, we shall move on.

Senator ROBERTS. I understand that. I think we all have heavy burdens. I am Chairman of the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee and the Chairman of the Intelligence Committee and I would like to wax on for about another 10 or 15 minutes. I have a lot on my mind. But I have yielded back my time like the chairman has indicated. Thank you.

Chairman WARNER. I note that I am the freshman member of your Intelligence Committee and you lash at me very fairly.

Senator Reed.

Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Myers, it is your opinion as a uniformed military officer in consultation with your commanders that there is no military requirement for additional troops in Iraq?

General MYERS. Senator Reed, that is correct, and it is in consultation. I rely on General Abizaid and he relies on General Sanchez and he relies on his division commanders on the ground and their subordinates as they try to come up with the troops they need.

Senator REED. So the request for international troops is to achieve a very important and laudable political objective exclusively?

General MYERS. I would not say exclusively. They are going to be doing real work, and I do not think we want to denigrate the work that they are going to do.

Senator REED. General, if I may, we get into this minuet about, well, it is not just political; they will do real work. If that real work has to be done, then that implies to me that there is a requirement for troops to do that work. Now, whether they are international troops or U.S. troops, there is still that requirement.

Now you just said there is no requirement, that if we do not get these international troops then it will be okay militarily.

General MYERS. Maybe I misunderstood your question. The troops I thought we were talking about in the first part of that were U.S. troops.

Senator REED. I said troops.

General MYERS. Okay, then I answered incorrectly. We are looking for a third multinational division, for the reasons that we have already discussed earlier at length, and I will not go into those, but to include sharing the burden of the effort in Iraq. It will help us in the long term.

Senator REED. But let me be clear, General, because we have talked around this issue. Your view is there is a military requirement for additional troops. Your hope is that they are international troops, but there is a requirement for additional troops?

General MYERS. That is not correct. The number of troops that we have had, that we will keep in Iraq, is going to stay at approximately about the same level. Today we have around 152,000. If we get a third multinational division—this will go up and down. It goes up and down with deployments and so forth. It went up a little bit over the forecast when General Mattis and folks decided to leave a couple of Marine battalions there. But generally speaking, the number of troops is going to stay about level. The composition of the troops will change.

Senator REED. So that if we do not get international troops we will still maintain roughly 130,000-plus American forces?

General MYERS. If the situation in that time frame when those international troops would come in, if the situation demands it, yes, is the answer.

Senator REED. I read, as we all do, that we have inadequately guarded ammo dumps. I receive messages from our Rhode Island National Guardsmen about what they perceive as inadequate air cover over their convoys, and we had casualties on convoy about 2 weeks ago. You hear about oil pipelines being blown up today which would suggest to me that additional forces in country could be used effectively.

General MYERS. I agree with that point, and some of those forces—it is a matter of priority for General Sanchez and his folks where he puts his protective forces and the air cover and so forth. It is also true on infrastructure protection that that is ideally suited for Iraqis themselves. Who better to protect their pipelines and their power lines than the Iraqis themselves?

Senator REED. I agree in principle, but it seems that yesterday, reported today, there was just another major pipeline in the north blown up, presumably guarded or not guarded by Iraqis or someone else.

Let me ask another question, which is, if we assume that the level of forces is in your view adequate, the composition of forces today, is it appropriate to this mission? We have combat brigades in there, but very few Military Police (MP) brigades.

General MYERS. That is something that the United States Army is looking very closely at and I think as you look at the force rotation that has been planned, for instance, the First Cavalry Division goes in. One of the things that I think you know you will see with it is an enhanced separate brigade from the Army National Guard. The reason is to give them more infantry, because they do not want to be based in their M-1 tanks because that is not the mission at this point. What they want to have are a lot of infantry that can go out and do the missions that they need to do.

So the Army is looking very hard at that and trying to structure their divisions. MPs are always going to be in big need.

Senator REED. General Myers, at the end of the year that you have extended the National Guard troops—and I have two MP companies and an MP headquarters battalion in there—when they come back to Rhode Island, where are you going to get MPs to replace them? They are not in the Active Force structure and they have already been used in the National Guard.

General MYERS. Right. I am very well aware of that issue because, at Fort Meyer, we have had from time to time Reserve component military police, normally National Guard, that do that mission. I talk about their deployment schedules and so forth. That is one of those areas, when we talk about Reserve-active mix, it is not just the mix; it is do we have enough of things like military police, civil affairs, in our Armed Forces to carry on the missions that we think we might have in the future. I think for some of those career fields we probably will come to the conclusion we do not.

Senator REED. Thank you.

Mr. Secretary, my recollection is hostilities began, actual offensive operations, on or about March 19; is that correct to your recollection?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. My recollection is March 20.

Senator REED. March 20. Those passports you have indicated, the first date was March 24.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Right.

Senator REED. Do you have any evidence of significant terrorist presence in Baghdad before those dates, since the Secretary maintained he had bulletproof evidence of a terrorist link in Baghdad prior to initiation of hostilities?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Yes, we do. There are some things that are publicly known from before. There are the things that Director Tenet described in his unclassified letter to this committee back in October, I believe. There is the well-known fact that for some 10 years the one bomber from the 1993 World Trade Center that was still at large was harbored in Iraq.

There is the evidence that Secretary Powell discussed—

Senator REED. These are al Qaeda elements?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Who did the 1993 World Trade Center bombing is, to use the intelligence community's word, a murky question. But it was masterminded by the nephew of the same man who masterminded September 11, and they went after the same target.

Senator REED. But you have, subsequent to our operations in Iraq, no further evidence other than that which was revealed?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. If you let me finish, Secretary Powell talked in his presentation to the U.N. Security Council at some length about a senior al Qaeda—or some people say he is not quite al Qaeda; he is affiliated; he is clearly in the same world—named Abu Musaba Zarkawi, with connections both to the poison lab that was operating in northern Iraq and to some plots that were broken up in London and Paris and in Italy.

I am not familiar with everything we have learned since we got to Baghdad, but I can say this, that what we have learned only

deepens the conclusions that were there on an unclassified basis before.

Senator REED. So you would disagree with the opinion of—

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. In fact, one last thing if I might. The group that Zarkawi is associated with, Ansar al-Islam, was established in Iraq in 2001 and it is I think in the judgment of the military and the intelligence people the single most serious terrorist threat we face today.

Senator REED. They were aided and abetted by the Saddam Hussein regime?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. These people went to very great lengths to bury and hide the links that they had with one another. So you have to recognize we probably see only the tip of the iceberg. But we certainly see links.

Senator REED. So you would disagree with the statement by Vincent Canastrato, the former Director of Counterterrorism Operations and Analysis of the CIA, who said: "There was no substantive intelligence information linking Saddam to international terrorism before the war. Now we have created the conditions that have made Iraq the place to come to attack Americans."

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I think Director Tenet's statement last year disagrees with it. I think Secretary Powell's statement to the U.N. disagrees with it. I think the Palestinian terrorists that we have captured in Iraq disagrees with it. I think the money that Saddam offered for Palestinian homicide bombers disagrees with it.

I do not know the statement you are quoting, but it does not stand with what I have been told from the intelligence world.

Senator REED. Mr. Chairman, if I may for a moment. My colleagues had an opportunity to opine and I would like to do it, too.

This was a war of choice and we will debate the wisdom of that choice for generations. But I think it is obvious now that the choice we made is more expensive than we thought, more time-consuming, more dangerous, and more difficult. I think also that we have put ourselves in the position where we have everything to lose and, it becomes increasingly apparent, very little to gain.

Certainly this operation has not transformed the Middle East peace process. It has not allowed us to effectively suppress and lethally preempt Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda. I think, despite General Myers, who I respect immensely, the notion that these apocalyptic terrorists are going to give up their jihad whether we prevail in Iraq is I think naive. I think we have made a questionable strategic choice. We have everything to lose, and I certainly will support all efforts to win. We have no choice. But I think we have put ourselves in a position where we have made a choice where we have everything to lose and very little to gain.

Thank you.

Chairman WARNER. Senator Allard.

Senator ALLARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I have a statement I would like to have submitted for the record if I might.

Chairman WARNER. Without objection. I wonder if you would indulge the chair. Senator Levin and I are of the view that this hearing will continue until such time as each Senator has had an opportunity to address questions to our witnesses, and at the conclu-

sion of that we do not intend to have a second round. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Senator Allard follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR WAYNE ALLARD

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing. I also thank our witnesses today for coming to testify before the Senate. Certainly, the eyes of our constituents are focused on Capitol Hill after the President's address to the Nation this weekend.

At the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, there were those who believed our military would not score a decisive victory against the Iraqis. The focus at the start of hostilities was on preventing and defending our soldiers, sailors, and airmen against any threat of biological or chemical munitions that Saddam and his ilk might use. Our well-equipped armed services proved in Operation Iraqi Freedom to be second to none, and victory was assured not only through our technological advantage, but also through the excellence of the men and women that compose the United States military.

Now we have a new challenge, and once again we are faced with detractors who would call President Bush's Sunday night address a capitulation to the United Nations the same body that chose to shirk its responsibility and not enforce its own resolutions. Reconstruction is not a simple task. It would be short-sighted for anyone to conclude that cooperation with other nations was not needed or wanted by the United States. Rebuilding and stability operations have indeed come with a large price tag in human and financial capital; but it will be much easier with more cooperation from our allies and the U.N. The administration is in the process of making such cooperation a reality. It is unfortunate that some who unfairly accuse the administration of just now recognizing the value of international cooperation, when in fact, it was evident from the beginning that such cooperation was one of this administration's top goals.

I look forward to hearing your testimony on the situation in Iraq, and also welcome any new information on the war on terror.

Senator ALLARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have heard members on this committee refer to September 11 as a disaster, and September 11 was an attack on the mainland of America. It has been my view that if we had ignored what happened on September 11, terrorists would have become even—we would have been facing even greater attacks, larger attacks, and they would have been more brazen and on a daily basis.

I thank God that we have had a strong leader in the presidency. I want to compliment many of you for your support in working to resolve this problem. It is not easy. I agree with General Myers that this is a problem that the American people have to show patience for, they have to remain committed, and they have to show a will to win.

It is something we simply cannot back away from. I think that our fighting men and women are doing a tremendous job and I think that we need to pause and reflect on the good decisions of the people that have gone before us in getting them prepared to face the unforeseen issues and problems that we are facing today. I am just thankful that we are in a position to be able to face them.

I just want to talk a little bit about the budget. I know it has been brought up by my colleagues, too, and since I serve on the Budget Committee I think there is a point or two that needs to be made, because I think there are statements that are being made that are misleading. The assumption that this is an unforeseen expense is wrong. If you look at the budget that we passed in this body for 2004, we assumed that there would be a supplemental that would be requested along the lines of the \$87 billion the President just requested this past weekend.

We put \$79 billion in there for a supplemental, including a factor for inflation. So we are somewhere around an \$80.5 billion supplemental in that request for the budget. So this argument that all of a sudden we are adding \$87 billion to the deficit is simply not right.

Now, there is \$5 billion that we will probably have to make up. We have \$1.8 trillion and it seems to me that we can find \$5 billion in there to make that up in a \$1.8 trillion budget. So the Budget Committee, particularly the chairman of the Budget Committee—and I can say we passed our budget this year, which is more than we can say for last year. We did not pass a budget last year. We passed a budget for this year in this Congress for 2004, and the figures that we were looking at for the budget were based on some plans that we were looking at, and we were trying to figure out what those unforeseen contingencies were.

So there has been a lot of planning. There has been a lot of thought. But the fact is that we are dealing with terrorists, and the factor that they count on is surprise and doing what is unexpected.

When I look at what has been presented to this Congress and where we are in the budget, I am amazed that we are as close to the figures as we are, and we are still pretty much on a deficit estimate of \$480 billion for fiscal year 2004 because we have already factored that in in the budget.

While I am talking about the request and what-not and money, I do have a question on the armored Humvees and body armor for our troops. The question is, and it was in the President's new supplemental request, how long will it take to get these much-needed vehicles and protective devices to the soldiers in the theater? Maybe, General Myers, that is a question for you.

General MYERS. Senator Allard, I am going to look through here. I have that information. I know we have a little over 600 that are on their way to theater today and exactly when the first ones get there, if you will just give me a second I may have it in all these papers here, because it is something that we are absolutely looking for.

They will all get over this year, and 301 of the 654 that are being shipped right now have arrived in Kuwait and are being processed for distribution. The remaining 353 of the 654 that are going to get there this year are being prepared for shipment to Kuwait. In addition, the Army is looking at the other armored Humvees that it has to see if they can be taken from other deployments and other events, including extended maintenance, and if we can push them toward Iraq as well.

Senator ALLARD. I thank you for that response.

In August I just finished some town meetings in Colorado. I had 20 or so of them. One of the issues that had been brought up was about the protective devices for soldiers in the theater. I am glad to hear that you have heard that call, heard the need, that there is a need there and are responding.

General MYERS. Absolutely.

Senator ALLARD. So I appreciate that. The Washington Post today had an article outlining the fact that our intelligence agencies had provided a fairly accurate description of post-war resist-

ance in Iraq. What more can you tell us about the intelligence reports, Mr. Secretary, in this open session?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. It is hard to do much in open session, but I would say one of the quotes I saw was intelligence reports told at some length about possibilities for unpleasantness. That is certainly true. In fact, you can make a very long list of things that we were concerned about that did not happen or things that we were concerned about that we prevented, and there were some things that were not predicted or that certainly were not predicted loudly.

But what I can say—I said it earlier—every single thing that the intelligence community raised as a serious problem was addressed seriously by General Franks and by the Secretary and by the President himself. I was a little puzzled a few minutes ago when it was said that these are expenses that were unforeseen and an extent of deployment that was unforeseen. No one tried to predict the future. No one said we would know anything other than this could be very bloody, it could be very long, by implication it could be very expensive.

Even a much simpler thing like Bosnia was predicted to be only a year and here it is 8 years later and we are still there. But we are there in much smaller numbers and we are dealing with that. Bosnia does not go to the heart of our interests. As you said, this is about the war on terrorism. The attack on the World Trade Center was certainly unforeseen and the expenses are staggering.

I believe the fact that foreign terrorists are coming to fight us in Iraq during the war and today, the fact that there are al Qaeda groups that are Iraqi and have been working against us now and were working against us before, and the fact that they have at least tacit and maybe explicit allies in the criminal gangs that ran the old regime—they know what is at stake here and I think we need to understand what is at stake here. The troops certainly do, and we need to project confidence—because it is absolutely warranted—that we are going to win. We have much more on our side, much more going for us. But what we have at stake is enormous.

Senator ALLARD. Mr. Secretary, thank you.

Mr. Chairman, my time has expired here. But, I have received a number of plans on my desk and I have been attending briefings about your plans for Iraq and Afghanistan and dealing with terrorism since September 11. I do not understand why anybody can complain that somehow this administration and each of you have not done your best to try to plan for unforeseen circumstances from the terrorists that we are facing.

I wish, like everybody else, that this would go away, but the fact is it is not going to go away, and I think terrorism is going to be with us for a while and we need to be prepared for that. We have been preparing for it in the budget. The dollars are there as best we possibly can, and in many cases we have already swallowed the poison pill in the fact that we have already accounted for that in the budget we passed for 2004.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Akaka.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.



General Myers, in a recent interview you mentioned an analysis DOD has been conducting into worldwide force commitments and stated that in some areas, such as the Balkans, the Europeans should be assuming a greater share of the burden. However, some of our allies have been reducing their commitments in order to provide additional troops to ongoing operations in Iraq.

I have three questions on this. What is your assessment of how likely it is that other forces will take on additional global responsibilities outside of Iraq when we are also pressing them to increase commitments in that theater as well? I would like to ask Mr. Grossman; if you have any thoughts on this, for they would be welcome as well.

General Myers, in your best military judgment what are the risks associated with declining international presence in Bosnia and how does the United States plan to address these risks? General Myers, did you examine the level of forces committed to Operation Noble Eagle and can you give your assessment of the military value and effectiveness of that mission?

General MYERS. You bet, Senator Akaka. I can take all three of those questions and try to run down them here quickly.

We have gotten what I think is very good response in terms of support in other parts of the world besides Iraq. We talked a little bit about this earlier, but in Afghanistan in particular. The fact that NATO is leading the International Security Assistance Force around Kabul is truly an amazing and astonishing fact. That they are enthusiastic about that mission, that they plan for it long-term, that they are looking to taking the mission, examining taking that mission outside of Kabul to some of the provinces, is also amazing.

In our recent operation over there where we successfully engaged Taliban fighters, relatively large numbers of Taliban fighters, with the help of the governor of Kandahar Pushtun and his militia that is under him, with the Afghan National Army, with U.S. forces, it is interesting to note that some of the blocking positions were by special forces from Lithuania, Romania, and France.

I think the understanding of what needs to happen in Afghanistan and in other parts of the world is going to get good international cooperation. So that is the answer, at least to the first part of that question.

Regarding the Balkans, clearly in Bosnia and for that matter for the most part in Kosovo, the military mission is essentially complete, if you will, and what we are waiting for is the civil implementation to take hold—the right number of police force, the judicial system to be fully stood up, prisons manned, and so forth, and the local governance to be stood up, and the political accommodations particularly—in both places the political accommodations on the various factions, so they agree to get along.

So I think there is a security risk there. Nobody wants to go back to the Bosnia or the Balkans that we had 8 years ago, or more recently in Kosovo during Operation Allied Force and before that, where we interrupted the genocide that was going on by the Serbian forces. But a lot of that world has changed.

If you look at Macedonia, as I mentioned earlier, there is a country that was almost in chaos and now is trying very hard to make itself ready for NATO membership. Albania and Serbia have made

overtures that they too would like to be part of the process that eventually gets them the NATO membership. So that whole region it seems to me is becoming more stable and more secure and we ought to really look at what contribution forces make there.

In relation to Operation Noble Eagle, yes, we reviewed that. We have talked about this in terms of the Department of Defense, in terms of the military contribution to the war on terrorism as it being both offense and defense. Part of the defense is Operation Noble Eagle. That is the operation here at home and for that matter in Hawaii and Alaska, which is part of the homeland and not to be forgotten even though it is quite a ways offshore in your case, Senator, to protect our people.

It is not only Operation Noble Eagle, but it is the standing up of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and the way they work with the Federal, State, and local governments to bring the resources of the Department of Defense to bear when it is appropriate that we do so. We have a substantial part of our Reserve Forces that are called up that I mentioned earlier, 173,000. They are not all in Iraq, they are not all in Afghanistan. A large number of them are here for Operation Noble Eagle. So that is a big part of our commitment as well. But that is essential to our country's defense.

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Grossman, would you offer any thoughts on that first question on additional global responsibilities outside of Iraq?

Secretary GROSSMAN. Yes, sir. Thank you very much. Let me first of all associate myself completely with what General Myers said, especially about the area of the Balkans.

No one would want to return to the Balkans that we had 8 or 10 years ago, and I think in fact that the commitment of the United States and our allies has been a great success there.

I generally do not travel anywhere now without a chart that shows the declining U.S. strength, both in Bosnia and Kosovo, and with the chairman's permission, I think we ought to include this as part of the record.


Chairman WARNER. Without objection.

[The information referred to follows:]



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


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### ***KFOR U.S. STRENGTH***



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Secretary GROSSMAN. It shows that we went there with a plan, we have reduced our forces over time, but we have still created something very important, I believe.

Finally, I also believe that, with General Myers, we ought to take a look at what more people can do outside of the U.S. forces, especially in the Balkans, Bosnia, and Kosovo. One very important point, and that is as we move forward there, there are still some jobs to do in the Balkans. I want to make sure that on the record is our continuing commitment to apprehending some of the war criminals out there, especially Mr. Mladic and Mr. Karadic.

Senator AKAKA. On March 20 of this year, Secretary Rumsfeld issued a memo outlining his plan for the development of an overseas basing strategy to support current and future U.S. defense requirements. According to the memo, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in conjunction with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy would develop a comprehensive and integrated presence and basing strategy looking out 10 years based on input received from the combatant commanders in cooperation with the military departments.

The report was due to Secretary Rumsfeld by July 1, 2003. General Myers, what is the current status of the overseas basing strategy and have you submitted your overall recommendations to the Secretary as stated in the March 20 memo?

General MYERS. This was a process in which we also involved the combatant commanders in Europe, in the Pacific, in SOUTCOM, in CENTCOM, to look at how we are postured, as you said, Senator Akaka, around the world. The reason we think this is important is that in many respects our posture around the world has been through the Cold War—Korea is a terrific example. Many of the camps, posts, and stations are exactly where they were when the armistice was signed. They were not designed to be that way. It just happened to be where they are.

Where we stand is that that work is ongoing. The combatant commanders have brought in recommendations. We have been working with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and folks on the Joint Staff have been working with the Secretary of Defense to go through each of those to try to put our best thinking on that problem, to say what are we going to need for the future.

There have been no decisions or conclusions drawn. It is a work in progress, if you will. Clearly it is going to involve more than just the Department of Defense. This is going to have to be a U.S. Government effort in the end because there are going to be a lot of political-military questions that will be raised and have to be answered.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much for your responses.

Mr. Chairman, my time has expired.

Chairman WARNER. Senator Sessions.

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would first just like to reiterate comments made by Senator Alard. I too serve on the Budget Committee and the memorandum for the chief budget staff person says that: "Our CBO budget deficit estimate already assumes that we will have a significant supplemental for this year and assumes a \$79 billion supplemental." So this idea that it is driving up our budget deficit unexpectedly is

really, to the extent that it really is about \$80, with interest \$87, \$5 or \$7 billion more than we assumed, but fundamentally this Budget Committee and our Congress assumed that we would have this challenge to meet, and I think everybody is going to be ready to meet it. I am convinced of that.

I just want to note that I believe most Americans understand that we are at war. We have not forgotten September 11, and we are committed. Over three-fourths of the members of this body and the House voted to support the effort in Iraq. We are not going to waffle now. We are not going to quit.

At this hearing, Mr. Chairman, I think it is wonderful, and we need to focus on what we can do to help us be more successful. But this is not a hearing to talk about abandoning a policy that we overwhelmingly adopted in the Congress of the United States, the President took to the American people, and the President and the Defense Department have so brilliantly led.

I would just note that I think the war has gone in many ways exceedingly well. We had all these concerns, and I did not dismiss them out of hand, that we would have house to house fighting, thousands and thousands of American casualties. I did not dismiss humanitarian disasters out of hand that did not occur. I did not dismiss all kinds of humanitarian problems that could have occurred. We did not have ethnic bloodbaths, as some suggested.

So I think in terms of the hostilities themselves it went brilliantly. I think the civilian Defense Department leadership, Secretaries Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz, worked with General Tommy Franks to develop a brilliant, innovative plan for decisive and swift victory in this war. Not only did they allow him to be bold and innovative and courageous, they encouraged it, and as a partnership together we had great success.

I think we need to remember that the greatest heroes are our soldiers who fought this battle. It was tough duty and it was risky. Many of them are alive today because of bulletproof vests and the kind of armor that we had, and we need more and better of it. It was a tough battle, but they moved with courage and decisiveness in the finest traditions of the American military.

They are not prepared to cut and run either, because I have been there and I have talked to them, with Alabama units that, apart from any bias from any high officials, they told me that they thought we were making progress.

I know that we have some challenges and I just want to get to those and ask about them and provide some suggestions. First I would like to share a few things about what is happening there. I met with an engineering unit from Alabama in the north in Mosul. They restored four schools that were devastated. The article by Tom Gordon of The Birmingham News, who was embedded with them, or September 6 talks about it.

One of the things Tom Gordon wrote about was Riban Abdul Wab, a 15 year old. He spoke English. He was their chief interpreter as they rebuilt the school and went out and helped them buy supplies at better prices. It said this in his article: "Alpha Company is working to get the youth to America to finish high school and college. If their efforts succeed, his home for part of his stay will

be with Sergeant Virgil Simpson in Booneville, Mississippi, a member of that unit." That is the kind of thing that is occurring.

It goes on to note: "In the aftermath of the ceremony, groups of beret-wearing girls held hands with soldiers, while more boisterous boys high-fived the soldiers."

I saw one American soldier on the streets of Baghdad talking to half a dozen Iraqi citizens on more than one occasion. I met with the Alabama MPs and had dinner with them. We talked about what was really going on. They go to the police precinct with Iraqi policemen that have been brought on board, and they patrol the streets of Baghdad together. One said: "We have bonded together." Intelligence is increasing, they told me. No high-ranking officials were there. It was their statement to me about what they perceived to be occurring.

I asked: Do you think you could leave today and the Iraqi police could succeed? They said they did not think so. They thought that we needed to stay there for some longer period of time.

General Myers and Secretary Wolfowitz, I think you are exactly correct, that we need to strengthen the local police forces. As a former prosecutor myself, I know a society cannot function where there is disorder. A lot of this disorder is pure criminal theft, pure robbers, burglars, and thieves.

So I guess I was very encouraged to see, General Myers, that you have a goal of 184,000, because to me we do not need more troops there; we need more intelligence, we need a stronger local police, a stronger local army, and we need to start getting our troops out, not putting more in.

You have a goal of 184,000. Does this supplemental give you enough money to do that? I think you need every dollar you are entitled to for that project.

General MYERS. Senator Sessions, my understanding is the supplemental does do that through fiscal year 2004. It has, as I said, I think about \$5.5 billion that goes specifically to training those forces.

Senator SESSIONS. I would just say, I visited their training camp and met with their trainers and met with the chief of the Baghdad police force, who I saw later had been the subject of an assassination attempt. But he was personally leading police officers on nightly raids, had been wounded, shot in the leg, the week before I got there, and was back to work before he should have been according to the doctors, leading this unit. If we have that kind of support, we will be successful.

A patrolling soldier who cannot speak the language, Mr. Chairman, is just not going to be as effective as an Iraqi police officer in getting the intelligence and leading raids.

Secretary Wolfowitz, I also have a strong belief that electricity is a big problem. I understand that because of neglect by Saddam Hussein's government the demand is 30 percent greater than generating capacity. Will this supplemental allow you to spend such sums as you need to immediately take steps to restore electricity? I think, with an increased police department and an increased electricity and continuous supply of electricity, I believe that will help us be able to reduce our forces.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Yes, it does. Actually, electricity is the largest single item in that part of the supplemental, and we are approaching the whole electricity issue with the sense of urgency that it requires. We had a very good plan, the Agency for International Development (AID) did as part of the CPA, to build up electricity in a sensible, methodical way. But when you realize how it affects the overall security environment, that you are spending \$4 billion a month on forces to deal with that security environment and Americans are getting killed and wounded in that environment, electricity has to be approached with an urgency that you would not normally do if you were just looking at efficiency.

We are doing that already with the resources that are available, but this money that is in the supplemental will allow us to finish the job and I believe do it rapidly.

Senator SESSIONS. I would just note in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, that the cost of an Iraqi police officer is about \$100 a month. We can probably have 30 just on a salary basis, perhaps 30 Iraqis hired. Each one of them therefore would have a stake in the new government and would also be able to feed their family. So the goal of transforming this to Iraqi leadership is just the right thing, and I am glad to see Secretary Rumsfeld speaking out on that, and you too, General Myers. This is the right direction to go.

General MYERS. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator. Our staff, Senator, has just handed me a memorandum with a breakdown of the \$20.3 billion. You asked about the electricity or energy. Energy infrastructure, \$8.1 billion, is the largest piece. You mentioned public security; \$5.1 billion. At 100 bucks that will buy a lot of policemen.

Thank you.

Senator DAYTON.

Senator DAYTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Myers, I respect enormously what you outlined in terms of the requirements for victory. I want to assure you that the will to win does not differ from one side of this aisle to the other. To my recollection, all my colleagues have accepted the President and Ambassador Bremer and others' description of what constitutes the elements of victory so that we can get our troops out after winning that lasting victory that will endure and make it worth the enormous sacrifices that have been made.

In terms of commitment, I think everything the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs have requested has been approved by the Senate and by Congress, with overwhelming bipartisan support. If there is any message to come out of today's events, it ought to be that, as the news media reported I think accurately earlier today, this latest request will be approved with overwhelming support. I will certainly support whatever the President demonstrates is necessary to achieve this victory.

But with regard to patience, sir, the sense of urgency that I bring toward my assessment of the situation actually came from my time in Iraq about 6 weeks ago now. General Sanchez briefed us there, as did Ambassador Bremer and others, and they all basically said the same thing, that the next 60 to 90 days would be crucial to show progress toward achieving the conditions necessary for bringing this to a successful conclusion as quickly as possible.

They said, furthermore, "Time is not on our side and the failure to show progress sufficiently would be likely to have very serious consequences."

So what were those elements of victory as they outlined? One is getting Saddam Hussein and his two sons permanently eliminated from the country and preferably the planet, which you have achieved two-thirds of, and that is just one short of perfection and hopefully it will be realized very soon.

The second was to install a successor Iraqi government as soon as possible. Now, when we met with Ambassador Bremer 6 weeks ago my recollection was that he said the goal was to have that government established and elected by the Iraqi people within 6 months, by the end of the year. Now it is being said that it will be practically a year from now. So in terms of patience, again, if that is the precursor to our being able to extract our troops successfully, then we are talking about an extension there for reasons that I must say I do not understand.

The third was domestic law and order, and I cannot assess the overall circumstances in the country. What I do know is that U.S. casualties were evidently up 35 percent in August compared to the month before. That was information gleaned by going into a Top Secret briefing last week and looking at a sheet marked "Top Secret" and seeing the information that had been reported the day before in The Washington Post, which I guess means I am better off reading the newspapers than I am going to those briefings.

But if that information is not made available or intended to be made available, it is very hard for someone like myself, much less the American people, to make a realistic evaluation.

I would urge that the facts be allowed to speak for themselves, whether they are good facts or not. No one expects this to go easily, but I think we have a right in Congress and, more importantly, the American people have a right to know what the real situation is.

The fourth condition for victory was social and economic rehabilitation, which is still under way. That is again an area where I guess there are differing reports. One of my colleagues said earlier that they are talking about improvements in basic services, but that is contrary to what I have been told in other settings. The Wall Street Journal says today continued sabotage against oil pipelines and power stations has plagued Iraq. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers recently did a helicopter survey of Iraq's high voltage distribution wires. Over about 700 miles they found 623 destroyed towers, up from fewer than 20 just after the war. Obviously, that is due to acts of sabotage and retaliation. But it is still of concern when it means that American troops have to be stationed there longer, and I believe their figure now of 140,000 or 138,000 contrasts to what was expected at one point in the planning process of it being only about 60,000 U.S. troops needed at this stage.

So those, and I know you feel more responsibility for them than anyone else—are the lives of our constituents' sons and daughters, and they are over there with their lives on the line and we want to figure out how to get them back as quickly as possible after achieving that success.

So I hope there is no misunderstanding about the shared resolve. I think we would be derelict in our responsibilities if we did not



try to explore what needs to happen and how it is going and what, if anything, needs to be done to make it more successful as soon as possible.

Along those lines, I would just say that "The Today Show" this morning—I try to watch the television and read the papers—they reported that the intent of the administration is to provide combat pay for soldiers in Iraq, but not in other places such as Afghanistan or other, I would call them, combat areas. Is that information correct or not?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. The supplemental assumes both Iraq and Afghanistan, Senator.

Senator DAYTON. Those two, combat in those two areas?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Yes.

Senator DAYTON. Thank you.

Maybe this goes better to you, Mr. Secretary. Regarding the President's assertion the other night that it was a terrorist attack against the U.N. headquarters, has that been definitively established?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. It is obviously terrorism and suicide terrorism. It is deliberately killing innocent civilians. I do not think the President meant to say that we know where it came from precisely. There is some belief that it was Baathists, some belief it could be terrorists. They could be working together.

I know more evidence actually in the case of Najaf than in the case of the U.N. bombing, but the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) is working on both of these.

Senator DAYTON. So when the President said the other night, "Terrorists in Iraq have attacked representatives of the civilized world and opposing them must be the cause of the civilized world," he is referring to terrorists who could be foreign terrorists or who could be Iraqi remnants of Saddam Hussein's army or whatever else.

Just one last question because my time is up here. With regard to Afghanistan, I note the reconstruction budget for Iraq is expected to cost \$20 to \$30 billion of expenditures next year. The supplemental request for Afghanistan, however, is \$1.2 billion, I think, combined, \$800 million additional and a quarter million from unspent funds previously. That is a fraction, 5 percent, less than that, of what is being undertaken for Iraq, and Afghanistan by many accounts is in far worse, more backward condition, and we are 2 years into that after winning that military victory and we do not even have a road completed from Kabul to Kandahar.

It seems that we have underfunded that effort, and the international community bears that responsibility, but is it your assessment, sir, that we are going to approach sufficient effort there to show some positive results?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Actually you put your finger on something that is a problem and is a concern, and it is operations. The road network in Afghanistan is not in our view being stood up fast enough, and it is an international community responsibility, which means it tends to get diffused and there is a lack of what the military would call unity of command, to put it charitably.

We are in this proposal putting some money into it so that we can push that effort along faster. It is a bit like the electricity in

Iraq. When you think of it as a purely economic development project, time is not that critical. But your point does not contradict the Chairman's point about patience. We need a sense of urgency about those things that can be fixed that will relieve the strain on our troops and make them safer, and roads in Afghanistan are one of those things, electricity in Iraq is another.

The disparity you point out is an interesting one and I think a lot of it stems from the fact that the one country is just much more advanced than the other, so the requirements become bigger.

Senator DAYTON. If it is lack of capacity it is one thing. If it is lack of putting full force behind this basic reconnecting of the country, I think we are missing a terribly important opportunity.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I would agree with you on that. In fact, looking at the two numbers side by side the other night, we said let us take another look at whether we have the balance right.

Senator DAYTON. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General MYERS. Chairman Warner, can I, just 30 seconds?

Chairman WARNER. 30 seconds.

General MYERS. If you do not mind. On the point of the bipartisan support, clearly it is the reason we have been successful to date and we appreciate that, and I have made that I think very clear in my opening remarks. It is really apparent at the troop level and they know that, and I think that is why we are successful.

On patience, I was referring not specifically to Iraq, but the broader war on terrorism. There are some things, as Secretary Wolfowitz said, we ought to have a terrible sense of urgency about because it does help our security. I do not disagree with what Ambassador Bremer and others have said about the urgency of getting the infrastructure stood up and in governance and so forth. That is exactly right on track.

The last point: If there is ever anything in a briefing that—if you do not think we are being forthcoming, then we have failed, because we have made a very large effort to try to bring everything we have. Just like the embedded reporters; we knew there would be the good, the bad, and the ugly, but that is what the American people expect, that is what you deserve on this committee.

I do not have the specifics on that case. If you can show it to me I would be happy to track it down.

Senator DAYTON. I will, thank you. I also would point out again, reading in the paper this morning about extending the tour of duty for reservists and guardsmen and women. Those are folks back home we hear from. We appreciate also, being a member of this committee, getting that information directly.

General MYERS. You bet.

Senator DAYTON. Thank you, sir.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator.

Secretary GROSSMAN. I just wanted to, if I could, just get one sentence in, Senator. That is, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz is exactly right about the challenges to building a whole road network. But I think it would be fair to say on behalf of all of us that the people who are involved in the sector that we have from Kabul to Kandahar have done a magnificent job. It will be done by the 31st

of December. They have been attacked here the last few days and they have really kept at this.

So while I completely agree with what Paul says, the people who are out there on our side doing what we promised to do, I think they deserve a lot of credit, sir.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Thank you for the amendment.

Chairman WARNER. Senator Talent, thank you for being patient. I think it is important that witnesses be given the opportunity to fully respond to these important questions, and that has run us over occasionally. But I appreciate your patience.

Senator TALENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the hearing.

We have all been called on—I guess I was a little surprised by this—to give our opinion of the strategic imperative according to which we went to war. I will do it briefly, speaking for myself. Two years ago this Thursday we were attacked, and I do not think you win wars by staying on the defensive. You take the fight to the enemy and the enemy's friends. You use your power and the power of your allies decisively to remove your enemies and to create more friends, and you do that diplomatically as well, as we have tried to do in the Mideast peace process.

That is the context in which I see this engagement in Iraq. I think it is not only fully justified, it is necessary. We are going to win. We are winning. The only thing that concerns me is that you do not win wars if quitting becomes an option every time things get tough. Things are tough. I do not know if they are tougher than everybody expected.

There are uncertainties in war. There is a spectrum of potential responses and difficulties. Some things in this war have been easier than I thought they were going to be and some things have been probably on the far side of the bell curve of difficulty. But you just keep going, and I have full confidence in this country, and I know what is going to happen if we persevere and I think the world is going to be a better place when we are done.

Now, I have two comments. Actually, one is a comment that I would like you all to comment on and then one is a question. As I understand it, the tactical goal or the immediate goal in Iraq was to remove Saddam because he was a threat to us and to the peace, and then also create in Iraq, with the cooperation of the Iraqi people, a stable ally in the war against terrorism. Number one, is that a proper way or a thumbnail way of summing up the goal?

The second part of this is I am going to give you my sense of where we are and then you tell me the extent to which I may be wrong. This again is a layperson's way of describing this. But if that is the goal, in the north and the southern part of the country we have made substantial progress towards achieving that goal, stabilizing it, standing up local governments, the whole thing. In the central part of the country what we need to do is get the lights turned on and continue creating an indigenous police force so that they can do the day to day guard the banks kind of thing, so that our guys can go and beat the tar out of the terrorists like they are doing in Afghanistan. That is a difficult thing and we are persevering in it, and that is in the central part of the country.

Is that overall an accurate description—I grant you, it is not detailed—of what our goal is and how far we are in progress towards achieving it?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I think it is an excellent, succinct description: to remove Saddam, to create a stable ally. Of course, the terrorists and the Saddamists want to keep us from having a stable ally. Most of the Iraqi people I think are ready to be a stable ally. I think it is correct what you described as the main problems that we face are in the center of the country.

But a slight qualifier: We want to get the lights on in the whole country.

Senator TALENT. Right.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. We do not want to presume to take for granted the success we have had in the north and the south, because we cannot afford to lose there and we need to keep the goodwill of the people. But the people who are really out there killing Americans are located principally in what they call the Baathist triangle, between Baghdad and Tikrit and Bakuba. We are making real progress. We have a lot of Iraqis in that Sunni area who are on our side. It is not a Sunni versus Shia issue. It is the old regime and their terrorist allies against the whole country.

Senator TALENT. I would certainly not expect, if this is as important a goal to us in winning the war as I think it is, the enemy to just sit there and let us accomplish it. In fact, it is in a sense an affirmation of how important it is that they are pushing the chips on the table, if you will, and going in.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. If you read the al Qaeda Web sites, they very clearly get it. They view democracy as a real threat and democracy in Iraq as a particularly big threat.

Senator TALENT. I thought—this is a digression, but we have all digressed today. Prime Minister Blair said that about as well as it could be said in his speech to Congress, that for them, and for us therefore, it has to be a battle on a larger plane about what the world should look like, what this emerging post-Cold War international order should look like.

The enemy does not want it to look like what it will be if we and our allies are able to exercise influence over it. That is just what it comes down to.

Now, to switch gears, and then this is my last question and comment. For you, Mr. Secretary, and you, General Myers. This is an issue I have shared with you all in other hearings and shared privately with you. It does not deal with whether we ought to put more troops in now in Iraq or in the future or not. It is whether our overall end strength, particularly for the Army, is adequate for this war and our other military responsibilities.

We have 485,000 troops in the active Army, 350,000 National Guard, a little over 200 in the Reserves. We now have about 133,000 in Iraq and several tens of thousands in theater, and they are going to be there for a while, and we hope to be able to get them down, but we still have to make this commitment. Then we have the rest of the war to fight.

I would like the two of you to share with me how the developments of the last 6 months or so have affected your view on whether the end number for the Army is adequate or whether it should

be greater, if not necessarily structurally in more divisions, but just maybe rounding out some of the forces we now have, maybe more MPs, more civil affairs people.

Have you had time to stop and think about what the configuration and the size of the Army ought to be in light of what we are experiencing in theater now as well as our other responsibilities?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I will do that, but if I could also just pick up on something you said early on. We were attacked 2 years ago by people who have made it clear that they will go anywhere in the world where they can to defeat us and fight us, and that fight is now in Iraq, though the people we are fighting are part of a worldwide problem. It is a worldwide problem that is centered in the Middle East.

If people say this was not the right war, that we should have left Saddam Hussein in power, we should have left his killing machines running, we should have left his weapons of mass destruction programs running, we should have left him free to finance terrorism, then I think they need to say, what was the other course? I am not clear what it is at all. To simply have waited many more months, with our troops sweltering in Saudi Arabia and Saudi Arabia buckling possibly under the strain of supporting politically that kind of American presence, I dread to think what that would have been like.

On the simpler questions, but very important ones: The size of the Armed Forces, I think it is just way too early to make a very expensive decision to increase the size of the Armed Forces to deal with what we expect is not going to be a long-term issue. Do I know that? I do not know that. In 6 months, a year from now, depending on the situation in Iraq, we may have to come to different conclusions. But we think, as I said, that the problem there is finite and we are making progress against it.

If that is the case, then you actually think about a situation later where many of our requirements are reduced. We have spent billions of dollars and enormous numbers of people deployed to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries and Turkey over the last 12 years to contain Saddam. We do not need to do that any more. Those air forces have gone home. The bases—we just took the last person out of Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia. That is not only a cost saving and a reduced personnel saving, it is a huge reduced strain on the Saudis, who are much freer now to go after terrorists.

So things change and I would say in that respect, if we are going to build up our forces and bring in a new capability 3 to 5 years from now that by then we will not need at all, it would be a mistake.

But on the specific strains you mentioned, I think it is absolutely clear that we have to re-look at the mix and that we cannot put all of certain elements in the Reserves, and particularly in limited numbers, so that people keep getting called back over and over again. We are looking at that set of issues. We are looking at it with some real urgency. Those I think there are near-term fixes for, I am hopeful.

Senator TALENT. But you view this as a practical question on which your mind is open.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Absolutely.

Senator TALENT. I do not want the Department to think of the issue of end strength as linked to the transformation issue, so that if you increase end strength it is a confession transformation has failed. You can be transforming with end strength going up or down depending on what the missions are and the rest of it. You are assuring me that that is——

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Absolutely right, absolutely. You have to look at things from the point of view of the strategic context we are in and we are a Nation at war, as has been said over and over again. But it is not a war like World War II.

Let me also say, because it is worth saying, that there is no doctrinal view of how many troops we should have in Iraq. If the commanders want more, I cannot say that they will get whatever they ask for, but I am pretty sure they will get what they ask for. I recall in fact when we were in Afghanistan and I was one of those people who wondered whether General Franks was asking for enough troops and we had, General Myers will remember, a fairly heated discussion among the three of us, and he convinced me that maybe he would need more later, but he sure did not want to ask for them now because he did not want to go down the road that the Soviets went down. He was right, and General Abizaid is adamant for much the same reasons, that he does not want to flood Iraq with American troops, and I think he is right.

But we have an enormous sense of urgency about getting Iraqis out on the front lines.

Senator TALENT. I am done, Mr. Chairman. Maybe General Myers wants to comment, or not.

General MYERS. Just a couple of comments. Just to piggyback on what Secretary Wolfowitz said, in terms of the mix, it is a mix between Guard and active. It is also, as we have talked about, total numbers. For our new security environment, do we have enough civil affairs for what we foresee in the future, enough MPs, or do we have the wrong kind of forces perhaps in the Guard and Reserve, that we could change the kind of forces we need.

That is something that is being evaluated right now, and you may see some of those results possibly in the fiscal year 2005 budget, because we need to make those changes, I think, if we are going to make some and agree to that, we need to make them fairly quickly.

The second part is that we continually run war games, for lack of a better term, to determine—and this is not just the Joint Staff; we bring in the combatant commanders, the folks from the Secretary's staff as well—to decide if we can fulfill our military commitments around the world. We have consistently found that, yes, we can. Where it means there is more risk, how long is that risk, what kind of risk is it? We try to capture that.

We are in the process of doing that right now. This heavy commitment that we have in Iraq—Iraq is in our new defense strategy, is a “win decisively.” We are involved in a win-decisive campaign and we have to have enough forces left for us to fully defeat the efforts of any resistance, and in other lesser contingencies and so forth, and homeland defense and so forth. We look at that regularly to make sure we can fulfill our commitments.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. By the way, the Services estimate we could get some 10,000 uniformed people into military jobs if we had, just in this coming fiscal year alone, the authority we are asking for from Congress.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator.

I recognize that our time has not been firm, but I want very much to give each of these witnesses a full opportunity to respond, Senator Talent. The responses to your question did run over, but I think those responses are very important for the record.

Senator Bill Nelson.

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony. I come to you as a friend, as we have discussed many times, not only in front of this committee but in front of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, these matters. I bring to you items for your consideration from 17 million Floridians, of which as we were home, with 25 town hall meetings, I have had an opportunity to hear from, and I want you to hear from them.

I believe that our Florida National Guard is the most professional in the country. They are well-equipped, they are well-trained. They are now stretched to the breaking point. Over half of our Florida National Guard have been activated. We are now in the middle of something known as hurricane season. You can recall the time, 1992, Hurricane Andrew. Not only did it call out the Florida Guard, but we had to bring Guard from all over the country into Florida.

Now, the flip side of this is that we should not be handing a commander unacceptable or avoidable risk with a rotation plan that leaves gaps in his required mission areas. So as you devise this rotation policy and the plan, it should appear fair. That is what I want to talk about, because Florida's National Guard stepped up and we stepped up immediately. It was back in December that so many of our units were activated, and I directly participated in those. I would go to them and speak to them as they were activated and sent off, mostly for their initial staging at Fort Stewart.

The families of those that are now still fighting have waited patiently, but that patience is beginning to break, and of course I am hearing a good bit about it. The Guard leadership is now being overwhelmed by the calls from the families for the soldiers to come home.

The Army's rotation policy announcement yesterday establishes a 12-month boots-on-the-ground rotation policy for Iraq unless the combatant commander determines that the unit is no longer needed. Now, it was, interestingly, and this is one of the little quirks that I wanted to bring to your attention, reported to me and has been confirmed this morning that the Army has withdrawn its alert notification to the brigades in the Arkansas National Guard. It was reported to me this morning and I have not confirmed, the same thing, that it has withdrawn its alert notification to the brigade in North Carolina. They had been alerted on the 25th of July. Had they been quickly mobilized, as were the Florida battalions last December, they would probably be very nearly ready to relieve the units in Iraq now.

Florida's 9 infantry companies have been attached, detached, and re-attached no more than 40 times to different units in the theater, some of which have already been redeployed. Soldiers of Company C, the Second Battalion, 124th Infantry, may be eligible to wear up to five different combat patches, given what units they fought with over the months. Although the 12 months in theater may be the right policy for you all to determine for units on their way to Iraq, I believe that it is a stretch for the units that are there now and that have already been through major combat.

I do not have to tell you—but I am going to because I am reflecting my folks—livelihoods and civilian careers are inherently at risk for deployed Guard and Reserve. Despite the protections that we have put into the law for them, the conditions are never exactly the same when they get home after extended deployments. The longer they are gone, the higher the risk for them back home.

But at the same time, I know that the Florida National Guard is as patriotic, as equipped, as trained, and as ready to serve as anyone, and they stepped up instantly, with only a 5-day notice on deployment activation. Normally the policy is 30 days. I am reflecting some of their frustration.

So, Mr. Secretary, can you paint for us a picture of the decision process to review and approve the recommendations of the Services relative to rotation policies and plans, and how you also will ensure the near- and longer-term rotation plans will meet the military requirements, not only in Iraq and Afghanistan?

General, then if you would comment on the challenges of an Iraq-Afghanistan rotation policy, begging a broader question of the adequacy of the Armed Forces as currently sized and structured.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Senator, you have asked a lot of questions, which need some work. I have been digging—I ran into a Tennessee Air National Guard unit that had a history not unlike what you describe about the Florida Army National Guard.

Senator BILL NELSON. I flew into Baghdad with Texas and Tennessee Guard units on the C-130s, and of course they were considerably concerned about when they were going to get home, too. They were concerned, by the way, that sometimes they were flying those C-130s absolutely empty.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Well, and they are concerned I think about—they are incredibly willing to serve. I did not encounter an attitude of complaining at all, remarkably. But there is a question of fairness which I think is underlying your question. There is a burden, but is it distributed fairly, is it shared equally. I will try to get back to you with answers on the decisionmaking process. I will also try to get back to you with answers on whether—the specific question you raised, the 12-month policy should apply across the board or whether for those already there it should be different.

[The information referred to follows:]

In order to support United States Central Command (CENTCOM) requirements, the Army recommended that units deployed to Iraq remain in theater for up to 12 months before returning to their home base. This includes the majority of Operation Iraqi Freedom Rotation #1 (OIF 1) units that deployed in 2003 and fought in major combat operations and also applies to units currently deploying to Iraq for OIF 2. If a unit's capability is no longer required, CENTCOM may release them to redeploy before they reach 12 months in theater.



Secretary WOLFOWITZ. To get to the larger question, and I will ask General Myers to help me on this, I think what you describe may be extreme in the case of the Florida National Guard, but it is unfortunately reflective of the stresses throughout the Reserve and National Guard system. That is why we are on an urgent basis addressing this question of active-Reserve mix. It is also why—I guess I will say it for the third or fourth time now, and I am sorry to do it, but—we really believe that a lot of these things that guardsmen are doing could be done today by active duty personnel who are tied up doing administrative and information technology and other kinds of tasks that are just very obviously good candidates for civilians.

As we look at how to reduce the dependence on the Guard and Reserve for some of these functions and moving them into the Active Force, the only way we are going to be able to do it is if we can shift some of that, those functions, from the Active Force into the civilian workforce. It can be done. The numbers start at 10,000 up to 50,000 as possibly in the first fiscal year, and at some point you could get into, I think, six figures. So again, I appeal for help on that.

General Myers, do you want to add anything?

General MYERS. The only thing I would add, Senator Nelson, is that I personally host a Guard and Reserve conference every year just so we can talk about issues like that. I am not sure if those issues emerged from this conference just concluded in the last month or so. But they are important points, because predictability in the lives of all our Armed Forces is very important. If it is more important to any component, it is probably in the Reserve component because they have in many cases employers that they have to make arrangements with as well.

So we understand that. The Secretary understands that. Secretary Rumsfeld understands that. We need to look into this issue of fairness, and we will look at all the units and we will see how they are being done. We have taken a look—and why we established the rotation policy we did was to find some, if you will, goals for rotation that will enable us to not just do Iraq and Afghanistan, but also the other things that we are committed to do around the world.

Part of that and part of the rotation policy is based on the fact that in Iraq we want to bring on as quickly as possible Iraqis taking care of their own security, and we have talked a little bit about that. So that is a piece of it, of course.

We would like to make this as multinational around the world as we can. In Afghanistan we have already talked about the numbers there, but there is huge international participation in Afghanistan, which is extremely important to us; Iraq as well, other places around the world where we need support.

Part of it is wrapped up in the global force presence policy and where we have forces stationed in the world today. Perhaps you could free some of those up to do other things. We have talked about that in terms of Korea. So those are the kind of deliberations—and it is not just Korea, but other places as well.

So those are the kind of deliberations that we are in the middle of to try to do I think exactly what you want to do, is make sure

that we are postured for the long term, for the long run, because, going back, Senator Dayton, this overall war on terrorism is going to require patience and probably a substantial commitment for some time to come.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator Cornyn.

Senator CORNYN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you to the witnesses for hanging in there with us during this very important hearing.

I remember 42 years ago when I was very young, President Kennedy said something that I heard President Bush echo last Sunday night. President Kennedy said: "Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, to assure the survival and the success of liberty."

I was pleased to hear Senator Dayton mention the broad bipartisan support that your efforts enjoy in this body as our troops bear the burden that they volunteered for and which they are currently bearing now in Iraq so that liberty may succeed for the Iraqi people and also for the American people.

But of course, the decision in Congress to go to war in Iraq was not universally shared, that commitment, and there are those who in my view seek some vindication of their lack of agreement for the Nation's policy for regime change in the subsequent hardships that our military forces have endured, and that is unfortunate.

I apologize for not having been here at the very beginning of this hearing, but I was chairing another hearing, which I think is indicative of where we are in the post-September 11 environment, and that was a hearing on the continuity of Congress in the event of a catastrophic event, perhaps a terrorist attack on this very Capitol, which indeed was narrowly averted on September 11 due in large part to the heroic efforts of civilians on a plane that were able to divert it to a Pennsylvania field. The very fact we are having a hearing about the continuity of government is a solemn additional reminder of the serious threats that we face.

I just want to come out and say that I commend President Bush and the administration for the resolute leadership that has been demonstrated in the war on terror, both in Iraq and around the globe. I believe that everyone who is engaged in fighting this war, from the most junior recruit to the Commander in Chief, is doing a remarkable job under extraordinarily difficult circumstances.

Of course, the American people understand that we are engaged already in a presidential election and that there are those who criticize the President's handling of the war in Iraq in order to gain political advantage. The American people, as I say, understand that. But again speaking only for myself, I find something unsavory about the comments of those who seek political advantage in questioning our commitment to our troops and our commitment to winning the war on terror.

I believe that there is a lot to be very proud of in terms of what we have been able to accomplish in making sure that the Iraqi people will enjoy the blessings of liberty that we enjoy in this country. For me the fundamental question is: Are Iraqis better off today than they were during Saddam's regime? The answer is unequivocal.

cally yes. Is America a safer place today than it was before Saddam was toppled? I think the answer to that is likewise unequivocally yes.

I had the privilege of traveling to Iraq with the chairman and the ranking member and other members of this committee at the end of June and the beginning of July. I was shocked, as they were, to see samples of mass graves of some 300,000 individuals who Saddam had simply killed during his reign of terror. I have been shocked as well to learn of some 1.5 million people that were simply missing and we do not really know where they are, whether they are dead or alive, in Iraq, out of Iraq, or elsewhere.

Of course, we know today that there are those who enjoy religious freedom that did not enjoy religious freedom under Saddam's regime. Women now have basic rights. The Iraqi people have hope for the future that they did not have just a few short months ago.

But I would like to ask, Secretary Wolfowitz, for you to comment on this issue. I know it has been because of the sabotage that we have seen on the electrical grid, the transmission lines in Iraq, it has been very difficult for us to get the message of all of our accomplishments out to the Iraqi people. Indeed, that was one of the things that I came away with on our trip, that the American people are seeing the drip, drip, drip of criticism of the armchair generals and the pundits who want to criticize everything that happens that does not happen in a perfect or desirable way.

I really worry that we are not doing everything we might do to get the positive message out to the Iraqi people. I wonder if you would just speak to that issue and the challenges you have and perhaps some of the successes that you have seen.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I would like to do that, but if I could also comment on what you said earlier, because I agree with you very strongly. We have an awful lot to be proud of in terms of what we have done for the Iraqi people, in terms of what we have done to make the whole Middle East safer, although it is a long way from safe, and what we have done to make our own children and grandchildren safer, although they are still a long way from safe.

I think it is very important, as I said earlier, that we be open to criticism, that we learn the lessons we need to learn, but not to send out a message to our enemies that we are weak or that we are lacking in resolve or that we do not recognize what we have accomplished and how strong we are, because, believe me, they do know we are strong. We need to show that we believe it.

It was said earlier, I think by Senator Reed, that the costs of this conflict were underestimated. I do not know which estimates he is referring to, but it seems to me that in fact, if you look at the various things that we feared could happen and quite legitimately feared—in fact, I have a list here that Secretary Rumsfeld drew up—it was secret at the time; I do not know if it is still secret—of 29 different terrible things that could happen with the war in Iraq. He started this list, he kept adding to it and adding to it and asking us to think about what kind of things needed to be done to prevent it.

But there is a note at the bottom that says: "It is possible, of course, to prepare a similar illustrative list of all the potential

problems that need to be considered if there is no regime change in Iraq.”

I think it was the right decision. I do think it is important to note that there are people who opposed the war but who now understand the importance of winning it, and I appreciate that support very much. I think that has to be said.

But let me say that none of us who believed it was the right thing to do thought it would be easy. Anyone who knows anything about war should not ever think that war would be easy. But we did not start this war. We were attacked on September 11. We are defending ourselves, not simply by sitting behind walls and barriers, but by going after the enemy where they are.

I will say it over again. Senator McCain has said it, the President has said it, General Abizaid has said it. Today the central battle in the war on terrorism is the struggle to build a secure and free Iraq, and the terrorists know it. I think most of our people know it. Certainly our men and women who are out there fighting know it. We have to win it.

Part of winning it now, to get to your specific question, is indeed the information campaign. General Abizaid has five I's: better intelligence, more Iraqis, more internationalization, better infrastructure, and better information, meaning in the sense of media and getting the message out.

We are at a number of disadvantages. One is there is a lot of very sophisticated poison out there, from the local media in that part of the world. It is pretty hard to fight that. We have to fight it. We had some severe physical infrastructure problems, which I think are largely corrected. We now cover most of the country.

The big challenge now is getting the right programming, and it is a bigger challenge there because we are dealing with people, if you do surveys—I do not know the percentages exactly—but most Iraqis rely on rumor for their information because in their history rumor has been much more reliable than anything you heard on state television. We have to get programming in Arabic. We may be good at media here, but we are not naturally skilled in Arabic media.

But Ambassador Bremer has brought a new man out there, Gary Thatcher, to do for the media what Bernie Kerik has done for the police, if I could put it that way, somebody I think of real star quality, who has a very ambitious strategy put together. Just as we are looking at how we can accelerate fixing the electricity by putting money against a good program, I think we have a good program now on the media side that deserves money against it, and that is indeed part of what we are asking for out of the supplemental. The importance of it cannot be exaggerated.

But let me make one last comment on this subject, because I saw it in connection with the Najaf bombing. We are at a fundamental disadvantage. It is what they call asymmetric warfare, because we do not believe in putting out untruth. Our enemies will put out untruths the minute something happens. We have people alleging that Americans bombed a mosque in Falujah. We know it was wrong. It took us 3 days just to find out the facts, though. Until we had the facts, the best media network in the world could not counter the lies.

One of the things we are talking about is just within our system, among the intelligence people and the military people who know facts, is to appreciate the importance of getting that information, not just to a tactical level, but to a level where it can be used in an effective media campaign also.

Senator CORNYN. Thank you. Let me just say in wrapping up that I was very pleased to see that the Arab League recognized the delegate, the foreign minister from the Iraqi Governing Council, as the legitimate representative of the Iraqi government, and see that as an important milestone.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. It is a huge breakthrough and it is the result of real teamwork between Ambassador Bremer and our State Department colleagues.

Senator CORNYN. It was very good news.

In conclusion let me just say, Mr. Chairman, that I think we all know that there are obstacles to overcome and there will be setbacks along the way, but I hope that the politics of the moment do not drive criticism that will only serve to undermine the war on terror and tend to undermine American resolve.

I wonder what people must be thinking at this point. Certainly not that we should cut and run or that we should leave the Iraqi people with only half of our promise fulfilled, the promise that we made to them that they would enjoy the blessings of liberty. Certainly I know that we will all agree that we owe our men and women in uniform our unequivocal support.

Our troops, I am convinced, have the will to win. I hope our politicians have that will to win as well.

Thank you very much.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman WARNER. Senator, thank you. That is an excellent statement on which to end this very important session of the Armed Services Committee.

I am pleased to note, together with my ranking member, that 22 Senators participated in this hearing today. We had extensive colloquies between the Senators and our distinguished panel of witnesses. I wish to commend each of you. You presented a strong message and you responded, I think, very thoroughly to the questions of the Senate.

General, I particularly want to thank you. I had an opportunity to visit at length with you yesterday and we talked about your experience, which goes back to Vietnam, which was another troubled era in the history of our country. But I think today was an example of how responsible the executive branch is informing the legislative branch and hopefully, and I think I am optimistic, the legislative branch is going to respond to the request of our President with regard to the support that we need to fulfill the missions and to do everything we can to protect the men and the women of the Armed Forces as they undergo the continuing burdens, together with their families, of these conflicts. That includes Liberia, where again there are 2,300 marines under the command of an Army two-star general, so a wonderful example of jointness, General Myers.

General MYERS. Yes, sir.

Chairman WARNER. These are very significant moments in the history of this country and I think our government collectively, the

two branches, are working in a responsible way to bring about fulfillment. As was said several times by many, what we do in these two conflicts will establish the direction of the world in terms of its ability to deal with terrorism, not just for years but for generations to come.

So I thank you.

Senator DAYTON. Mr. Chairman, if I may just thank you for your excellent conduct of this hearing, and say I would prefer your wisdom and discretion over any stopwatch any day of the week. Thank you.

Chairman WARNER. I think in some instances I recognized my good friends on the right. Do not worry about that. But time and time again, at the conclusion of a Senator's period there were important responses in which our witnesses brought information which was essential to complete the colloquy. Particularly, General Myers, if I ran over, by golly, it was your fault. But I will take the heat.

General MYERS. You bet, it is my fault.

Chairman WARNER. I will take the heat.

General MYERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator Dayton, and thank you, Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Just one quick comment. Let me thank our witnesses. I think what you heard, I surely feel, is that there are differences as to how best we can succeed in defeating terrorism around the world and here at home. There are healthy differences as to how best to succeed. There are no differences as to whether we must succeed. That goal is shared by all that I know of in the Senate and I think by all Americans.

The constructive criticism, which has been forthcoming, I hope is viewed as exactly that, as a healthy earmark in a democracy of what we are all about. I hope that everyone who watches this around the world will say, hallelujah, these folks here are trying to succeed in the war on terrorism, but they are more than willing to speak out as to how best to achieve that. That is what this body has always been about, I hope always will be about, and I think that you have expressed your understanding of that, all of you, this morning, that that is how you have taken comments from this panel this morning.

Finally, on the information side let me just quickly say, and I think the rest of us who took that one trip together remember very vividly that getting information to the people of Iraq about what is going on on the positive side is absolutely critical. We made that point on the ground in Iraq 2 months ago.

We made that point when we got back here. We actually have asked for those tapes to see what is going forward to the people of Iraq on the television channel that we control. We cannot control Al-Jazeera. We can control our own television channel. We have urged the administration to put Iraqi people speaking in Arabic who have positive things to say about our trying to get water systems back, our trying to get the electricity system back, our getting schools back and going again, and how it is the enemies, their enemies, who are attacking those progressive efforts on our part.

We have urged the administration to get those messages out, not from our people speaking, not talking heads of Americans on our channel, but Iraqis talking to Iraqis about what we are trying to do, what our soldiers and our marines and everyone else are trying to do in Iraq.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I think it can also stimulate us to get our people to perform better, too. So I am glad to work with you on that.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you.

Chairman WARNER. You mentioned the other day when General Abizaid was here—and it is a follow-on because Senator Cornyn on that trip to Iraq brought up this subject, as you did today. You indicated in our discussions here a week ago that you needed to do more in that area, and you have agreed today to do just that.

Senator TALENT. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman WARNER. Yes?

Senator TALENT. I did not want the hearing to close leaving uncontested on the record Senator Nelson's comment that the Florida National Guard was the best in the country. I saw a few eyebrows raised around the table and, as good as the Florida National Guard is, I do not want to leave the record showing that I agree with that comment. [Laughter.]

Senator LEVIN. As a matter of fact, I am glad Senator Talent mentioned that, because in that one regard I think there is total disagreement on this panel. [Laughter.]

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator.

Thank you very much. We are adjourned.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

##### OPERATIONS TEMPO

1. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Wolfowitz, I understood during the hearing that the Department of Defense does not want any additional troops in Iraq. I understand the desire to limit the size of the footprint currently in country. However, I don't think my concern was fully understood. I am concerned about the current strain on the Guard and Reserve component. What can be done to reduce the strain on the Guard and Reserve?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. On September 26, 2003, we had about 166,039 Reserve component personnel mobilized in support of Operations Noble Eagle/Enduring Freedom/Iraqi Freedom. This number represents about 14 percent of the RC force down from a maximum of 218,000 or 18 percent at the peak of operations on April 29, 2003. The Department is reducing the number of Guard and Reserve in theater as operational requirements allow and reducing the pressure on the Guard and Reserves in several ways. Efforts are currently underway to find the right balance to meet the challenges of our country while preserving this valuable resource—our people. To alleviate the strain on the Reserves, Active/Reserve Force mix issues are being addressed in the fiscal year 2004 budget and more will be done in the fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2006 budgets. Some examples include:

1. Moving active and Reserve capabilities within and between warplans to reduce involuntary mobilization during the early days of a rapid response operation.
2. Implementing various innovative management techniques to enhance volunteerism.
3. Expanding the use of reachback to reduce the footprint in theater through virtual connectivity to CONUS locations.
4. Streamlining the mobilization process to provide adequate notification and reduced mobilization timelines.

5. Using alternative manpower resources, such as contractors, civilians, or coalition forces, or mitigating shortfalls through technology when appropriate.

Additionally, the Department has in place a survey program that continuously reviews family and employer issues and concerns to determine whether adjustments to policies are needed.

2. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Wolfowitz, do you think the current size of the Army should be increased from 10 to 12 divisions, not only to relieve the strain on the Guard and Reserve, but also on the rotation of troops from Iraq and to address other worldwide commitments?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. First, let me emphasize that increasing end strength is not a near-term solution for relieving strain on our Guard and Reserve units. It takes several months to recruit, train, and adequately equip newly formed units. The Army leadership is thoroughly examining ways to relieve current stress on our units and better align its active and Reserve capabilities to support current operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the global war on terrorism.

We are not sure if the current pace of military operations will continue for the near future. Adding more end strength is a costly endeavor for our taxpayers, especially if the use of our military declines in the coming months. It is imperative that we continue pursuing ongoing initiatives. At the completion of these efforts, if it is determined that additional end strength or divisions are needed, it will be DOD's responsibility to recommend such adjustments to the President.

3. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Wolfowitz, what can be done immediately, within the next 6 months, to relieve the strain on the active, Guard, and Reserve?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ.

- The Department has taken several measures to reduce the stress on troops deployed in support of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. To that end, rotation policies, rest/recuperation programs, redistribution of specialties, and extended childcare operations are among tools the Department intends to use to alleviate the impact of deployments.
- The Operation Iraqi Freedom rotation policy will provide greater certainty and stability for our deploying service members.
- The Department has recently announced a rest and recuperation (R&R) program that would provide 15 days leave for those expected to serve at least 1 year in contingency locations in direct support of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. At steady state, as many as 800 service members at a time will depart to Frankfurt or one of four locations within the U.S. from which they can further travel to a destination of their choice. In a March 2003 Defense Manpower Data Center survey, respondents indicated that some of the best stress reducers included time with family and friends.
- Our low density/high demand (LD/HD) troops have been under a very challenging deployment schedule. They provide intelligence, command and control, special operations, search and rescue, and air defense support to our combatant commanders. The Services have developed a stress list to identify the LD/HD specialties and realign 3,704 authorizations from the 42 least stressed to the 15 most stressed career fields. Even more important, the Department is conducting an overall review of military billets to determine which could be affected by non-military sources. This would allow even more people to flow to the LD/HD career fields. Our goal is to eliminate today's LD/HD issues.
- On the home front, the Department has expanded childcare operations and subsidies to meet the increased needs of troops maintaining stateside bases. We are also standing up family assistance centers to provide 2,417 telecommunications access to deployed family members.
- Other steps to relieve the strain on the Active, Guard, and Reserve Forces include: use of coalition forces, host-nation support, use of trained Iraqi Nationals, civilian contracted labor, and items that provide technical solutions for security both at CONUS and OCONUS locations.

4. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Wolfowitz, how many troops could we dedicate to Korea if required with the current number of troops in Iraq?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) and Commander, U.S. Forces Korea are confident they have the forces in theater and readily available to deter or, if necessary, defeat any foreseeable North Korean belligerence.



However, operations in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) have put a higher premium on certain low-density, high-demand assets, and made the task of decisively defeating North Korean aggression somewhat more difficult. Military planners, currently scheduling force rotations for Iraq and Afghanistan, are working hard to ensure the United States has sufficient forces available to address any PACOM contingencies. Due to existing operational requirements, any major contingency in the PACOM AOR could require some forces to be deployed with less than ideal recovery time following CENTCOM's AOR duty.

5. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Wolfowitz, how many deployable troops would be available if the operations in Kosovo, Bosnia, the Sinai Peninsula, and Okinawa were reduced?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. The United States currently has slightly over 2,000 military personnel deployed in support of the NATO mission in Kosovo and approximately 1,600 deployed to Bosnia in support of the NATO mission, 800 in the Sinai, and 11,000 in Okinawa.

Since last October the Department of Defense has reduced the force presence in Kosovo by over 2,000 soldiers and in Bosnia by nearly 500 soldiers. The forces in Okinawa are forward-based to be able to rapidly respond to crises in that part of the world. DOD worldwide force presence is constantly evaluated to balance U.S. global commitments and the risk to U.S. interests against the need to support current operations. The Department of Defense is considering all options regarding its worldwide force structure as part of the current force rotation deliberations.

6. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Wolfowitz, how many deployable troops would be available by converting military to civilian positions?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. The number depends on the results of reviews now ongoing. The Department plans to convert military in functions such as law enforcement, personnel support, installation management, administrative support for recruiters, and training development. The converted military will be used to, among other things, provide light infantry and additional high demand capabilities such as military police. The Department is reviewing the potential use of supplemental funds for this purpose. The number of military conversions possible and options for how to best utilize these resources is under review.

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY

##### TROOP SUPPORT

7. Senator KENNEDY. Secretary Wolfowitz, what is the administration including within the supplemental request for our deployed troops that will assist them to overcome some of the financial difficulties associated with protracted deployments?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. The supplemental requests funding for enhanced special pays, including Imminent Danger Pay (IDP), Family Separation Allowance (FSA), and Hardship Duty Pay (HDP) for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) deployed personnel in theater or in direct operational support. The fiscal year 2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-11) increased IDP temporarily by \$75 per person per month (from \$150 to \$225 per month) and FSA by \$150 per month (from \$100 to \$250 per month), effective from October 1, 2002 through September 30, 2003. The Department intends to continue paying IDP and FSA at these increased rates through December 31, 2003.

Beginning on January 1, 2004, the Department's plan is to begin paying an additional \$225 per month in HDP to military personnel serving in OIF/OEF in a combat zone. This would maintain the same level of special pay as IDP and FSA, via increased rates HDP. Further, it would increase the special pay amount for members without dependents, who are serving in those same combat zone locations, by \$150 (these latter members received a \$75 increase in special pay only via IDP) as a result of Public Law 108-11, whereby married members serving alongside them had received a total increase of \$225 (an additional \$75 in IDP and an additional \$150 in FSA).

Moreover, by funding incremental costs associated with the global war on terrorism, the supplemental will obviate the need to divert funds from the regular annual Department of Defense budget. This will help us sustain good quality of life and support for deployed troops and their families.

The Department needs greater flexibility in executing appropriated funds so that it can address its most pressing requirements, some of which would be ways to re-

lieve the strain on deployed forces. To that end, the Department urges congressional approval of the supplemental's request for authority to transfer up to \$5 billion between appropriations.

8. Senator KENNEDY. Secretary Wolfowitz, are there any funds set aside for supporting families of deployed members, such as fully funding the Marine Corps' highly successful One Source program and expanding it across DOD, and if so, how much is included? If there are additional funds for expanding the One Source program, how far will this go toward making the program available to all military families?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Yes, we have \$20 million to support family members of deployed service members in the fiscal year 2004 supplemental request.

We have funding in the fiscal year 2004 President's budget request to expand military One Source across all Services.

9. Senator KENNEDY. Secretary Wolfowitz, are any funds identified to support expanded demands on the Defense Health Program that result from the growth in eligible beneficiary population precipitated by Reserve personnel being activated?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Yes. The funds identified for the Services listed in the DHP section of the supplemental request represent funds to support the health care requirements of activated Guard and Reserve personnel and their family members. The projected requirements are the product of the projected number of full time equivalent National Guard and Reserve personnel activated for the global war on terrorism during fiscal year 2004 multiplied by the per capita rate for health care costs, which is \$2,689 in fiscal year 2004. These funds will support the cost of health care provided to activated National Guard and Reserve personnel and their family whether the care is provided by military treatment facilities or purchased from the private sector. The Service-specific distribution is provided below.

Army .....	\$400,100,000
Navy .....	5,700,000
Marine Corps .....	18,000,000
Air Force .....	101,400,000
Total .....	\$525,200,000

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA

##### OVERSEAS BASING STRATEGY

10. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Wolfowitz, when will this committee receive the results of the overseas basing strategy that is being developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in conjunction with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to support current and future U.S. defense requirements?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. As the President recently noted in a statement, we are intensifying our consultations with Congress and with our friends, allies, and partners on our overseas defense posture review. We have shared detailed outlines of proposed changes with this committee staff and others, and we will continue that process. No decisions have been made.

11. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Wolfowitz, have there been any interim decisions made or steps taken toward any change in our overseas forces either by the commands or the military departments while the overall basing strategy is being developed?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. There have been no decisions to change our overseas posture. We will consult with Congress and our allies and friends to ensure that our decisions support our transformational and operational needs with comprehensive and affordable actions.

12. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Wolfowitz, when will we see basing decisions reflected in the budget? In further fiscal year 2004 revisions, or in the fiscal year 2005 request?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. We anticipate decisions on overseas defense posture to be made during 2004, with initial budgetary implications included in the fiscal year 2006 budget proposal. We will, of course, stay in close consultations with you throughout this process.

13. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Grossman, the Department of Defense is in the process of developing a comprehensive overseas basing strategy to support current and future U.S. defense needs. To what degree have you been consulted by either the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the individual military departments, or the combatant commands in their process of developing this strategy?

Secretary GROSSMAN. We are in the early stages of a senior interagency review, in which we are working closely with the Department of Defense in particular to develop the best possible strategy for U.S. force posture overseas.

14. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Grossman, how would the State Department typically be consulted or involved in this decision process?

Secretary GROSSMAN. The State Department's role in the process will be to provide our expertise and to assess options and their foreign policy implications of changes to our posture. We will also be deeply involved in consulting with allies, partners, friends, and other key countries on our plans as part of the process. Together with the Department of Defense, we will also consult with Congress. Finally, we will play a key role in obtaining, negotiating, and implementing any new or modified agreements central to the transformation.

#### INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING TROOPS

15. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Wolfowitz, the Liberian operation is an example of an international peacekeeping operation that relies mainly on troops from developing countries to ensure stability. We are relying on many of these developing country troops for the current operation in Iraq and may end up relying on many more. These troops often lack the resources, training, and motivation of our own troops. They are underpaid and ill-equipped. Corruption and poor command and control often affect their capability. Have any of these problems affected the current troop deployment by West African states in Liberia?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. The limitations of developing countries to contribute to international peacekeeping operations (PKO) in general are well known, but our past and present programs of support seek to address these limitations. The U.S. pre-positioned equipment in Freetown, Sierra Leone, and U.N. pre-positioned equipment in Brindisi, Italy, address many of the vehicle, communications, and basic equipment shortfalls existing in developing countries for effective participation in PKO. In Liberia, U.S. PKO and Foreign Military Financing funding were used to procure additional necessary equipment for deploying West African militaries. Past training efforts, such as the U.S. Africa Crisis Response Initiative, Operation Focus Relief, and International Military Education and Training programs have helped to leaven West African forces with better-trained personnel. Regarding leadership and motivation, these forces are motivated, generally experienced in peacekeeping, and have good leaders. West Africans do not lack in motivation or peacekeeping experience, only resources. Their readiness for international PKO was confirmed by the U.N. assessment that all Economic Community of West African States Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) troop contributors would be accepted for the U.N. Mission in Liberia.

A review of ECOMIL results suggests this operation was highly successful, albeit with significant U.S. logistics assistance and staff mentoring. With continued security assistance and training focused on enhancing peacekeeping capacity, the militaries of developing countries do make an important contribution to international PKO.

#### CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ

16. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Wolfowitz, General Mahan recently claimed that Army forces were unable to get necessary support in some areas in Iraq because contractors refused to go into some of the most dangerous areas. This is of great concern, particularly if DOD intends, as is reported, to increase its reliance on non-governmental contractors. How is DOD valuing the operational risks involved with increasing contractors on the battlefield in its analyses of whether additional military positions should be outsourced?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. The DOD (and Army specifically) has several policy documents that describe how to design long-term contractual support vehicles that consider operational risks of outsourcing, plan for specific contingencies, and execute contingencies in which contractors play an active role. They do a good job of addressing the risks associated with using contractors on the battlefield. Theater planning by combatant commanders also addresses risk and many of the issues that

arise when using civilian contractors to better prepare the Joint Task Force commander and mitigate the risks in advance. Although risk assessment approaches vary among DOD components, all approaches call for effective risk assessment on the use of contractors on the battlefield and none do anything that jeopardize our warfighting capability.

In light of the increasing use of contractors on the battlefield, the DOD has been working with the RAND Arroyo Center to further examine our decisionmaking and risk assessment processes affecting use of contractors and to recommend improvements. Interim findings from the RAND effort indicate that recent Army doctrine has effectively captured the conceptual risks relevant to using contractors and choosing between contract and organic sources and that Army doctrine on risk assessment provides a reliable framework for improving Army sourcing decisions. RAND further adds that the challenge now is to transform this doctrine into practice by training our personnel in the subtleties of risk analysis relevant to sourcing decisions.

The challenge for commanders at the operational level is how to make the most effective use of contractors and to balance the increased capabilities brought by contractors with the added challenges. Commanders evaluate each function, define the acceptable level of risk, and balance the mix of military and contractor support accordingly. When using civilian contractors, commanders don't necessarily face more risks, but they do face different risks. These benefits and risks must be placed in perspective, properly assessed, and dealt with. For example, use of contractors may actually reduce operational risk because the contractors represent capabilities, or increments thereof, that otherwise may not be available to commanders. However, in accepting that contractor's increased capability, the commander must assess the increased force protection associated with the contractor's presence.

#### HEZBOLLAH

17. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Wolfowitz, in testimony before this committee earlier this year, the Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, said that the Hezbollah is a "more capable organization" than al Qaeda "with a potential for lethality that's quite great." General Sanchez was quoted over the weekend as stating that Hezbollah fighters are now coming into Iraq to attack Americans. If true, this would be, I believe, the first time that this State-sponsored terrorist organization has threatened the United States directly. Are these reports true and could you comment on the danger this organization poses, not only to our troops in Iraq but also to the American homeland?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Director Tenet's sentiments were echoed last year by Deputy Secretary of State Armitage, who described Hezbollah as the terrorist "A Team." We agree with both the DCI and the Assistant Secretary. Hezbollah—an organization supported and nurtured by Iran—remains the most capable terrorist organization in the world. It is well funded, highly motivated, and professional. Although its stated *raison d'être* is Lebanon and the "liberation" of Israel-occupied lands, Hizbollah is a terrorist organization of global reach—a reach that includes the United States. In 2000, for example, law enforcement authorities interdicted a Hezbollah fundraising operation based out of North Carolina. Anti-U.S. operations sponsored or assisted by Hezbollah, should they happen in Iraq, would not be unprecedented. Hizbollah was responsible for and/or implicated in: the destruction of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut in 1983 which killed 17 Americans; the killing of Navy Diver Robert Stethem aboard TWA Flight #847 in 1985; the destruction of the U.S. Marine barracks in 1984, in which 241 Americans were killed; and the blast at Khobar Towers then in 1996 which killed 19 Americans. General Sanchez' comments on Hezbollah presence in Iraq also are true. Hezbollah constitutes a clear and present danger to U.S. and Coalition Forces in Iraq, and elsewhere.

#### INTELLIGENCE

18. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Wolfowitz, so far we have not discovered the weapons of mass destruction that posed an imminent threat to the United States. Indeed, it appears now that our intelligence was less than definitive about the existence of these weapons and that this assessment was perhaps not clearly understood. The Washington Times in a September 3 article states that "Senior U.S. officials, including Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, conceded in recent weeks that the Bush administration failed to predict the guerrilla war against American troops in Iraq." The question I would like to ask you, and you may have to answer this question in a classified response, did

our intelligence fail to predict a guerrilla war or the post-war problems that have surfaced in Iraq?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. The administration did not claim that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction posed an "imminent threat to the United States." The President called it a "grave and growing danger." Nothing in the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) interim report detracts from that statement. Rather the ISG report confirms that Saddam was deceiving the U.N., violating 12 years worth of U.N. Security Council Resolutions, hiding a network of biological weapons laboratories, and developing prohibited longer-range missiles.

Intelligence is hardly ever "definitive." As chief U.S. arms inspector David Kay has said, "[W]hatever we find will probably differ from pre-war intelligence. Empirical reality on the ground is, and has always been, different from intelligence judgments that must be made under serious constraints of time, distance, and information."

Governments make decisions based upon the best information available at the time. The ISG interim report has not undermined the credibility of the intelligence on which we, the Coalition, and the United Nations based our judgments. The ISG report is not final and we look forward to the conclusion of the teams work.

With respect to anticipating post-war developments in Iraq much of our planning effort was directed at dealing with potential disasters that were averted or did not occur. There was no refugee crisis, no mass starvation, no epidemics, very little destruction of the oil infrastructure, and no use of weapons of mass destruction—in part because of the speed and unexpectedness with which our military operations unfolded.

Events that we did not fully anticipate did pose challenges during the post-war phase:

- The extent to which the Iraqi government would simply collapse in the absence of Saddam's terror to sustain it.
  - When the Saddam regime collapsed, 17 of the 21 Iraqi ministries simply evaporated, leaving nothing and no one to work with.
- The extent to which Saddam had allowed the infrastructure to decay, while he devoted resources to armed forces and palaces.

That said, intelligence assessments of the post-war situation did include a broad range of possibilities. Among them were reports of the distribution of arms to regime loyalists.

19. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Wolfowitz, did you see intelligence assessments of post-war problems?

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Yes, I did see such assessments of possible post-war problems. In part we based the planning referred to in our previous answer (question #18) on information provided in these assessments.

#### ELABORATE CROSSBOW

20. Senator AKAKA. General Myers, it is my understanding that the Joint Staff has been coordinating an exercise or planning effort called Elaborate Crossbow. I have heard various references to the results of these deliberations, but the scope and purpose of this effort is not clear to me. Can you describe exactly what Elaborate Crossbow is, what issues it covers, and what happens with the results of the analyses?

General MYERS. Elaborate Crossbow is one of a number of seminar war games the Joint Staff conducted to address different issues concerning our global commitments. The results of these seminars and other efforts help to shape our operational thinking and planning as we work with the combatant commanders and Services to prepare for the future.

#### INTERNATIONAL UNITS IN IRAQ

21. Senator AKAKA. General Myers, does the United States intend to provide any long-term support to the multinational divisions in Iraq?

General MYERS. Currently the United States has contracted, established, and is funding a Logistical Civil Augmentation Plan (LOGCAP) in Iraq that provides basic logistic support to coalition forces. The LOGCAP is being used to provide logistic support for the Multinational Division-Central South, (MND-CS) in support of operations in Iraq. Some of the areas covered by this contract are: leased vehicles, main-

tenance of leased vehicles, feeding, lodging, fuel, power generation, and morale welfare and recreation for the forces assigned to the MND-CS.

22. Senator AKAKA. General Myers, do we expect U.S. forces to be attached to or associated with international units to provide them with logistics, training, or other support on a routine or regular basis? If so, how many United States forces are projected to be involved?

General MYERS. Currently, there are U.S. units working alongside coalition partners. In the Polish sector (Central South), we support their efforts with two military police battalions [deleted], a signal battalion providing communications support [deleted], one Special Forces company [deleted], and four civil affairs battalions conducting civil-military operations [deleted]. In the U.K. sector (southeast), the United States currently has two civil affairs brigades [deleted].

23. Senator AKAKA. General Myers, how much in-kind support do we plan to provide to multinational forces? It is my understanding that we are providing some forces with vehicles, night vision goggles, and other equipment. I would like to know how we intend to ensure the continued readiness of U.S. units that are giving up current or planned equipment to foreign units.

General MYERS. Utilizing Department of State Peacekeeping Operation funds, we have procured approximately \$43 million of personal equipment such as night vision goggles, desert uniforms, body armor, and tactical radios for coalition forces in the Polish-led MND-CS. Vehicles required by this division are being leased commercially through the Logistical Civil Augmentation Plan with costs paid through the \$1.4 billion DOD supplemental for Iraqi operations. The equipment being provided to the MND-CS is not being diverted from operational stocks intended for U.S. soldiers supporting operations in Iraq. Some equipment with long procurement lead-times, such as night vision goggles and radios, have been loaned temporarily to the MND-CS until the procured equipment arrives in theater by mid-November 2003. Similarly, certain vehicles are being temporarily loaned until vehicles leased from commercial sources are delivered in the same timeframe.

The U.S. commanders on the ground in Iraq have not indicated that these temporary loans or procurement of these items have caused any operational impact to U.S. forces in Iraq. When all procured equipment and leased vehicles are distributed to the MND-CS, all loaned U.S.-owned equipment and vehicles will be returned to U.S. units. With vehicles and other equipment required by the MND-CS being in place by mid-November, we anticipate very little loaning of U.S.-owned equipment to multinational forces in the future.

#### ATTACKS IN IRAQ

24. Senator AKAKA. General Myers, with casualties increasing in Iraq, could you speak to the level of sophistication and the number of attacks?

General MYERS. [Deleted.] These are conventional weapons being used in conventional ways, and do not reflect an increase in sophistication. [Deleted.] [Deleted.]

25. Senator AKAKA. General Myers, are the bombs being used in these attacks now more sophisticated and has the number of these attacks increased?

General MYERS. [Deleted.]

#### STATE DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL IN IRAQ

26. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Grossman, there have been press reports suggesting that Ambassador Bremer is understaffed in Iraq and that because of security concerns, even these personnel are restricted in their access to what is happening on the ground. Could you provide us with an estimate of how many State Department personnel are assigned in Iraq and comment, if you can, on their ability to get out in the field and be Ambassador Bremer's eyes and ears?

Secretary GROSSMAN. As of October 24, there are 59 State Department personnel on the ground in Iraq with another 65 in the pipeline. The Department was asked by the Coalition Provisional Authority to fill 110 positions total, and we are working to do so. It is a very fluid situation on the ground in Iraq. State Department officers assigned to Iraq, and all personnel at the Coalition Provisional Authority, are doing admirable work under tough circumstances. Security measures have not kept CPA personnel from doing their job. Throughout the country, they are working closely with Iraqis to lay the foundations for participatory democracy by establishing local

governing institutions. These neighborhood and municipal councils have provided a transparent forum for local leaders to address local needs. Even in less secure areas like Tikrit, CPA representatives have been able to meet regularly with tribal leaders and religious leaders to gain insight into local views and sensitivities.

[Whereupon, at 2:15 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

